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The Ottoman-Venetian Border (15th-18th Centuries) 
Maria Pia Pedani
Abstract
The aim of this book is to study the development of frontier and border relations be-
tween Christian and Muslim countries at the end of the Middle Ages and in the Modern 
Age. Few essays have been written about the Ottoman border in the Modern Age: when 
and how it was created, how it developed and which documents were produced to 
establish it. Some documents that have been recently discovered show that a proper 
border already existed at the end of the fifteenth century, at least in some regions of the 
Empire. The first chapter deals with the words used both in Europe and in the Islamic 
world to express the idea of frontier, border, boundary and other related concepts. 
Then, the second chapter tackles the concept of frontier in general. A further field of 
study is represented by the relations that took place in a frontier region; about this 
subject, several examples are provided by the contacts between the subjects of the 
Republic of Venice and those of the Ottoman Empire. For many centuries, also the sea 
was considered to be only a frontier, crossed by ships of corsairs, pirates, levends and 
regular fleets. In the third chapter, the author analyses how a land-border was usually 
established. The first Ottoman border with a Christian state seems to have been that 
with the Republic of Venice. The fourth chapter describes the society that lived in a 
border region. The fifth chapter deals with the Mediterranean. In general, Europeans 
and Muslims had different opinions about the possession of the sea: on the one hand, 
the former thought that it belonged to everyone and no sovereign could presume to 
rule over it; on the other, the latter thought it could belong to a prince. A border is not 
only a line established on the ground. It may also be everything that separates two dif-
ferent ways of thinking and living. In this logic, the elements used to identify ‘the other’ 
become more and more important. The sixth and the seventh chapters deal with the 
means used to recognise a foreigner and the people who crossed a border. Signs were 
put on things, but also human bodies might be signed for ever; the behaviour was also 
another important element that divided the subjects of a ruler from those of another; 
also the way of imagining ‘the other’ varied according to the centuries, above all as 
far as Christians and Muslims were concerned. The development of the means used 
to identify a group or a person are also of special interest. With the appearance of new 
documents of personal identification, the study of the passage from the concept of 
frontier to that of border may be considered to be complete. A slow development that, 
in the sphere of Christian-Muslim relations, had begun in the Middle Ages had finally 
reached long-lasting results. Nowadays, new technical devices allow us to create new 
borders; they are no longer linked to the idea of space, but to the image individuals 
offer of themselves as well as to the way of living and considering our and others’ time.
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Preface
In 1996 I published a work about Christian-Muslim peace agreements 
between the Middle Ages and the Modern Era.1 On writing it, I discovered 
how important it was to establish a borderline to maintain good relations 
between neighbouring states. Thus, I turned to this topic and focused on 
the Ottoman Empire. Few papers had been published about this subject 
till that moment. In 1969 Rifa‘at Abou el-Haj described the Ottoman-Hab-
sburg frontier;2 from that time onwards, scholars went on repeating his 
words over and over again and the idea that Ottomans left the frontier to 
create their first real borderline only after the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699) 
became an unquestionable historical truth. As for me, I had at my disposal 
the huge amount of documents kept in the Venetian State Archives that 
gave a different version on the matter and also provided a vivid account of 
the life along the Ottoman-Venetian border zone. In 2000 I published my 
first paper dealing with the idea of frontier3 and, in 2001, I wrote about 
sea borders and the so-called Triplex Confinium, i.e. the place where the 
Venetian, Ottoman and Habsburg empires met.4
In 2002 I organized the material I had gathered in the previous years 
and wrote this book. It was, however, written in Italian, as it had been 
suggested by some of my colleagues, but this fact prevented it from be-
ing widely known, since few scholars interested in the Ottoman Empire 
know this language. Then, I wrote other papers in Italian and English on 
the same topic.5 In the meanwhile, other historians began to be interested 
in this subject6 and some of them, who did not know my language, asked 
1 Pedani, La dimora della pace. 
2 Abou-El-Haj, The Formal Closure of the Ottoman Frontier in Europe, 467-475.
3 Pedani, The Ottoman Venetian Frontier, 171-177.
4 Pedani, Spunti per una ricerca sui confini del mare. Gli Ottomani nel Mediterra-
neo, 221-239; Das Triplex Confinium. Diplomatische Probleme nach dem Karlowitz 
Frieden, 115-120.
5 Pedani, Cristiani e musulmani nel Mediterraneo, 239-251; Beyond the Frontier. The 
Ottoman-Venetian Border in the Adriatic Context from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth 
Centuries, 45-60; The Border from the Ottoman Point of View, 195-214; Ottoman Mer-
chants in the Adriatic, 155-172.
6 One of the first books with papers on this subject was Constructing Border Societies 
on the Triplex Confinium, ed. by Drago Roksandić and Nataša Štefanec in 2000.
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For the transliteration of Arabic words the following characters have been used:
a, ā, b, t, ṯ, ǧ, ḥ, ḫ, d, ḏ, r, z, s, š, ṣ, ḍ, ṭ, ẓ, ‘, ġ, f, q, k, l, m, n, h, u, ū, w, i, ī, y.
me information about the Ottoman-Venetian border. Thus, I realized that 
it was time to publish an English translation of this text but I did not want 
to change it or to revise its bibliography: it would have meant to change 
it or even to write another book. I preferred to leave it as it was since I 
am sure that it still has a lot to say to historians interested not only in 
the Ottoman Empire but also in the Venetian Republic and, in general, in 
Muslim-Christian relations. 
I want to thank here only Mariateresa Sala who translated this book so well 
and always kindly met all my requirements.
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1 The Words
Summary 1.1 Comparisons. – 1.2 Frontier. – 1.3 Taġr. – 1.4 Limes. – 1.5 Munāṣafa. – 1.6 Dār al-
ṣulḥ. – 1.7 Border. – 1.8 Ḥadd, sınır, hudud. – 1.9 Ġazw and gaza. – 1.10 Militärgrenze.
1.1 Comparisons
At the beginning of his book on the creation of the Ottoman state, Cemal 
Kafadar states, by means of a nice image, that Osman was for the Ottomans 
what Romulus was for the Romans, namely the eponymous hero of a politi-
cal community that succeeded in a foreign land.1 Proceeding along the same 
path, however, some antithetical elements may be noticed: Romulus began 
his adventure as the sovereign and the priest who marked out the primeval 
furrow of the city of Rome carving the ground with his ploughshare; cross-
ing it, and therefore negating that holy border, spelt death for his brother 
Remus. Romulus’ power lay in that furrow, in that split between the sacred 
and the profane, in that partition of competencies: in that idea of border. 
On the contrary, the so-called ‘classical’ historiography about the Otto-
man Empire stressed the fact that Osman was a gazi, son of a gazi, that is 
to say a warrior who fought along the farthest frontier of the dār al-islām 
to defend and spread the faith. This is the so-called ‘ideology of the holy 
war’, namely a thesis that was advocated by Paul Wittek in the 30s of the 
twentieth century and that was never challenged before his death.2 On the 
one hand, there is the rex, who is invested with power by gods, marks out 
a straight line and creates not only a territory but also the regula, the law. 
On the other, there is the gazi who, fighting the ǧihād, moves the frontier 
further and further; the frontier is a vague and moving area where every-
thing mingles and changes and it holds in itself the idea of a confrontation 
with a hostile element, while the law for which the gazi fights is the Islamic 
one that joins religion and state and divides the world into two opposing 
entities: the dār al-islām, whose future success is certain, and the dār al-
ḥarb, namely the land of the infidels doomed to a defeat.3
1 Kafadar, Between Two Worlds, 1.
2 Wittek, The Rise of the Ottoman Empire. 
3 Mélikoff, Ghāzī, 1068-1069; Johnstone, Ghazw, 1079-1080.
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In the history of the first Ottomans, therefore, two well-defined ideologies 
would clash: on the one hand, there is the idea of border that was handed 
down by the Romans to the succeeding European states; on the other, there 
is the idea – which is of Islamic origin – of a frontier that is always expanding, 
to which only the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699) put an end by the force of arms. 
If historiography could reckon only with theories, and not with facts, the ques-
tion would be perfect and complete in itself. It remained as such for decades. 
Wittek himself did not delve into the subject of the Ottoman Empire’s frontier, 
even though it was one of the bearers of his theory. Only in the last two dec-
ades, in the wake of the critical review of the ‘ideology of the holy war’ as the 
asset of the Ottoman advance, were specialised essays devoted to the idea of 
frontier/border between Christian and Muslin countries. Various aspects have 
been considered: not only political and military, but also religious, social and 
economic ones. At the same time, scholars also realised that, throughout the 
Middle Ages, the idea of border, which has been inherited from the Roman 
world, underwent changes due to the bursting of alien elements belonging to 
other cultures: those who are usually defined as barbarians brought different 
ways to consider and live one’s own and other people’s space into the Roman 
culture while, at the same time, the law men obeyed started to depend only 
on the group they belonged to and not on the country where they lived.
1.2 Frontier
Frontier and border are not synonyms, even though one often tends to 
employ them without perceiving their correct meaning. The frontier is a 
belt of territory that holds in itself the idea of ‘front’: the enemy who may 
advance or fall back is beyond it. The same applies to the French frontière, 
the Italian frontiera and the Spanish frontera. This term appeared in the 
Iberian peninsula for the first time: in Ramiro I of Aragon’s first will, which 
was drawn up in the year 1097 of the Spanish era, equivalent to 1059 AD, 
we find the expression «ad castros de fronteras de mauros que sunt pro 
facere»; also in his second will of 1061 AD, we read «in castellos de fron-
teras de mauros qui sunt per fare et in castellos qui sunt in fronteras per 
facere»; at last, in a third act of the following year, the sovereign himself 
stated: «et tu quod cavallero et franco sedeas quomodo homine debet esse 
in frontera francho et caballero». With regard to the first use of the word 
‘frontier’, it may be observed that, first of all, it appeared in a military en-
vironment linked to the state power; then, that it was used to refer not to 
a defence line but to a dynamic space turned towards the Muslim enemy 
and, finally, that the term was linked to a behaviour that was necessarily 
The Ottoman-Venetian Border (15th-18th Centuries) Pedani
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far from set patterns and characteristic of a land of conquest and freedom.4
The idea of frontier as an entity that is essentially political and mili-
tary was then mainly used in the French state ambit, since Valois’ times 
to Richelieu’s, and was later welcomed by European historiography in 
general. On the contrary, the American epic made the frontier a passage 
area that was open to any possibility and where the enemy was the hostile 
nature in place of the neighbour: it became a region inhabited by free and 
self-sufficient men. American historians were notably influenced by this 
concept, which was later passed on to overseas colleagues too. Moreover, 
it should be underlined that right in the US, in the 20s of the twentieth 
century, Frederick Jackson Turner was perhaps the first to regard the 
frontier as a valid historiographic subject and to dedicate a volume to 
it, even though this was focused on the history of his country and on the 
meaning the concept had had in that reality;5 it was mainly by means of 
his work that the American idea of frontier spread to the extent that it 
influenced also people that studied completely different contexts: it was 
the case of Wittek as for the origin of the Ottoman Empire, or of Claudio 
Sanchez Albornoz as for the Christian advance in Spain.6
Originally, however, speaking of frontier meant, first of all, making ref-
erence to two opposing worlds, the Christian and the Muslim ones, which 
shared out the Iberian peninsula.
1.3 Ṯaġr
According to Philip Sénac,7 the idea of bounding the space does not seem 
to have been an important element in the ancient Arab-Muslim civilisation 
of Spain; for instance, in al-Andalus, the frontier was not a line but an area. 
Thus, in the Omayyad era, once the Ebro Valley had been conquered, it 
began to be identified as al-Ṯaġr al-a‘lā, the upper frontier (or marchland).
The word ṯaġr (plural ṯuġūr) was, therefore, used in this way by Arab 
writers. It comes from the root ṯġr, which holds an idea of opening, mouth 
and, thus, of frontier and teeth. It cannot be found in the Koran but in the 
pre-Muslim poetry; it appears also in some ḥadīṯ: Abū Dāwūd al-Siǧistānī 
(d. 275 AH/889 AD) uses it right with the meaning of frontier referring to 
4 Du Cange, Glossarium, vol. 3, 421; Sénac, Islam et Chrétienté, 100-101; Sénac, Ad castros 
de fronteras, 205-221.
5 Turner, The Frontier in American History, 1-38.
6 Bazzana, Guichard, Sénac, La frontière, 56-57; Power, Introduction, 1-12.
7 Sénac, Islam et Chrétienté, 106; La frontière et les hommes, 109-114.
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the caliph ‘Umar’s era.8 During the Ottoman advance in Asia Minor, this 
word was used to mean, par excellence, the regions of the north of Syria 
and Mesopotamia close to the Byzantine Empire. Within these confines, 
ṯuġūr, in the plural, evoked the line of strongholds that guarded the likely 
arrival of the basileus’ armies, beyond which a proper no man’s land ex-
tended, purposely depopulated by Heraclius (610-642) when he withdrew 
from Syria; the basileus had purposely ravaged the plain of Cilicia between 
the Anti-Taurus and the Taurus to defend Anatolia and Armenia, pushing 
away its garrisons and its inhabitants. This area was subject to recurrent 
attacks and was called al-ḍawāḥī, i.e. the outside place, the exterior, or else 
ḍawāḥī al-Rūm. On this side, a compact territory with a series of strong-
holds extended. These were known as al-‘awāṣim (or the protectresses) 
since Hārūn al-Rašīd’s times (786-809) and the warriors could take refuge 
there after their raids.9
In the singular, the word ṯaġr was also used for meaning the big har-
bours of the Syrian coastline – Tripoli, Sidon, Tyre and Acre – that safe-
guarded against enemy attacks coming from the sea.10 With the meaning 
of commercial stronghold, it may be found in the Mamluks’ times in Egypt: 
the Muslim ṯuġūr were the harbours ‘protected [by God]’, frequented by 
infidel consuls and merchants, mainly Venetians, but Florentines too. Two 
documents written in Arabic at the turn of the fifteenth century state: “in 
the previous kings’ time, their consuls and merchants had frequented the 
Muslim ṯuġūr to sell and buy just like the Venetians’ little state did”.11 In 
the documents of the time, Alexandria almost seems to be the ṯaġr par ex-
cellence, even though it shared that appellative with Damietta, Ashkelon, 
Tyre, Sidon and other seaboard towns, just like Crete, Cyprus, Sicily and 
other islands were called al ṯuġūr al-ǧazariyya.12
In the Far West, instead, as we saw, ṯaġr was widely used to mean the 
areas close to the realms of the north of al-Andalus and, more generally 
speaking, took on the meaning of ‘marchland’. The most recent histori-
ography believes that, in this region, the system of the recruiting centres 
(ǧund, plural aǧnād) that the Omayyad caliphs had constituted in Syria was 
8 Cf. Manzano Moreno, La Frontera de al-Andalus, 31.
9 Canard, al-‘awāṣim, 783-784; Keiko, Migration and Islamisation, 87-91.
10 Miquel, La perception de la frontière, 130-131; Bianquis, Les frontières de la Syrie, 140; 
Bonner, The Naming of the Frontier, 17-21.
11 «Ai tempi dei re predecessori, i loro consoli e i loro mercanti avessero frequentato i 
tuġūr musulmani per vendere e comprare al pari del piccolo stato dei veneziani» [translation 
of the Author of the text]. See Amari, I diplomi arabi, 184-209 (year 1496); see also 218-220 
(year 1507).
12 For example, cf. al-Qalqašandī, Ṣubḥ, vol. 10, 357, 439, 446; vol. 11, 32, 405; Udovitch, 
Islamic Treatise, 37-38.
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re-created, giving the name of ṯuġūr to those that were placed in frontier 
areas. Thus, the territory of Saragossa and the entire north-eastern region 
of al-Andalus were called ‘the upper frontier’ (al-ṯaġr al-a‘lā) or ‘the re-
mote frontier’ (al-ṯaġr al-aqṣā), while the area near the central Cordillera 
was known as ‘the middle frontier’ (al-ṯaġr al-awsaṭ) or ‘the near frontier’ 
(al-ṯaġr al-adnā).13
The word ṯaġr, therefore, generally indicated an area of encounter or 
clash between Christians and Muslims: on the one side, there was the dār 
al-islām, of which it was a part; on the other, there was the dār al-ḥarb: to 
take it into account, observers must necessarily place themselves on the 
Muslim side. Once the frontier had been violated, the ǧihād (the legal war) 
became a duty for the Muslim sovereign. Among his tasks, as a matter of 
fact, there were the support to religion, the maintenance of a correct fis-
cal administration and the safeguard of the frontiers,14 namely the ṯuġūr 
al-muslimīn that, at least theoretically, could never move back. It was not 
a constantly expanding frontier, however: for instance, right in the Iberian 
peninsula, after the Battle of Poitiers (732), in front of a Christian front 
that kept advancing, a Muslim one was founded, but this tended to switch, 
even though it was politically, socially and economically more definite.15
1.4 Limes
In the course of time, the Muslim frontier in the Iberian peninsula shrank 
more and more. Even though there are the due differences, a similar 
contraction occurred also in the case of another state entity whose expan-
sion, almost theoretically, should have had no limits: the Roman Empire, 
an “imperium sine fine” as Virgil writes. The concept of limes came about 
right with regard to the Roman troops’ advance.
In general, the limes is considered to be a fortified line placed in defence 
of the Empire; however, this word underwent several changes throughout 
the centuries. According to Benjamin Isaac, three phases may be identi-
fied in its evolution: a) in the first century AD, in a moment of expansion, 
it meant the military road built to penetrate into the enemy territory; b) 
13 Manzano Moreno, La Frontera de al-Andalus, 44-69.
14 Laoust, La pensée, 56. According to al-Māwardī, the defence of the frontiers is the fifth 
of the caliph’s ten personal obligations.
15 Cf. Manzano Moreno, The Creation of a Medieval Frontier, 38-40; the author recalls 
that, according to Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 150AH/767AD), the transformation of the dār al-Islām into 
the dār al-ḥarb was possible in three circumstances at least: when non-Muslim laws were 
enforced, when the dār al-ḥarb was near and when Muslims’ life and goods were not safe. 
The problem of the passage from an entity to the other came up again with colonialism (cf. 
Pedani, La dimora della pace, 54).
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from the first to the third century, it was adopted to define a frontier region 
of the Empire, without referring to military structures; c) from the fourth 
century onwards, it was a frontier district with a connotation that was 
more administrative than military, while the turres and the praetendurae 
that studded it were, above all, an element of political control of the ter-
ritory.16 S.T. Parker, on the contrary, points out that, throughout the second 
century, a ‘scientific frontier’ was created. He uses the adjective ‘scientific’ 
because it was either marked by a series of forts linked by roads or made 
of an uninterrupted barrier such as, for example, the Hadrian’s Wall.17
Since the Roman Empire extended up to the Persian borders, the con-
cept of limes did not belong only to Europe, but also to the Near East. 
According to George Tate, the frontier between Byzantium and Persia in 
the north of Syria and Mesopotamia underwent a drastic change around 
the seventh century: between the fourth and the seventh century, it looked 
like a linear series of forts and fortified towns linked by roads; between 
the seventh and the eleventh century, when Muslims made their appear-
ance and became more and more dangerous, the situation changed and 
the line became an area that, moreover, was placed no more according to 
the north-south axis, but in an east-west direction.18
 1.5 Munāṣafa
Even though it is rarely used, another word deserves to be taken into 
account when we talk about frontiers, borders and territories divided be-
tween Christian and Muslim countries: it is the Arab word munāṣafa (fifty-
fifty, co-ownership). The text of the armistice reached between the Mamluk 
sultan Baybars and the Hospitallers of al-Marqab on the 1st ramaḍān 
669/13 April 1271, thoroughly debated by Urbain Vermeulen,19 explains 
what this word means in detail: namely a territory that is placed under a 
joint sovereignty. More specifically, this agreement implied that buildings 
and produces, tilled lands and deserted areas, rights, duties, income taxes 
on the al-Marqab’s suburbs and the neighbouring area pertained both to 
the sultan and the knights, and that the customs of the country could not 
be modified. Both states were responsible for the safety of those passing 
from the Muslim territory to the Christian one, and vice versa, and they 
both had also to jointly supply men for the escorts. With regard to the 
16 Isaac, The Meaning, 125-147.
17 Parker, Romans and Saracens, 7-9.
18 Tate, Frontière et peuplement, 151-155.
19 Vermeulen, Le traité, 123-131; Holt, Early Mamluk Diplomacy, 34-35.
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criminal law, Muslims had to be judged according to the šarī‘a, but the 
proceeds of fines and penalties had to be confiscated and shared between 
the two parties. If the goods that had to be seized belonged to a Muslim 
merchant or a dimmī living in the sultan’s lands, the latter would confis-
cate them; instead, if they were of a Christian who came from Christian 
areas, then they would be due to the knights. Also police’ tasks had to be 
carried out jointly, since the Mamluk officers guarded the Muslims, while 
the Hospitallers’ ones repressed the Christians’ abuses; however, nobody 
could be imprisoned without the consent of both parties and the fugitives 
– Christians as well as Muslims – had to be sent back to their place of ori-
gin; in that case, even the Churches could not grant the right of asylum to 
a Muslim that sought refuge there. Finally, the inhabitants of al-Marqab 
and its suburbs could not come into contact with the inhabitants of the 
close citadel of al-‘Ullayqa, neither could they allow anybody to enter the 
sultan’s territories with malicious intent. Further clauses concerned the 
prohibition for the knights to restore crumbling buildings and fosses; even 
some jobs that had already been undertaken had to be interrupted.
The last two conditions concern the mobility of the population and of the 
knights themselves and the restoration of houses and fortifications; they 
clearly represent the Christians’ waiver of a part of their sovereignty in the 
Muslim sovereign’s favour: it was not an agreement with equal rights and 
duties. The political and military situation proves it: Le Crac des Cheva-
liers (Ḥiṣn al-Akrād) had been conquered a few days before; a few years 
later, in 1285, al-Marqab would suffer the same fate. It is interesting to 
note, however, the idea of munāṣafa that equated Christians and Muslims 
living in the same territory as for safety and coexistence, while the rev-
enues were shared by the two states. Thus, even for a very short period, 
two ancient enemies created a state where Christians and Muslims lived 
together, each of whom kept their own law, while the police and escort 
services were jointly performed.
The agreement that was reached by Baybars and the Hospitallers of al-
Marqab was not the only one that implied a kind of co-ownership between 
Franks and Muslims, even though it is probably the best known. Looking 
at the historians’ papers, we find out that there were other agreements of 
this kind; for instance, the one signed by Baldwin I of Jerusalem in 1108-
1109, which implied that a third of the revenues of the territory east of 
the Jordan Valley went to Damascus’ authorities and two thirds to Franks 
and peasants.20
20 Holt, Early Mamluk Diplomacy, 8.
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1.6 Dār al-ṣulḥ
Throughout the centuries, then, not only times of war between Christians 
and Muslims followed one another, but also times in which the agree-
ments were kept. It is enough to quickly count the years of peace and war 
throughout the almost five centuries of relations between the Republic of 
Venice and the Ottoman Empire to realise that the years of peaceful or 
armed coexistence outnumbered the years of open war by far, even though 
Venetian historiography usually depicts ‘the Turk’ as the enemy par excel-
lence. It cannot be always clear what sultans and viziers really thought of 
a state that agreed to pay thousands of ducats for the renewal of a peace 
agreement or to keep territories, such as Cyprus or Zakinthos, that were 
officially under Ottoman sovereignty. Their point of view varied accord-
ing to the periods of greater or lesser Ottoman power. Some documents 
of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries contain words that make us 
think about, for example, the use of the word zâbit (officer) with reference 
to the doge of Venice, or else of haraç (Arab ḫarāǧ) to mean the tax Vene-
tians paid for Cyprus and Zakinthos, or the statement that the Republic 
was under the sultan’s ‘protection’. All these expressions shift towards the 
thesis that, sometimes, Ottomans regarded Venice as a somehow tributary 
state. Some other papers speak of the Republic’s devotion (ubudiyet), sub-
mission and obedience (itaat ve inkıyad) and of a akd-i maun or akd-i ahd 
between the two states. All the letters written in such harsh and incisive 
a language belong to the second half of the sixteenth century or the first 
half of the seventeenth century and were addressed to the doge either by 
Ottoman princes or by the Porte’s high-ranking officials. The sultan usually 
expressed himself in that way only when he wrote to his own subordinates 
and not when he directly addressed the Republic.21
By now, we cannot refrain from observing that, in the Muslim law, there 
is a concept that could fit this specific case, even though it is not welcomed 
by all legal schools and, in particular, by the Ḥanafi one, followed by the 
majority of Ottomans. It is the dār al-ṣulḥ or dār al-‘ahd, namely a terri-
tory where the war condition is somehow suspended. It was recognised by 
the Šāfi‘ī school, who specifically regarded it as a land of infidels whose 
inhabitants, in exchange for a kind of protectorate, paid a joint ḫarāǧ to 
the Muslim ruler. Once peacetime ended, however, the dār al-ṣulḥ fell 
21 ASVe, LST, f. II, c. 105, no. 127 (1562, prince Selim to the doge); f. III, c. 118, no. 296 
(1576, the Grand Vizier Mehmed pasha to the doge and the Seigniory); f. IV, c. 138, no. 433 
(1589, Sinan pasha to the doge); NB f. IV, cc. 154-155, no. 443/A where the agreements with 
the ‘king of Vienna’ are called ahd ve aman and ahd ve misak; Pedani, Documenti turchi, no. 
1163; Pedani, La dimora della pace, 38; cf. also Gökbilgin, Le relazioni, 289 (1548, Sokollu 
Mehmed pasha states that Venice is an allied Republic, like all the Ottoman countries); 
Lesure, Notes et documents, 131-132.
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under one of the two previous categories again and became either dār 
al-ḥarb or dār al-islām. As often happens in the Muslim law, this theory 
originated from an episode of the Prophet’s life and, precisely, from the 
agreement made by Muḥammad and the Christian population of Najran. 
Another striking example was the peace reached in 31/652 between the 
emir ‘Abd Allāh ibn Sa‘d and the Nubians. The concept of dār al-ṣulḥ usu-
ally is not clearly defined and, according to David Santillana, the existence 
of a neutral land, neither dār al-ḥarb nor dār al-islām, is a legal institution 
unknown to the Muslim law.22
1.7 Border
The idea of border as a line or a furrow cut in the ground was part of the 
Roman world since its founding myth. The king-priest who founded Rome 
reproduced the cosmic order on earth; he had the task of regere fines. For 
Romans, the cardo and the decumanus were at the root of the orientation 
of every town and the cardo had the same direction of the celestial axis, 
whereas the decumanus went from east to west, following the course of 
the sun.23 During the fifth century, however, the Western Roman Empire 
ended and the so-called barbarians introduced a different culture. There-
fore, for instance, in the De Bello Gallico, Julius Caesar tells that Germanic 
peoples used to devastate the borderlands since they considered the terra 
vacua safer than the land where a different people lived (4.3, 6.10, 6.23). 
Thus, the word marka that comes from the word ‘wood’ of the old Gothic 
German language was then used to mean a district placed right close to 
the border.24 In English, but not in Italian, there are two words for border 
that do not exactly coincide: one is the border, namely the state border, 
identifiable with a line; the other is the boundary, namely an ideal border, 
which includes neighbouring peoples who share the same culture, land 
and blood. Thus, in practice, border and boundary can or cannot coincide.
Luciano Lagazzi set up the idea of an external and agrarian border, 
derived from the Roman centuriation, against the idea of a circular, cen-
tralised border, coming from nomadic peoples. The Medieval parchments 
show that the borders of monastic or private estates often bounded a cir-
cular area, whose centre was represented by a building: in the first half 
of the seventh century, for instance, the monastery of Bobbio possessed 
22 Santillana, Istituzioni, vol. 1, 90-91; İnalcık, Dār al-‘ahd, 116; MacDonald [Abel], Dār 
al-Ṣulḥ, 131; Pedani, La dimora della pace, 6-7; Vercellin, Istituzioni, 27-28.
23 Piccaluga, Terminus, 174; Benveniste, Il vocabolario, 295; Zanini, Significati del con-
fine, 6-8.
24 Werkmüller, Gli alberi come segno di confine, 465.
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four miles of the land around it. In that period, there were borders marked 
by heaps of stones or rivers or mountains as well as borders identified by 
more intangible elements such as the sound. In the Chronicon Novalicense, 
Charlemagne gratified the Longobard jester who had taken him to un-
known lanes to avoid Desiderius’ army and gave him all the land where 
the sound of his horn played from the top of the mountain could be heard. 
Still today, on the Belluno mountains, parishes’ borders follow the trend 
of the valleys, marked only by the sound of the churches’ bells.25
Besides the quadrangular typology there was also a territory structured 
in a circular way. It was the contribution of a nomadic economy made of 
hunting and harvesting. During a halt, men drove a stone, a pole or a pike 
into the ground to re-found the space and re-create the cosmic order: in 
this way, the surrounding area became habitable, safe and protected by 
god. Only another equally holy element, like river water, could interrupt 
this circle and create a different border, as the Danube waters did during 
the barbarian invasions. Turks and Mongols as well as Avars and Huns 
were among the nomadic peoples that used to create a holy space in this 
way.26 The elements at our disposal allow us to make only vague hypothesis 
of old ties between different cultures.
While the idea of border changed in this way, territorial and juridical bor-
ders split asunder in the West. Lege romana vivens, lege langobardorum 
vivens, lege salica vivens… These sentences abound in Medieval notarial 
deeds at least since the Carolingian era until the twelfth century: they 
are used for men obeying different laws but involved in the same legal 
transaction or living in the same area. All individuals made reference only 
to the law of their own ethnic group and not to that of the country where 
they were. This idea had a nomadic origin, belonged also to the European 
society for a long time, and was in force when Franks, Longobards and 
other peoples shared the same land.
 1.8 Ḥadd, sınır, hudud
It has often – and rightly – been repeated that, since its foundation, the 
Muslim state was not bound up with territorial divisions, that Islam’s im-
passable borders regard gender or relations with the neighbour and not 
those marked on the land and based on artificial conventions, and that 
they do not prevent the transfer of people and concepts from one area 
25 Alessio, Cronaca di Novalesa, 154-155 (it should be noted that who suggests this system 
is not a Frank, but rather a Longobard); Lagazzi, Segni sulla terra, 32-36.
26 Eliade, Immagini e simboli, 38-54; Zanini, Significati del confine, 42-43; Goetz, Concepts 
of Realm, 78; Roux, La religione dei turchi, 288-291.
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to another. The idea of a clear-cut separation of states, sanctioned by a 
border line, however, was not completely extraneous to the history of 
Muslim peoples, at least in practice. If, on the one hand, among the ca-
liph’s duties, there was the defence of the strongholds along the frontier, 
on the other, the historical circumstances sometimes led to settlements 
that could provide for a proper border: for example, the story goes that 
Abū ‘Ubayda, one of the Prophet’s companions, and some Christians of 
the north of Syria granted a truce of one year, and that a line of demarca-
tion – symbolised by a column on which there was Heraclius’ portrait († 
641), the ruling Byzantine emperor – was placed between the territories 
of the Christians and those of the Muslims; later on, according to a leg-
end, probably of Christian origin, an eye of the image was destroyed by 
mistake and, as a reparation, an eye of one of the caliph ‘Umar’s statues 
was equally disfigured.27
In Arabic, as well as in Ottoman, the word ḥadd (plural ḥudūd) is used 
to mean the border. It expresses the concept of an object that is sharp like 
a knife blade or, else, a mountain ridge. Arab geographers used this term 
to mean, in general, any limit and, especially, the dār al-islām one; ḥadd 
became also the technical term used to mean the sanction of certain acts 
that were forbidden or sanctioned with punishments in the Koran and 
considered to be crimes against religion. The Arabic word passed on to 
Ottoman (hudud) to mean, above all but not exclusively, the state border: 
ehl-i hudud were the inhabitants of the frontier areas, namely the guardi-
ans of the spirit of the war against the infidels. Instead, had was the limit 
and, especially, the individual limit that was bound up with the behaviour 
rules of an individual who was fully integrated into the Ottoman society. 
The had of a person was determined by factors such as the social or fam-
ily environment, the class one belonged to, the rank one had achieved: 
within this sphere, everyone was rather free to act, and this was greatly 
important mainly for those who operated in the state apparatus: crossing 
that border and invading other people’s space was considered to be coarse, 
uncivil and a complete lack of etiquette.28
Besides the word hudud, Ottomans used the word sınır, or sınur (from 
súnoros, ‘neighbouring’ in greek). Even though they are synonyms – and, 
thus, used in the same way –, the second term was mainly used to mean the 
limits within the Ottoman state, such as for example the borders of the vak-
fs, while hudud was preferably used for sea and water borders; sınır was 
used also in the second half of the fifteenth century to identify the imperial 
27 Piacentini, Il pensiero militare, 26; Scarcia Amoretti, Il mondo musulmano, 40; Laoust, 
La pensée, 56; Manzano Moreno, Christian-Muslim Frontier, 88; Grabar, Arte islamica, 63, 
100-101.
28 Miquel, La perception de la frontière, 130; Carra de Vaux, Schacht, Ḥadd, 21-22; Shaw, 
L’impero ottomano, 97-98.
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documents establishing borders with foreign countries (called sınırname), 
but later hududname was preferred. The sınırname beratı, instead, were 
the imperial diplomas that defined the borders of a territory or an estate 
given to a governor or to an important man. At last, in some documents – 
according to my experience, mainly the seventeenth-eighteenth century 
ones –, the two terms were used together in the formula hudud ve sınır.29
 1.9 Ġazw and gaza
According to Colin Heywood, Ottomans had clear ideas as to the difference 
between the border meant as line (hudud/sınır) and the frontier meant as 
area or marchland (uc). According to Wittek’s well-known theory of the 
‘holy war’, which will be later more widely referred to, this was the limit, 
the furthermost point, the end, beyond which the land of unbelief extended 
and whose inhabitants were the keepers of the spirit of the raid against the 
infidels (gaza in Turkish and ġazw in Arabic). Some historians, however, 
considered the fact that theory and facts do not always match of minor 
importance. As a matter of fact, the uc were the marchlands that existed 
only in the Balkan area, in the west of the Empire, and not towards the 
Muslim Persia. Maḥmūd al-Kāšġarī, who wrote a dictionary of Turkish in 
Arabic in the eleventh century, regarded uc, namely the border of a coun-
try (el), as a translation of the word ṯaġr. Other historians, from Imber 
to Heywood himself, observed that the most ancient Ottoman chronicles 
employed the word gazi as a synonym of alp (hero) or akıncı, (the raider of 
the frontier), as Aḥmedī himself (about 1400) says in his İskendernâme.30
The Balkan marchlands were ruled by ucbeyis (i.e. the lords of the fron-
tier), and they were some of the very few Ottoman estates bequeathed to 
the owner’s descendants and not given back to the sultan after his death. 
29 Kreisler, Osmanische Grenzbeschreibungen, 165-172; Kolodziejczyk, Ottoman-Polish 
Diplomatic Relations, 58; Pedani, The Ottoman Venetian Frontier, 171-177. A Greek docu-
ment of 10 July [1480] (Documenti turchi, no. 17) was defined sınırname in the subsequent 
Venetian-Ottoman peace of 1482 of which the Ottoman original exists, cf. Theunissen, Otto-
man-Venetian Diplomatics, 131, 362. As for the use of both terms together see, for example, 
ASVe, Bailo, b. 254, reg. 348, cc. 81-82, second ten days of safer 1132 (24 December 1719-2 
January 1720); as for the use of sınır for the sea borders, cf. b. 253, reg. 346, non-numbered 
cc., first ten days of rebiyülevvel 1121 (11-20 May 1709) and b. 254, reg. 349, cc. 80-82, first 
cemaziyülevvel 1133 (28 February 1721). Two facsimiles of sınırname beratı are published 
in Calligraphies ottomanes, nos. 61, 64, pp. 166, 170-171. Cf. also Kovačevic, Hududnama, 
365-436 and his monograph Granice.
30 Heywood, The Frontier, 233-235; Tryjarski, Kultura, 157-159, where the author’s pas-
sages concerning the Uygur border kumi talās, which is probably the name of the town 
situated on the frontier, and the town of Qazvin, which Turks believe to be situated within 
their borders because it was founded by Afrāsijāb’s daughter, are mentioned (my acknowl-
edgements go to Elzbieta Swiecicka for the reference); Imber, The Legend, 73-74. 
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The ucbeyis were the last descendants of Ottoman ancient nobility and 
belonged to the great households founded by the first sovereigns’ com-
panions (Malkoç, Mihail, Evrenos, Turahan). Their families were removed 
from the court during the fifteenth century when the kapıkulu, i.e. the 
Porte’s slaves, seized the power and men uprooted from their homes and 
totally devoted to a lord to whom they owed everything reached the high-
est positions of the state.
Instead of paying taxes to their lords, Balkan peasants were enrolled in 
a special army corps, that of the akıncı (from akın, ‘raid’), and they did not 
receive the pay but could keep the booty they took. They were irregular 
soldiers and they had not to conquer a hostile country permanently but 
only to scout or to divert the enemy’s attention from the true objective of 
the regular army. These raiders of the frontier used bows and swords and 
often had more than one horse with them, so that they could quickly run 
away with their booty made of things and people; they fought in groups of 
ten, were led by an onbaşı, and did not use to camp in the same place for 
long: for instance, in the second half of the fifteenth century, their forays 
in Friuli lasted a minimum of four days (July 1478) and a maximum of 
ten days (November 1477), even though these quick raids went down in 
history as ‘the Turkish invasions’. It has been proved that, at least in the 
sixteenth century, when these corps were becoming unfashionable, not 
only Muslims but also Christian peasants were enrolled as akıncı. By that 
time, the gaza spirit had little to do with men pushed to fight in the name 
of the Ottoman Empire by interest, profit or necessity.
The akıncı’s epic deeds ended at the beginning of the sixteenth century; 
other corps, such as the gönüllüs (volunteers) – that have been studied 
only recently –, took their place and borrowed their techniques. They too 
were soldiers coming from frontier areas, but their conscription was on 
a voluntary basis; they had to provide for their own equipment and the 
food; their highest ambition, supported by the Ottoman propaganda, was 
either to be rewarded with a tımar (estate) for their brave deeds or to join 
a regular corps.31
1.10 Militärgrenze
The presence of Ottomans in the heart of Eastern Europe, from the borders 
of Dalmatia to Podolia, created an area of political instability northwards 
and that situation influenced also the names given to some territories. 
31 Fodor, In Quest of the Golden Apple, 278-279, where also the ambiguity of the Ottoman 
vocabulary as for the use of the words gönüllü (voluntary, brave), garib yiğit (strange, curi-
ous, foreign, homeless, poor), gönüllü garib yiğit and simply yiğit (young, hero, brave) and 
the groups of soldiers to whom these words were referred can be noticed.
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Ukraine simply means ‘marchland’ and this word was used to point out 
that the land was the last strip of Poland/Lithuania (and later Muscovy), 
placed in front of the khanate of Crimea.32
The history of the Habsburg-Ottoman border along Croatia, Slavonia 
and Hungary was peculiar and complex. Since the sixteenth century, Chris-
tians equipped several areas with strongholds to protect themselves, but 
no agreement was made to mark a border line. At the beginning of the 
eighteenth century, instead, after the Treaty of Karlowitz and the creation 
of a real border line, the House of Habsburg organised the territories close 
to the Ottoman Empire into the so-called Militärgrenze (military border), 
entirely and directly controlled by Vienna and removed from the Croatian 
kingdom. Strongholds already existed in that area: from the Adriatic to the 
north of Transylvania and from Senj to Košice, however, the territory was 
organised in six regions, which were divided in captaincies (1. the Croatian 
border or Karlowitz generalship; 2. the Slav border; 3. the Hungarian bor-
der from the Drava to the Lake Balaton; 4. the Hungarian border from the 
Lake Balaton to the Danube; 5. the border of mining towns; 6. the upper 
Hungarian border); the system of strongholds was defended by German 
regiments. This was not the only characteristic and important element of 
the new territorial organisation; the lands were assigned mainly to south 
Slav peasants who took refuge there, found a house, and in return commit-
ted themselves to defend and protect their new land; thus, they became 
border men.33
The Ottoman territory ran on the other side of the Militärgrenze. It was 
studded with fortresses placed in defence of an empire. In the first years 
of the seventeenth century, the number of Ottoman strongholds reached 
the number of Habsburg fortresses and thus remained almost until the end 
of the century. As Rhoads Murphey observed, such strongly militarised an 
area had obviously a great geo-political importance for the Ottoman rul-
ers; in comparison, the Ottoman-Safavid border, which was almost twice 
as long, was much less defended and more vulnerable.34
The Treaty of Karlowitz established a border line between the Ottomans 
and the House of Habsburg for the first time, and for this reason histo-
rians considered it as the moment when the Porte finally welcomed the 
32 Power, Introduction, 6-9.
33 Pálffy, The Origins, 3-5, 60-63; Lazanin-Štefanec, Habsburg Military Conscription, 91-
94. According to Dieter Werkmüller (Recinzioni, 650), the German word grenze, like the 
Russian graníza, comes from the word used in old Slavic to mean the oak; likewise, in the 
Middle Ages, the word marka was used to mean a wood; other (see Zanini, Significati del 
confine, 10) affirm that it originates from the habit of marking out the border with a cross – 
the Slavic gran’ –, carving it on the trees. On the Croatian and Serbian words kotar, meda, 
krajina, cf. Roksandić, Stojan Jankovic, 240-241; Roksandić, Ottomans, 415-425.
34 Murphey, Ottoman Warfare, xviii; Ágoston, The Ottoman-Habsburg Frontier, 287-296.
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European legal principle of the state border. By now, this historiographical 
idea has been challenged, but it is important to note that it was between 
the seventeenth and the eighteenth century, when the concept of the lin-
ear border was widely known, that political, juridical and fiscal relations 
became more definite, ideological, religious and sanitary controls more 
common, and the military defence of a state easier not only in Europe but 
also in the sultans’ Empire. In the middle of the seventeenth century, the 
Peace of Westphalia marked the end of two universalisms, i.e. the Catholic 
and the imperial ones. Thus, European states could no longer settle their 
quarrels appealing to a superior authority. The equilibrium policy was 
the winning formula necessary to prevent a great power from getting the 
supreme hegemony. At the same time, the Ottoman Empire, which was 
coming out of the long period of crisis called the ‘Sultanate of Women’, 
partially recovered its strength. In the past ages, it had to face either a 
single Christian enemy or fragile alliances that were soon broken off but 
now it had to fight against a strong and close-knit alliance of sovereign 
states. For this reason, both in the European capitals and Istanbul, the 
art of diplomacy and negotiation played a more and more prominent role, 
together with the art of defining borders, which is one of its most impor-
tant elements.35
35 Carassi, Topografi e diplomatici, 192-194.
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2.1 The Frontier: Symbol and Myth
The frontier is a belt of territory facing the enemy, that may expand or 
fall back, and where different laws and religions can find a way to live to-
gether more easily than elsewhere. It is a land of clash and heroism, but of 
pragmatism and coexistence too. In the history of Christian-Muslim rela-
tions, this frontier way of living was, perhaps, more important than what 
people usually believe: between Turks and Europeans there were not only 
the battle of Lepanto and the two sieges of Vienna, but also many years of 
peaceful or armed coexistence, over land and sea, from the Balkans to the 
Mediterranean Sea and from the Black Sea to the Indian Ocean. It may be 
argued that it is easier to remember the won or lost battles and the hate 
for the enemy than the silence of a truce. Public papers gathered in the 
archives support this partial view: they are produced when people clash 
and not when they live in peace.
Beside the land frontier there was a sea one too. It may be affirmed that 
the concept of frontier suits sea waters better than land: as a matter of 
fact, it is impossible to place boundary stones or metae there to distinguish 
what belongs to one or the other state; everything mingles and merges; 
the army corps continually advance or withdraw without finding a safe 
heaven there. It is usually thought that a shore or a rocky coast can be 
a border. During the most ancient times of Islam, harbours themselves – 
such as Alexandria, Damietta and Ashkelon – were called ṯaġr and were 
linked more to the concept of frontier than to the border one. Finally, sea 
people, namely those who knew and sailed it, were perhaps nearer to a 
society that lived in an area of uninterrupted war, or armed truce, rather 
than in an area of peaceful coexistence.
If we go over the history of the Near East, we may draw a parallel be-
tween the sea and other two similar elements: the steppe and the desert. 
It was difficult to mark the limits in all of them. Food and water usually 
had to be brought from afar by those who ventured there; only groups sur-
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vived, such as the Turkish and Mongolian tribes that advanced westwards, 
or the caravans that crossed the deserts,or the ships and the convoys of 
ships (the Venetian mude) that sailed the Mediterranean Sea. The raid, 
the fight and the assault on the enemy or the weakest were characteristic 
of those who inhabited these places where nature looks hostile and only 
the sky – by night with the stars or by day with the sun – seems to be able 
to show the way. Desert and sea could appear as two similar realities: 
it is not by chance that Arabic employs the word maǧrā, which denotes 
the daily distance covered by a camel, to mean the distance covered by 
a ship in a day; the verb rakiba, namely ‘riding’, is employed to mean the 
act of sailing.
The desert and the sea, together with the forest, were considered 
to be places of tests and initiations, meditation, peregrinations, hal-
lucinations and demonic snares also in the western imagination for a 
long time. As Jacques Le Goff showed in his classic essay, these reali-
ties were geographical and symbolic at the same time, namely places 
where believers could find their way to Heaven. The Life of Antony, 
written by the bishop Athanasius of Alexandria (about 360), focuses 
on the desert; shortly after, Saint Jerome moved to the desert of Qin-
nasrin in Syria, not far from Antioch. Many other eastern hermits lived 
in those extreme areas. Instead, Celtic and Nordic monks decided to 
wander from island to island; the sea was their desert, cold like the 
one described in the Voyage of Saint Brendan and studded with islands 
just like the desert is studded with oases.1
In the Middle Ages the sea, such as the desert, could appear to be an 
extreme place, where a hermit could more easily get closer to God. In the 
ninth-century Near East, another character-type, i.e. the warrior literate, 
thought that the stay in a frontier area was an élite devotional practice. As 
Houari Touati stated, in this period people widely accepted the idea that 
living or visiting a frontier facing an infidel enemy was a praiseworthy act. 
It was a new concept that was developed by the traditionalist thought in 
the preceding century and that, as a consequence, did not meet with the 
first Muslims’ approval. According to this author, the chronological ante-
riority of the use of the word ġazw (raid) – compared to ǧihād – to mean 
the fight along the frontier, is one of the elements that allow to state that 
this ideology, unlike what many argued, was a belated fact. The myth of 
the frontier, together with the experiences linked to it, was ideologically 
parallel to the Islamic pilgrimage: advancing towards Mecca was a similar 
praiseworthy act that symbolised getting closer to God. The journey to the 
farthest lands of the dār al-islām was performed also by learned men and 
scholars in search of new masters – therefore, the wells of knowledge –, or 
1 Le Goff, Il meraviglioso e il quotidiano, 27-44; Gast, Un espace, 165-172.
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of legitimation. A scholar who had lived in those extreme areas, even for 
a short period and without fighting the infidels, gained a new charisma in 
front of ordinary people; thus, he could be considered to be a real martyr 
and witness of Islam. In that society, just like the utmost centres of Muslim 
religion, from Mecca to Medina and Jerusalem, the border too could ap-
pear to be holy; it was considered to be a source of spiritual energy. Those 
who approached it received strength and legitimation.2
This ideology was then drawn on in the most well-known myths of the 
origins of the Ottoman dynasty as well: Osman and his son Orhan, as gazi 
warriors, received their right to rule an empire by their fighting against 
the Byzantine infidels.
Since its arising as an independent discipline, more than a century ago, 
historiography regarding the Ottoman Empire had to face the concept of 
frontier and it became so important that Heywood stated that in this field 
it is necessary to espouse a historiographic point of view rather than a 
historical one.3 Some scholars, inflamed by the nationalism of the Kemalist 
era, read only the evidence of a cultural and political old-Turkish inherit-
ance in the most ancient Ottoman chronicles.4 On the contrary, using the 
same sources, other scholars stressed the importance of the Islamised 
Byzantine element in the first Ottoman administration.5 Wittek,6 still rec-
ognising that not only did these two worlds and civilisations fight but also 
met, suggested the so-called ‘ideology of the holy war’: from this moment 
on, the state created by Osman and his first successors was considered 
to be a political entity fighting in the name of Allah and scholars began 
to look only for the influence of that ideology in every aspect of the life of 
this period. At the beginning, a few, such as Köprülü and Friederik Giese,7 
rose up against this thesis but it soon became indisputable. Only around 
the 80s did a considerable number of opponents rise up: Gyula Káldy-Nagy, 
followed by Heywood, challenged Wittek’s thesis from a historical and 
methodological point of view; Rudi Paul Lindner regarded the first war-
riors as fighters in the name of the shamanism rather than in the name 
of Islam; Imber encouraged his colleagues to consider if Turkish sources 
were reliable or not; then, also other scholars such as Ronald C. Jenning, 
2 Touati, Islam et voyage, 9-18, 96-121, 237-249.
3 Heywood, The Frontier, 228; cf. Wittek and the Austrian Tradition, 7-25; Boundless 
Dreams, 32-50.
4 Cf. Mehmet Fuat Köprülü’s many works, for example Alcune informazioni, passim (Ital-
ian translation). 
5 Cf. Gibbon’s 1916 work, The Foundation of the Ottoman State.
6 Wittek, The Rise of the Ottoman Empire; Deux chapitres de l’histoire de Turcs de Roum, 
passim.
7 About Giese, see what Heywood states in Boundless Dreams, 46-48.
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Aldo Gallotta and mainly Kafadar went on this way, severely criticising 
Wittek’s thesis.8
Lately, the issue of the ties or the independence of the first Ottomans 
from the ‘holy war’, instead of draining away, gave rise to further research 
and closer examinations, probably linked to present-day events and the 
subsequent interest in everything that is Muslim.9
Ottomans found relevant material for their ‘tales of the origins’ in the 
epic of the frontier against the Byzantines: the first fixed date of their 
history is a battle won against the basileus, namely the Battle of Bapheus 
(27 July 1302). At the beginning, they were only one of the several Islamic 
states fighting against Christianity in a narrow strip of Anatolia, but they 
soon amplified their field of action and, in the following centuries, the 
word ‘Turk’ became a synonym of Muslim. From the fourteenth to the 
seventeenth century, their empire kept expanding and it had no longer to 
fight in a narrow piece of land; many frontiers made their appearance both 
eastward and westward, southward and northward, and their opponents 
were not only Christians or Europeans anymore, but also Shiite Persians, 
or Berbers living in the inland regions of the Maghreb.
2.2 The Peace Agreements and the Frontier
If we take into consideration the Ottoman ahdnames issued for the Europe-
an states, we realise that, from a diplomatic point of view, this type of docu-
ment may be divided into two sub-categories, even though their effects 
were often the same. The most ancient group derives from the armistice 
(hudna), whereas the other derives from a general safe-conduct (amān 
‘āmm) granted by a Muslim leader to a group of people. The former implied 
not only the oath on the part of those who issued them, but also a similar 
document issued by the other state’s sovereign, who in turn had to swear 
not to break the agreement: they were instrumenta reciproca. The latter, 
instead, were unilateral decrees issued by the sultan in the form of nişan 
or berat (imperial privilege), and did not need any ratification on the part 
of the opposite party. Over the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, 
the latter was prevalent and also the instrumenta reciproca started to take 
some of the formal characteristics of the privileges. Western diplomatics, 
generally speaking, did not notice the slight difference existing between 
the two types of document, so much so that both were known by the name 
8 Káldy-Nagy, The Holy War, 467-473; Lindner, Nomads and Ottomans; Imber, Paul Wittek, 
65-81; The Ottoman Dynastic Myth, 7-27; The Legend, 67-75. See Jennings, Some Thoughts, 
151-161; Gallotta, Mito Oguzo, 41-59; Kafadar, Between Two Worlds, 1-59.
9 Cf. Linda T. Darling, Contested Territory, 133-163.
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of capitulations, even though the nineteenth-century ones, which were 
imposed by European states and once and for all abolished only in the 20s 
of the twentieth century, originated from the Ottoman berat rather than 
from the armistices.10
If we take into consideration the states in which one or the other docu-
ment was drawn up, however, we might make some remarks. First of 
all, the documents included in the category of the hudna were issued for 
states like the Habsburg Empire, Venice or Poland, whereas those who 
were classifiable as berat were given to the representatives of France, 
England and Holland since the end of the sixteenth century. Therefore, 
on the one hand, there were state entities with which the Porte not only 
had fought some wars, but which were also territorially neighbouring; on 
the other, instead, they were states that were geographically very far and 
with which the Ottoman Empire had come into contact mainly because of 
their commercial and sea activities.
In particular, three capitulations deserve a more thorough examination 
since they seemingly contradict what was stated before. The first docu-
ment was granted by Selim I to the Republic of Venice in 1517, right after 
the conquest of Mamluk Egypt, namely a state that had been providing for 
ages protection documents to Venetian merchants that went there to trade: 
it is an ahdname that falls under the category of the general safe-conduct, 
i.e. a type of document that had never been granted before by an Ottoman 
ruler to Saint Mark’s subjects. However, if we start from the assumption 
that Selim wanted to act as the heir of Egypt, as well as its conqueror, and 
that what was said for Ottomans applied to Ayyubid and Mamluk rulers of 
Egypt – namely that they had granted hudna to overseas sovereigns that 
were their neighbours and amān ‘āmm to the merchants of Italian towns –, 
then also the diplomatic characteristics of the 1517 ahdname seem to be 
easily understandable.
Another document may be more hardly intelligible. It is a question of the 
capitulations that were granted to France in 1536 and that, on the basis of the 
existing copies, probably were a proper treaty drawn up between two states 
that placed themselves on the same level. In this case, it may be observed that 
the original of the act cannot be found today and could not be found in 1569 
either, when a new document was granted to King Charles IX in the form of 
a berat, but modelled on the clauses usually granted to Venetians. Historians 
have defended the validity of these capitulations for a long time, to the extent 
that the history of international law, forgetful of other agreements that are 
older of more than a century, has often regarded them as the first capitula-
tions granted to a European state by the Porte. The most recent historiogra-
10 İnalcık, Imtiyāzāt, 1208-1219; Wansbrough, Imtiyāzāt, 1207-1208; Pedani, La dimora, 32-
35; Papp, Der ungarisch-türkische Friedensvertrag, 67-68; Papp, Christian Vassals, 719-730.
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phy prefers to believe it was just a draft wanted by the Grand Vizier İbrahim 
pasha, who was to be executed soon after, probably because he had become 
too powerful and intolerant of the sovereign authority. Kanûnî Süleyman – 
the sovereign who, more than anyone else, left traces of farsightedness, self-
confidence and strength in the history of the Empire – ordered the execution: 
this sovereign, who had defeated the Habsburgs in Mohács, would hardly 
have demeaned himself by undersigning a document in which he appeared 
on the same level as Francis I, the ‘king of the province of France’, who had 
been defeated by the Habsburg armies in Pavia.11
As for the third document, namely the agreement of 1581 with Spain, it 
has been observed that it appears in the form of a temessük (receipt) that 
confirms what was established between the second vizier Siyavuş pasha and 
the Spanish ambassador Giovanni Marigliani, i.e. the keeping of the peace 
between the two countries, on earth and at sea, for three years. As Dariusz 
Kolodziejczyk showed for the following period, Ottoman practice could pro-
vide for an exchange of provisional receipts among official representatives of 
two states that had to be confirmed by means of an ahdname. The explana-
tion of the diplomatic peculiarities of the Ottoman-French document of 1536 
may be found in this observation. So far, the importance of the temessük in 
the drawing up of international agreements has not attracted the attention 
it deserves; instead, it is useful to understand the development of the peace 
agreements between Europe and the Ottoman Empire and to place well 
known international documents, such as the ‘Peace of Zsitvatorok’ or the 
‘Treaty of Karlowitz’, in their real dimension; contrary to what has often been 
said, they do not represent a renewal of the diplomatic practice, but rather 
the enforcement of what had already been employed. The temessüks – that 
were very flexible and, if used with other European states, easily influenced 
by western terminology and diplomatics – played an important role on the 
occasion of the delimitations of borders, as will be shown later.
Now we can come to the statement with which we started this speech. 
Whether or not the other state shared a frontier with the Ottoman Empire 
influenced the kind of agreement the sultan made with the Christian ruler. 
A document that derived from the armistice was used for the inhabitants 
of the neighbouring areas, whereas a privilege or a general safe-conduct 
that might protect people and goods could be granted to those who lived 
in distant countries.
11 Skilliter, William Harborne, 1; Pedani, In nome del Gran Signore, 131-133; Kolodziejczyk, 
Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations, 47-49. See also Matuz, Capitulations, 182-192, who 
employs two documents in support of his thesis: the first makes reference to the Venetian 
capitulations and not to the French ones; the second follows the capitulations of 1569 as may 
be clearly read in the published facsimile text. A document of 1541, where a confirmation 
of the friendly settlement with the king of France is mentioned, is more intriguing on this 
point (Documenti turchi, no. 455; edited by Gökbilgin, Venedik, vol. 1, 153, no. 26).
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2.3 The Society of the Frontier
Before taking into consideration the Ottoman frontier, we should go over 
the customary stereotypes of a society of the frontier. It is usually a male 
environment, where women are few and children do not exist; the living 
conditions are violent; killings and heinous crimes are committed in the 
name of religion (or profit or the necessity to appropriate someone else’s 
space). Also heroic and savagely romantic characters, however, belong 
to this category of men: spurred by an ideal drive, they fight against the 
enemy – the hostile nature or a people different as for religion, culture 
and origin. Society and men are barbarian anyway, mainly if compared to 
the life led in the furthest and most central areas of the state. The other, 
i.e. the different, does not need comprehension and does not have to be 
understood, but must be only politically and, if possible, physically, wiped 
out. Similar ideas may be found not only in historiography, but also in the 
chronicles or contemporary literary works or works that came slightly 
after the narrated events, if the author wrote mainly to support a certain 
ideology or to create a founding myth that had to be politically used. Thus, 
we should pay more attention to the sources than we usually do, mainly if 
we use papers written for a wide public and not documents drawn up for 
practical or administrative reasons.
With regard to the first Ottomans, we have to settle for few available 
evidence, mostly chronicles, and try to understand their real dimension 
divesting them of the ideology to find only their true elements. The revi-
sionism of Wittek’s thesis has led also to study again the ancient chroni-
cles, i.e. ‘Aşıkpaşazâde’s, the so-called anonymous ones and Uruc’s, as well 
as to reconstruct the political ideology of the environment that produced 
them and to imagine what their sources, namely the takvims (annals), the 
menakıb-names (semi-legendary tales), the gazavat-names (heroic deeds, 
mainly in frontier areas), which are missing today, could say.12
If for the first period of Ottoman history almost exclusively subsequent 
literary works exist, for the following one (since the capture of Constan-
tinople onwards), the documents that allow to look at men’s deeds from 
different angles increase in number. Therefore, it is easier to observe that 
not only opposing entities existed but contacts and encounters too, and 
that the good and the right were not the prerogative of a single part but 
everything mingled and crisscrossed.
An illuminating example of this frontier society may be the so-called 
12 Cf. Woodhead, Ta’rīkh, 313; Taeschner, ‘Ashıḳ-pasha-zāde, 699; Ménage, Ottoman His-
toriography, 168-179; Iṅalcık, Ottoman Historiography, 152-167. For a historiographical 
survey carried out in this way, see Yerasimos, La fondation de Constantinople, 1-4, 247-249, 
which is essentially based on the Turkish legends created after the conquest of the town in 
1453 for ideological reasons.
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‘blood brotherhood’ (pobratimstvo), which was created with a proper rite 
and was present in the Balkan area since the seventeenth century at least. 
Similar customs strengthen the idea of a society where the ideal of the 
ǧihād made room for different lifestyles. Also the great traveller Evliya 
çelebi, who was witness to a similar episode in 1660, gapingly talked 
about it. He told the story of a gazi who took part in a skirmish with the 
troops of the close Republic of Venice and was discovered while hiding a 
Christian. When it was time to kill the prisoners who had been captured, 
the Ottoman warrior prostrated himself before the pasha asking to have 
mercy on his enemy: «Mercy, Grand Vizier! I have sworn brotherhood with 
this captive on the battlefield; we have pledged each other our faiths. If 
you kill him, he will go to paradise with my faith and that will be an injury 
to me, wretch that I am; and if I die, the faith of this captive, with whom 
I have sworn brotherhood, will stay with me and we will both go to hell, 
so that again I am the loser».13 The pasha was told that a Christian and 
a Muslim, by means of the ceremony of the blood brotherhood sealed by 
the formula «your faith is mine and my faith is also yours», committed 
themselves to save the other if this was taken captive, because otherwise 
the hell promised by their religion would wait for them. Even though he 
was astonished, the pasha decided to free them both. As Wendy Bracewell 
explains, the pobratimstvo was a form of false relationship spread among 
the Slavs of the south and still known and practised in the twentieth cen-
tury; it was a way to create new ties and family obligations. It was often 
practised between people who belonged to similar groups, for example 
between two Orthodoxes, or two Catholics, or two women or two men (in 
which case, but only rarely, this relationship implied also a homosexual 
relation). In the case of two Catholics, this relationship might also be 
officiated in front of a priest and made more solemn with a mass, to the 
extent that Zadar’s and Split’s archiepiscopal synod banned such rites. 
Epic songs of frontier areas among Slavs, inhabitants of Veneto, imperi-
als and Turks often tell of examples of blood brotherhood and heroisms 
linked to it. The pobratimstvo, thus, appears to be an important factor of 
coexistence in the Balkans and testifies that this world experienced not 
only splits between different faiths, cultures and empires, but could also 
find unifying elements and common interests. If on the one hand religion 
and politics were dividing elements in that society, on the other sharing 
common values such as heroism, honour and virility made peoples living 
along the Balkan frontier move closer.14
The society of the frontier, however, was not an idyllic environment; 
disorder, anarchy and brigandage marked that area, together with pil-
13 Official English translation made by Bracewell (see Frontier Blood-Brotherhood, 29-30).
14 Bracewell, Frontier Blood-Brotherhood, 29-45; see also Iṅalcık, Foundation, 59-62.
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lages, famines and plagues, whereas people hardly appeased their hunger 
and resorted to any means to survive, as Vesna Miović-Perić states while 
describing the several heinous crimes that occurred outside the state of 
Ragusa (Dubrovnik) during the Morean War (1686-1699).15
2.4 The Sea as a Frontier
In 1377 the great Tunisian historian Ibn Khaldun wrote in his Muqaddima 
that, in the time of Byzantines, Franks and Goths, Muslims watched most of 
the Mediterranean Sea and no Christian board could float there.16 That state-
ment was taken up again in the twentieth century by the Belgian historian 
Henri Pirenne, who also wrote: «With Islam a new world was established on 
those Mediterranean shores which had formerly known the syncretism of the 
Roman civilization. A complete break was made, which was to continue even 
to our own day. Henceforth two different and hostile civilizations existed on 
the shores of Mare Nostrum. And although in our own days the European has 
subjected the Asiatic, he has not assimilated him. The sea which had hitherto 
been the centre of Christianity became its frontier. The Mediterranean unity 
was shattered».17 Pirenne’s very much debated thesis focused on the idea that 
the barbarian invasions did not break the Mediterranean unity, which was bro-
ken once and for all by the coming of a different faith and a different culture, 
i.e. Islam; since then trades stopped definitely and, as a consequence, a reces-
sion occurred in the West, while Muslims became the absolute masters of the 
Mediterranean Sea in the ninth and tenth centuries, as Ibn Khaldun observed.
Many historians were prompted to reject that theory for various reasons: 
Dopsch, Lopez, Ehrenkreutz among others asserted that the recession of 
the Carolingian period had many causes, that Christianity and Islam were 
never two rigidly opposing worlds, and that trades did not stop so abruptly, 
even though – as Elihau Ashtor maintained trying to mediate – there was a 
severe crisis of the sea trade from the seventh to the ninth century. In his 
introduction to a recent reissue of Pirenne’s famous work, Ovidio Capitani 
argues that the historiographical debate ended without losers or winners, 
even though that book is still somehow stimulating: the use of other dis-
ciplines, such as archaeology, allowed to detect the key role of the Arab 
and the Muslim in the Mediterranean trade, whose spreading was more 
the product than the cause of western economic crisis.18
15 Miović-Perić, Brigandage on the Ragusan Frontier, 41-54.
16 Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddima, vol. 2, 41-42.
17 Pirenne, Mohammed and Charlemagne, 152-153.
18 Pirenne, Maometto e Carlomagno, v-xxxiv.
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Without entering into this debate again, we may still employ Pirenne’s 
words as a spur to delve into the problem represented by the stormy rela-
tion that existed between Muslims and the sea, namely a subject that has 
been the main field of research for several historians in the last few years, 
e.g. from Bono to Bonaffini, from Picard to Khalilieh and Planhol among 
others.19 Therefore, the new civilisation that overlooked the Mediterranean 
coasts regarded the sea as a new frontier along which they could advance, 
but many believed that it was an entity that was hostile in itself. One of 
the very first tales of Islam tells that the caliph ‘Utmān (644-656) would 
have let Mu‘āwiya go towards Cyprus only if the expedition would be com-
pletely safe and if his wife would go with him to prove it; then, Mu‘āwiya 
sailed not only with his wife, but with his sister too, thus organising the 
first Muslim sea expedition.20
Arabs very rapidly moved from desert sands and camels to waves and 
ships: there were three expeditions against India in 636; Alexandria 
became Muslim in 645; the expedition against Cyprus was in 648-649. 
Therefore, the new conquerors immediately found themselves in front 
of two different ways of considering the sea and their position would be 
inherited by Ottomans. On the one side, there was the Mediterranean Sea 
where raids alternated with wars and pirates and privateers with sover-
eign states’ warriors and armies; on the other side, there was the Indian 
Ocean, especially the Persian Gulf, whose waters were characterised by a 
thriving trade that was constantly hampered by a piracy that was endemic 
and lasted for more than a thousand years. Episodes of proper war were 
fewer than in the Mediterranean Sea. For instance, at the beginning of the 
European expansion in those seas, the Portugueses, given their technical 
superiority, got the better of the warship sent forth by the Mamluks. Only 
after the British intervention, the conquest of Aden in 1839 and the agree-
ments of 1853, did the ‘coast of the pirates’ (as the southern area from 
Rams to Dubai was called) finally become the ‘coast of the truce’ (ṣulḥ).21
In his classic work on Philip II’s times, Fernand Braudel considers piracy 
as a supplementary form of the great war by sea.22 Examining the Mediter-
ranean of the sixteenth century, he observes that, after the big conflicts 
made of fleets, expeditionary forces and great sieges that ended in 1574, 
this activity substituted much bigger conflicts. This probably happened 
19 See, among the recent ones, these volumes: Bonaffini, Un mare di paura; Bono, Il 
Mediterraneo; Khalilieh, Islamic Maritime Law; Picard, La mer et les musulmans; Picard, 
L’océan Atlantique; de Planhol, L’Islam et la mer. As for the Indian Ocean, see also Özbaran, 
The Ottoman Response.
20 de Planhol, L’Islam et la mer, 25.
21 Kelly, Ḳurṣān, 511.
22 Braudel, Civiltà e imperi, 919-920.
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at intervals in the previous centuries as well. There was an uninterrupted 
alternation of moments when state fleets acted and moments when mainly 
pirate ships acted during the historical development of Muslim navy. A 
quick excursus throughout the centuries,23 however imprecise and super-
ficial it may be, shows that both dynasties or sovereigns interested in sea 
operations and state entities completely committed to piracy existed. Most 
dynasties and Muslim reigns, however, despised and looked down on sea 
activities, considering them as unworthy of true warriors, even though 
the sea frontier was not very different from the land one as regards the 
lifestyle it allowed, the society it housed and the clashes that occurred 
there. The Muslim sea frontier obviously experienced the counterstroke 
of such behaviours; when the sovereigns committed themselves to the im-
provement of the fleet, or supported the pirate forays, it usually advanced; 
instead, when they took no interest, it tended to fall back.
23 It may be observed that, under the Umayyads, there were some clashes where the 
fleet was used: for example, in 716 Maslama, the caliph’s uncle, employed both the fleet 
and the army in the siege of Byzantium, but he was driven back by Leo III the Isaurian and 
by the ‘Greek fire’. After this clash, the first Mediterranean conflict between Muslims and 
Byzantines ended. With the Abbasid Empire, however, the caliphs turned their back on the 
sea and the sea expansion was carried on by smaller and more organic formations with 
more limited means and goals. Since the end of the eighth century, squads coming from 
the caliphate’s fringe territories reft and traded. It was an activity that kept an economical 
considerable significance for ages; coast peoples usually lived by both fishing and piracy; 
they did not want to achieve great military feats or to take part in a destructive war, but to 
capture slaves and goods. The more and more urgent request of slaves on the part of the 
court of Córdoba, or a chaotic situations within Muslim Spain could push men to turn into 
pirates. Vikings’ piratical expeditions of 844-976 against Spanish coasts caused a revitali-
sation of the harbours and of the military organisation of the Omayyad of al-Andalus. Also 
the Aghlabids’ dynasty (800-909) stood out for an intense naval activity that culminated 
in the conquest of Sicily when also Naples, Gaeta and Amalfi sailed across the Mediterra-
nean with their fleets; they earned considerable incomes thanks to the piracy undertaken 
along the Italian coasts as well. Also the Tulunids, who reigned in Egypt from 868 to 905, 
mustered a powerful army and a good fleet, followed by the Fatimids who inherited Sicily 
(909) and conquered Egypt (969). Saladin, who possessed a fleet of 80 ships in 1179 and 
defeated the Franks that had penetrated the Black Sea in 1183, dealt with the needs of the 
war to hinder the crusaders also at sea; the events of the third crusade caused the collapse 
of this navy in 1189-91. After the Ayyubids, also the Mamluks, who had taken power in mid-
thirteenth century, did not care much about the sea: only the great Baybars seemed to be 
aware of the importance it might have, even though only low-level people engaged in the 
sea activity. Then, also Byzantines, urged by big economical issues, dismantled their fleet. 
Therefore, mainly Genoeses, Venetians or Catalans sailed across the seas of the East until 
the arrival of the Ottomans.
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2.5 Sea People: Privateers, Pirates and Others
Wars and fights between Christians and Muslims took place not only along 
the land front but also along the sea one. The ideology of the ǧihād was 
not restricted to fights on foot or with horses; rather, it was often used in 
connection with those who opposed the Christians at sea both in the most 
ancient times and in the modern era. The atavistic fear of a hostile and 
unknown element for people used to the desert sands such as the Arabs 
was justified by a series of traditions that – however generically in favour 
of naval expeditions, the pilgrims’ sailing towards Mecca, the use of sea re-
sources and the expansion of the sea trade – mainly encouraged those who 
decided to fight against the infidels by sea and promised to these martyrs 
twice the recompense of those who died fighting on the mainland.24 The 
Muslims who regarded the sea as their battlefield resorted to this corpus.
Sailors, pirates and privateers inhabited this liquid frontier, but these 
categories very often mingled, even though, at least theoretically, the dif-
ference between privateers and pirates was clear, at least within the Euro-
pean world: privateers had to attack only the enemy ships of the sovereign 
who gave them the licence to sail, whereas the pirates did not follow any 
law or legality.25 If we take into consideration some Ottoman ahdnames, 
we find out that, in this regard, the Muslim point of view was slightly 
different: if on the one hand there were the pirates (harami levend) who 
were clearly recognisable as law-breaking fighters, on the other the pri-
vateers (korsan in Turkish) were solely those who acted in the name of a 
western sovereign; instead, the Barbaries were not given this appellative 
but were called levends26 of the Maghreb suggesting that their fighting 
against Christian warships did not fall within the activities accorded by a 
sovereign, but it was a due behaviour every Muslim must display. We can 
find the same distinction between the Ottoman word levend and the Arabic 
qorṣān in some Arabic peace agreements issued by the sultan of Morocco 
in the eighteenth century.27 Beside qorṣān, the Arabic language employs 
liṣṣ al-baḥr (thief of the sea) to mean the pirate and ġāzī al-baḥr to mean 
the Muslim who fights against the infidel.
Even though the distinction among pirate, privateer and levend was 
clear, such strict a classification could not exist in practice: those who 
fought by sea in the name of a state (sometimes as soldiers by profession) 
24 Khalilieh, Islamic Maritime Law, 160-176.
25 Bono, Corsari nel Mediterraneo, 9-15.
26 Levend means ‘irregular Ottoman serviceman’, from which deniz levendleri (levend of 
the sea) comes, namely the levend par excellence. As for the use of levend in the Ottoman 
fleet, see Bostan, Osmanlı bahriye teşkilâtı, 241-244.
27 Pedani, La dimora della pace, 43-44.
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could act as an outlaw when the circumstances were favourable. There-
fore, sovereigns often did not hesitate before taking pirates into their 
service in order to get military benefit they could not gain differently. 
Also Ottomans applied that logic mainly between the fifteenth and the 
sixteenth centuries when their navy was not on the same level as some 
European ones. For instance, in 1501 after the clash with Venice and in 
1515 on the eve of the conquest of Egypt, the sultans Bayezid II and Selim 
I mustered the levends’ fustas to fight against the Christian ships. If at 
first the measure proved to be effective, then it was clear that the central 
power had to keep a careful control to prevent the captains (reis) from 
breaking the law and denying any authority. Thus, after arousing such a 
devastating strength, the latter had to be fought. Kara Tumuş, who was 
one of the most famous captains who had already fought in the Venetian-
Ottoman conflict, was taken prisoner in 1503. In 1506 the janissaries and 
silahdars, embarked on galleys, defeated many pirates, whereas after 1517 
it was necessary to fight against the pirate Kurtoğlu, who was to support 
the sultan’s armies again in 1522.28
The fight of the Ottoman sailors against the Christians could fall within 
the ǧihād, at least theoretically. Once the great season of the yearly Otto-
man war campaigns ended in the second half of the sixteenth century, the 
gazi ideal, which the sultan did not want to set aside despite the changed 
political and military conditions, was devolved on the Barbary privateers. 
These seamen, at least nominally, were under his high sovereignty and 
continued his due fight against the infidels by means of their raids. Both 
the Porte and the Maghrebis often followed that ideology to argue points 
of view that were also opposing and based exclusively on economic and 
political reasons. Thus, peace could exist among the land armies while 
war could continue at sea, or vice versa. The sovereign of Morocco, Sīdī 
Muḥammad (1757-1790), displayed a similar behaviour and used to give 
the same importance to two factors that could seem antithetical at first 
sight: an inducement to the ǧihād and the opening of his markets to Eu-
rope. For example, in 1774 he wrote to Charles III of Spain and suggested 
a distinction between the sea war and the land one and, shortly after, 
he announced to foreign consuls that his men, who were camped before 
Melilla, made war during the day, but smuggled during the night, while 
peace reigned at sea.29
28 Vatin, L’ordre de Saint-Jean, 126-129, 133-134.
29 Caillé, Les accords, 31, 65, 78-81.
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2.6 The Sea Frontier: the Case of the Venetian Piracy
Going over the history of the Ottoman-Venetian sea frontier means, at 
least partially, writing another histoire événementielle. The fights between 
these two states were eleven and were characterised mainly by naval 
clashes, since the strength of the lagoon city lay in its fleet and it would be 
impossible to face the sultans’ Empire solely by means of its land forces: 
the disparity would be unbridgeable. Besides the periods of sworn hostility 
when the sea turned into a theatre of clashes, the Mediterranean was a 
frontier area between Venice and the Porte during many periods of peace 
as well. The lack of general limits unanimously set brought about a situ-
ation of potential advances, clashes and skirmishes between the boats of 
the two parties. Thanks to their flags, ships represented small shreds of a 
state wandering in a water immensity that did not belong to anyone. There 
were state fleets busy with police tasks, merchant ships, boats, caiques, 
fustas of pirates, ships of privateers, ships belonging to Maghrebis who 
were Ottoman subjects. When we talk about the sea frontier in peacetime, 
we have to consider privateering and piracy and their historical develop-
ment. A diachronic analysis shows that these activities, apart from their 
outcomes, were not always consistent. The fields of action, the forces and 
the support they had from the states involved in that endemic conflict 
changed across time.
In addition to the great war, there were often episodes of piracy, both 
on the Venetian and the Ottoman side. The same Venetian seamen some-
times acted as pirates, conforming to what happened in the Mediterranean 
where a real difference among pirates, privateers and regular soldiers did 
not exist. An example of this behaviour was the one held by the governato-
re delle galee dei condannati, Gabriele Emo, when in 1584 he raided Me-
hmed bey of Djerba’s ship and killed also the young bey’s mother and wife 
and many maidservants. The Republic paid about 60.000/70.000 ducats to 
settle this affair: maintaining the whole Venetian military apparatus in the 
Levant cost only the double. Emo paid it with his life, but other Venetian 
officials, who behaved as pirates, took no consequences. This was the 
case of the Venetian provveditore all’armata (admiral) Nicolò Pesaro, who 
crashed into a Turkish ship with a squadron of five galleys on 3 August 
1499 and killed the entire crew. This episode, however, fitted in a situation 
that was degenerating more and more. Perhaps it was a cause, perhaps 
a consequence; the fact is that the war began a few months later. The be-
ginning and the cessation of the hostilities, before a proper declaration of 
war and after peace had been signed, were characterised by episodes of 
piracy on the part of Venetians as well. Because of a difficult communica-
tion, tense minds and a desire for booty, the captains did not let slip the 
opportunities that could occur, even if their actions were opposite to the 
agreements in force. For example, there is an episode we may recall: in 
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1479, after the cessation of the hostilities, the sopracomito Scipione Bon 
attacked two Turkish ships loaded with goods in the harbour of Thasos. 
The painter of the sultan Sinan, together with his cousin Panteley Arfara, 
was a profit-sharer; Venetians hastened to refund them in order to avoid 
retaliations in the court. At the beginning of 1504, after peace had been 
agreed but not yet sworn, Venetians sank a ship of the sanjakbeg of Vlorë 
and Albany, Mustafa, near Ragusa and drowned its crew.30
The episodes of Venetian piracy against Ottoman subjects are not many; 
they were fewer than those perpetrated by other European states such 
as Malta and the Order of Saint Stephen that, committed to that activity, 
got mixed up with privateering; moreover, the Venetian state retained a 
high control not only on its men, but also on the sources of information. 
In general, Venetians knew how to get wealth elsewhere, mainly thanks 
to trade, while the state protected them taking upon itself the right of 
revenge and retaliation on the strangers. Moreover, the peace with the 
Porte was considered to be important, when it existed, and they did not 
want to exacerbate the souls; besides, the agreements always provided a 
mutual exchange of prisoners. In this way, many Muslim slaves managed 
to come back home just crossing Saint Mark’s lands.31
2.7 The Ottoman Sea Frontier
We have more information regarding Ottoman attacks to Venetian ships 
in peacetime than the other way round. Whether they were pirates, pri-
vateers or simple sailors is of little consequence; on the contrary, the 
outcomes of this activity and its diachronic development are important. To 
simplify things we will talk about ‘Barbary privateers’ as for the Muslim 
world (like traditional historiography has it) and of ‘pirates’ for those who, 
coming from Ottoman Albanian and Greek coasts, attacked the Christian 
ships they met in order to rob them.
In the very first years of the fifteenth century, Venetians sent ten gal-
leys to fight the pirates who had attacked them near Constantinople but 
they were not Turks – probably Genoeses, Biscayans and Catalans. Soon 
afterwards, an Ottoman navy began to make its weight felt in the Medi-
terranean, even though in 1416 it clashed with the Venetian one near 
Gallipoli and lost.
When the war of 1463-1479 ended, Ottomans conquered Vlorë, 
namely the town placed right in front of Leuca in Apulia, and made 
30 Fabris, Un caso di pirateria veneziana, 91-112; Zago, Emo, 628-631; Gullino, Le frontiere 
navali, 90; Documenti turchi, nos. 20a-d, 137, 147.
31 Bono, Schiavi musulmani, 32-34.
42 2 The Frontier
Pedani The Ottoman-Venetian Border (15th-18th Centuries)
their appearance in the Adriatic. According to Venetians, there was an 
imaginary line that marked the ultimate border of their Gulf. After the 
peace, Venetians were completely ousted from the Aegean, where they 
kept the protectorate of the dukedom of Naxos. By then, the Muslim 
frontier between Venice and the Porte moved towards the Adriatic 
more and more.
Vlorë, together with other close harbours, was a nest of pirates for 
those who ventured out to those waters. When peace was signed in 1479, 
Mehmed II ordered Gedik Ahmed pasha to pay damages done by Vlorë’s 
fustas to the Venetians ships that sailed within the Gulf. He prohibited his 
privateers from entering the Gulf with offensive aims against Venice and 
threatened to punish them if they would disobey. The local population did 
not abandon that activity: in 1488 his successor, Bayezid II, confronted 
with the doge’s complaints, guaranteed the damages would be refunded 
and the malefactors punished. In 1479, outside the Venetian state, small 
Turkish groups carried out attacks in Grottammare (Ascoli Piceno); in 1485 
in Montemarciano, Marzocca and Mondolfo (between Fano and Ancona); 
in 1488 in Sinigallia and in 1506 in Apulia.32
Throughout the sixteenth century, the mouth of the Adriatic was a dan-
gerous area for ships. In 1533 Venetians complained about acts of piracy 
committed by Ottoman subjects; in 1536 Hayreddin Barbarossa occupied 
Castro for about ten days spreading terror in the neighbouring areas. In 
1553-1554 another privateer, Turgud reis, attacked Apulia’s coasts twice 
and reduced the 6.000 inhabitants of Vieste to slavery; in 1560 the Turkish 
fleet reached the Abruzzi. Watch-towers were built on the Adriatic western 
coasts; they were used to alert peasants and villages about the arrival of 
enemy ships so that they could plan the defence and be ready to fight or 
at least take shelter in fortified small places. In 1563, the levends that had 
captured 22 ships charged with olive oil in the Adriatic resold the booty 
to Vlorë, Durrës and Lezhë, and the following year the sultan protested 
because Süleyman reis’s, Parmaksız Mustafa’s and Arab Hasan’s galliots 
had been captured by Venetians; the Venetian bailo Daniele Barbarigo gave 
25.000 gold ducats to the damaged as a compensation.33
Piracy and privateering were becoming more and more frequent, mainly 
after the end of the great Mediterranean war where the Ottoman Empire 
fought against Spain and other Christian powers. Senj’s Christian and 
imperial pirates, i.e. Uskoks, joined the Muslims, while skirmishes be-
tween Venetian and Ottoman ships occurred more and more often in the 
32 ASVe, Comm, reg. 16, no. 122, cc. 141-141v (=143-143v); Documenti turchi, nos. 4, 39; 
Nardelli, Incursioni e minacce, 42-43.
33 Documenti turchi, nos. 295, 305-306, 785-786; Nardelli, Incursioni e minacce, 43; Volpe, 
Le torri di guardia, 47-73; Cresti, Le difese marittime, 23-38.
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Aegean. The Ottoman local authorities, pressed by the Porte (which was 
in turn pressed by the bailo’s complaints), intervened to call their subjects 
to order. For example, in 1586 Murad III ordered the sanjakbeg and the 
qadi of Vlorë to prevent Mehmed reis from shipping with his galliot to pil-
lage Venetian lands. In 1590, instead, the sanjakbeg Karlı-eli was ordered 
to prevent Lefkada’s armed caiques from going out. Thirty-nine former 
Muslim slaves, who had been freed from a privateer Christian ship by 
Venetians, joined these levends. On 5 May 1594, the rettore (governor) 
of Šibenik, together with his three sons and other nobles, was attacked 
near Rogoznica by two Muslim frigates and three galleys, one of which 
had the insignia of a high-ranking officer, i.e. a lamp and a flag. The crew 
was killed, whereas the marshal and his relatives were taken prisoner.34
Papers relate what happened to the Venetian ships that anchored to take 
water but were looted, as in 1590 near the harbour of the Bojana river 
(close to Shkodër), and what happened to the inhabitants of Herceg Novi 
who got ready to attack Venetians and to the reises of Vlorë’s galleys and 
galliots that ventured as far as Crete.35 Since 1593 onwards, the sultan’s 
orders, which enjoined the authorities of Herxegovina, Shkodër, Herceg 
Novi and Neretva to prevent the building of boats fit for privateering and to 
burn the ships built by the subjects to go in for piracy, increased.36 People 
from the Maghreb penetrated into the Gulf more and more frequently: for 
example, in 1591 Murad reis of Algiers reached Split, Perast, Kotor and 
Budva; in 1595 Kara Deli arrived with five fustas and took two Venetian 
vessels.37
In the first half of the sixteenth century, only occasionally do we find the 
sultan preventing the inhabitants of the coast from helping the levends38 
but, since the beginning of the seventeenth century, these pirates have 
either Maghrebi or Albanian nouns from Valoë or Durrës. For instance, 
in 1605 the sultan ordered to restrain the wrongdoings of İbrahim ağa of 
Durrës, Mustafa ağa, Ahmed kahya, Bali, Mustafa, Hasan kahya, who were 
joined by Zafer reis of Algiers, Arabacı Hüseyin, Hasan of Tunis, Mehmed 
34 ASVe, Bailo, b. 250, reg. 330, cc. 13ab; b. 252, reg. 343, cc. 87-89; Documenti turchi, 
nos. 947, 1057.
35 ASVe, Bailo, b. 250, reg. 330, cc. 6ab (1589), 15ab (1590), 32ab.
36 ASVe, Bailo, b. 250, reg. 330, cc. 16, 136; b. 252, reg. 343, cc. 14, 33, 55, 57, 65, 66, 68, 
76; b. 250, reg. 331, c. 14, 22; b. 250, reg. 332, c. 28, 42, 47, 64-68; b. 251, reg. 334, cc. 44, 
46, 57, 75, 99; Provveditori alla camera dei confini, reg. 243 bis, fasc. Cattaro, passim (from 
the end of the sixteenth century to 1634). The issue was resumed in the eighteenth century, 
cf. ASVe, Bailo, b. 253, reg. 347, passim; b. 254, reg. 348, cc. 14-15; BOA, MM, reg. 6004, c. 
26; Documenti turchi, no. 1240.
37 ASVe, Bailo, b. 250, reg. 330, c. 98; b. 252, reg. 343, c. 62; Villain-Gandossi, La Médi-
terranée, 26-27, 36 (fifth part).
38 Documenti turchi, no. 295 (1533).
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reis and Ömer of Herceg Novi’s sons. People from the Maghreb, Valoë, 
Durrës, Herceg Novi and Risan were united in their attempt to penetrate 
into the Gulf of Venice with close-knit squads; moreover, there were fu-
stas of levends built in Methoni, Koroni, Monemvasia and, in general, in 
the Peloponnese and in Lefkada.39 The new pirates who lived along the 
coast started to treat Muslims and Christians in the same way when it 
was time to attack and raid. Also eminent characters, such as in 1611 the 
former sanjakbeg of Karlı-eli (Mehmed bey) and the sanjakbeg of Dukagin 
(Mehmed bey) did not disdain to leave Durrës with their galliots, caiques 
or fustas to plunder the Adriatic. Maghrebi beylerbeyis too did the same, 
such as Kasım pasha of Tunis, who sent Bizerte’s galleys as well as his own 
one into the Adriatic around 1624. There were several attacks between 
1622 and 1627 when Maghrebi privateers had already organised a com-
plicity network along the Ottoman coast; the orders given by Istanbul to 
the beylerbeyis of Tunis or Algiers were more and more disregarded, to 
the extent that in 1626 the sultan turned to the şeyhülislam to have a fetva 
by means of which he could impose on them the obligation to return the 
Venetians who had been made prisoner, since Venice freed the Muslims 
that had fallen into its hands.40
Piracy continued all through the century, as the uninterrupted building or 
rebuilding of coast watch-towers bears witness. After the Cretan war (1645-
1669), the piracy within the Adriatic resumed but it was not concealed by 
war reasons anymore. In 1670, the sultan ordered his local commanders to 
put an end to the attacks against Venetians on the part of the people from 
Ulcinj. The name of this place, which rarely appeared in the late sixteenth 
and early seventeenth century documents that regarded the relations be-
tween Venice and the Porte, is cited more and more often from this moment 
on. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, after other wars, this place 
was on the same level as Vlorë and Durrës with regard to Ottoman piracy 
against Venetian ships; to restrain that activity, on the basis of the Treaty 
of Passarowitz of 1719, the inhabitants’ galliots and other ships were con-
fiscated and they were prohibited from building others.41
In the meantime, Maghrebi flags that were hoisted on the yards started 
to be desired also by other Ottoman subjects who wanted to practise pi-
39 ASVe, Bailo, b. 250, reg. 331, cc. 58, 60 (first cemaziyülahır 1014/14-23 September. 
1605), 79, 85-86; reg. 335, cc. 7, 11, 41; b. 251, reg. 335, c. 29, half receb 1034/19-28 April. 
1625; Confini, reg. 243bis, fasc. Cattaro, şevval 1037/4 June-2 July 1628 (the sultan to the 
sanjakbeg of Herzegovina and qadi of Herceg Novi for Risan).
40 ASVe, Bailo, b. 250, reg. 332, cc. 22, 23, 38, 47; b. 251, reg. 334, cc. 121b-122a, 130, 56; 
reg. 335, cc. 56, 81a-82; BOA, MM, reg. 6004, cc. 34-35, 52, 104-105, 109, 126; Documenti 
turchi, no. 1196; Bostan, Garp, 67-69.
41 ASVe, Bailo, b. 253, reg. 247, nos. 13, 14; b. 254, reg. 348, cc. 14-15; Volpe, Le torri di 
guardia, 62-63.
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racy without being recognised – as a 1720 imperial order bears witness: 
in this occasion, people from Ulcinj hid themselves under the flags of the 
Maghreb. Therefore, we may ask how many attacks that the inhabitants 
of the western Adriatic coast and also historiography considered to be 
Maghrebi were actually carried out by other Ottoman subjects. Another 
imperial order, issued in 1723, prohibited the inhabitants of Ulcinj not 
only from using those ensigns but also from leaving their harbours. The 
ties between Maghrebis and people from the Ottoman Adriatic coast did 
not loosen; for example, in 1726 a man from Ulcinj took refuge in the 
Maghreb with a Barbary tartan and the sultan gave orders to Tripoli and 
Tunis to have the marcigliana he had robbed returned. Then, in 1728-29 
the inhabitants of the town were ordered not to help Barbary privateers. 
The Republic was in such a sharp contrast with the people of Ulcinj (also 
because of a dramatic episode that occurred in Venice) that it obtained a 
name-i hümayun from the Porte, which was later reasserted in May 1729 
and in March 1731, and which prohibited their ships (the only ones among 
the merchant ships of the Adriatic East coast) from entering the lagoon for 
any reason. In any case, the inhabitants of Ulcinj’ habit of erecting Barbary 
ensigns continued to enjoy great favour, to the extent that the sultan had 
to prohibit it several times at the end of the 40s.42
The use of a fake flag was more common than we might think and the 
frequency of name-i hümayuns prohibiting Ulcinj subjects from hoisting 
the Barbary flag is astonishing. This is indicative of a practice that was 
not bearable by the Ottoman authorities anymore. Every ship that used to 
sail across the Mediterranean and elsewhere hid, together with its own, 
also other states’ ensigns for protection in case of suspect sightings or 
to hide and be able to attack from a favourable position. The same Vene-
tian admiral Angelo Emo – who was famous for the bombarding of Tunis 
and La Goulette and to whom the Naval Museum of Venice dedicated 
an entire room – led a little squadron of three ships towards Gibraltar 
and sailed under the English flag’s protection, i.e. a banner it hoisted 
and substituted with the Venetian one only when, after having met the 
Spanish xebecs, the reciprocal visits began.43 Therefore, in 1712 Hasan 
reis brought the fact of having disregarded a flag he thought to be fake 
(since the employment of others’ ensigns was very common at the time) 
in his defence for having attacked an English tartan led by Peter Davis 
near Souda.44 Saint Mark’s flag was well-known and respected within 
42 ASVe, Bailo, b. 253, reg. 247, passim; b. 254, reg. 348, cc. 221-223; b. 255, reg. 351, cc. 
1-2, 6-7; b. 256, reg. 353, c. 11, 12-13, 44-45, 292-294, 312-313, 324-326; reg. 354, cc. 30-34; 
b. 358, reg. 359, passim; b. 359, reg. 361, cc. 47-48; b. 259, reg. 362, cc. 27-28.
43 ASVe, Arsenale, b. 546. My acknowledgements go to Guglielmo Zanelli for this report.
44 ASVe, Bailo, b. 253, reg. 247, first ramazan 1124/2-11 October 1712.
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the Mediterranean, to the extent that the convoy of ships that left Venice 
on 8 July 1797 (i.e. after the fall of the Republic) could foist the ancient 
banner in its defence.45
In the second half of the eighteenth century, besides piracy, there was 
also the outbreak of some conflicts between the Most Serene Republic of 
Venice and the Barbary regencies that were more and more independent 
from the Porte. In 1766 Giacomo Nani and his squadron forced the bey-
lerbeyi of Tripoli to pay for damage caused to Venetians by his privateers. 
In 1784-1786 Angelo Emo ordered his ships to draw up in battle order 
against Tunis and La Goulette, even though the conflict faded into peace 
in 1792 after his death, which was probably caused by poison. Other two 
wars, however short, broke out between Venice and North-African coun-
tries. In June 1795 the sultan of Morocco declared war on the Republic 
since the money of the yearly payment it had to give him had not yet ar-
rived The conflict ended at the end of October after the capture of only 
one Venetian ship and with the delivery of the due money. On 10 October 
1796 the dey of Algiers declared war as an answer to the aggression 
experienced in İzmir by his vekilharc’s men on the part of a group of 
Venetian Slavonians; in this case, diplomatic contacts did not lead to any 
settlement of the conflict that ended, after the capture of some ships by 
Algiers, with the vanishing of the millenary Republic of Saint Mark from 
the international scene.46
Napoleon’s armies, after the destruction of ancient state entities such 
as Venice or Malta, upset an equilibrium that had been slowly formed 
between Christianity and Islam throughout the centuries; after years of 
stagnation, the resumption of the Barbary privateering in the Mediter-
ranean at the beginning of the nineteenth century was another indication 
of the fact that the political situation had changed.
2.8 The Sea Frontier: Final Remarks
Sea was a real frontier between Venice and the Porte both during declared 
wars and peacetime for centuries. Venice – together with its islands, har-
bours and, most of all, with his squadrons that sailed from Saint Mark basin 
every year – generated a barrier for the Ottoman armies right in the field 
where they were weaker, i.e. the sea one. It was an effective barrier and 
all Europe took advantage of it, even though it was fragile, destined to 
shatter here and there because of the Ottoman attack and then to regroup. 
As Braudel argues, «perhaps after all the Venetian line held because the 
45 Zordan, Il codice, vol. 1, 52-54, 94.
46 Pedani, Marocco, 96.
The Ottoman-Venetian Border (15th-18th Centuries) Pedani
2 The Frontier 47
Turks had already made breaches in it, doors and windows through which 
they could reach the West».47
When the great sea war left the Mediterranean for a wider space in the 
Atlantic, piracy and privateering in this inland sea were the proof of end-
less undeclared hostilities. At the same time, the government of Istanbul 
underwent a dramatic series of dynastic problems caused by repeated suc-
cessions and infant or imbecile sultans, and it delegated (at least ideologi-
cally) the legal Muslim war against the infidels to its Maghrebi subjects. 
This was the period when the privateer activity was in the best: Algiers 
became gorgeous and rich thanks to the activity of its reises’ booties, 
the first between 1560 and 1570, the second between 1580 and 1620. 
In the first years of the seventeenth century, Barbary ships penetrated 
into the Adriatic more and more often, in conjunction with the outbreak 
of the Uskok phenomenon, i.e. the pirates of Senj who, supported by the 
imperials, incessantly attacked both Venetian and Muslim ships. At the 
same time, Maghrebi and Dalmatian-Albanian, and even Aegean, Ottoman 
subjects acted hand in glove and created squadrons that used to go plun-
dering together. We might suggest that Barbaries taught great piracy (or 
privateering) to the coast inhabitants; the latter appropriated their flags 
and started to act along the Adriatic coasts by themselves, blaming their 
ancient lords for their own massacres and raids.
Istanbul’s behaviour towards this uncontrolled situation was contra-
dictory: on the one hand, they could not totally disavow the Barbaries’ 
privateering in the name of the sultan; on the other, their unjust attacks 
risked causing reprisals and clashes in a time that was ill-suited for a de-
clared war. As a name-i hümayun of the first part of the moon of muharrem 
1034/14-23 October 1624 says to the beylerbeyis, the beys, the Janissaries 
ağa and the chiefs of the Tunisian armies, after the attack of Perast by 
thirteen galliots,48 «so far my subjects of those places accomplished he-
roic deeds and their swords are flashing, but now they must not upset the 
peace with my friends regarding them just like other Christian enemies… 
We have to distinguish between the friends and the enemies of the Porte». 
And Venetians, in peacetime, however Christian, were friends.
47 Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World, 847.
48 ASVe, Bailo, b. 251, reg. 334, cc. 122a-121b; BOA, MM, reg. 6004, cc. 109-110; Bono, I 
corsari barbareschi, 175.
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3.1 How a Border is Built
Bounding the ground by mutual consent, marking it, distinguishing what 
belongs and what does not belong to someone is not a sign of war, but of 
peace. The frontier vanishes and gives way to the border, i.e. a definite and 
settled line that, right because it separates in a clear-cut way, somehow 
draws territories, people, ideologies, religions and laws together, giving 
their living space to everybody. The border is a shared line, marked with 
one accord, recognised and recognisable by everybody. If there is no con-
sent, then it is not a real border, but it is a wall, a barrier, an obstacle, 
a rampart. The border may follow the course of the mountains and the 
waters of a river, a road that has already been planned by men or it may 
run among identical fields, pass through an inextricable tangle of a wood 
or a forest, halve a desert and separate two oases, or run following an im-
aginary parallel, a meridian or a line marked with a ruler on a map. It may 
respect ethnic groups or religions, or cut houses and separate families and 
communities. This is the border and it depends on the way it is marked.
The decision to build a border implies that the preconditions for a peace 
already exist. This subject, however, is often vaguely broached when an 
agreement is endorsed. If the frontier is the first element to be violated 
when the hostilities outbreak, the border is the last element by means of 
which peace is ratified. Rather, negotiations continue in new meetings, 
namely other debates among people who are specifically charged with 
deciding a new line. It is not always easy to agree on a border if the aim 
is establishing a long-lasting peace: nature and communities should not 
be violated by irresponsible new divisions. The theory of natural borders 
that already exist and respect the territory was defined in the nineteenth 
century (the century of colonialism) even if at the same time the ‘Westerns’ 
marked straight lines on a map in order to create new states the Near East 
or Africa. If we observe an atlas, we soon realise which are the borders 
that respect geography and which are the borders that were arbitrarily 
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marked without observing the territory at close quarters and without go-
ing there and then decide.1
The creation of a border represented a further acknowledgment of the 
right of the other to exist as far as the relations between Christians and 
Muslims are concerned: if making peace sometimes employed a temporary 
cessation of the hostilities, marking a border by mutual consent meant cor-
roborating an agreement that had to last for a very long period, without 
taking into consideration what theories and religions asserted.
The first information regarding the existence of an Ottoman border 
regards Rumelia’s provinces in the second half of the fifteenth century. 
Before the relentless advance of Osman’s successors in the eastern Medi-
terranean, Venice had to hold out to defend its islands, its harbour towns 
and coastal strips. The very nature of these properties – i.e. long and 
narrow areas, constricted between the sea waves and a more and more 
dangerous enemy – led Venetians to want a border. It was a vital need for 
the survival of the Venetian Stato da Mar (maritime provinces) but not 
for others. As a matter of fact, it was not equally perceived by Habsburgs 
who, from the heart of Europe, ruled a wide Empire and could afford the 
existence of an indefinite area to its ends. The conquest or the loss of some 
miles was not vitally important for this sovereign, as it was for Venice, for 
which loosing Morea, Dalmatia and the Albanian towns meant to loose all 
of its maritime provinces.
The first document that concerns agreements for the border between 
Venice and the Porte was signed in 1479, right after a peace agreement. 
On this occasion, the sultan sent the emin Halil bey in Morea and later 
in Nafpaktos, Himara, Sopot, Shkodër, Bar, Ulcinj, Budva and Kotor to 
establish the border. The instructions given by Mehmed II were commu-
nicated also to Venetians and were very precise with regard to the lands 
and the towns he had to get or give. The areas conquered by means of 
the sword by the sultan’s victorious armies had to go to him, even though 
this implied rejecting a natural border such as the one represented by 
the waters of the Bojana River near Shkodër. Old borders, such as those 
who had marked Giovanni Cernovich’s lands, were restored. Poljica and 
other places did not have to offer gifts to the sultan anymore.2 In this first 
border name-i hümayun that was written in Greek as it was customary for 
the correspondence with European states, there are some of the principles 
that underpinned the drawing up of agreements regarding the borders: the 
official task given to a diplomatic representative of going there to debate; 
the existence of possible natural borders other than those of ancient states 
1 As for the borders of the Middle East or of North Africa in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, see Blake, Schofoeld, Boundaries and State Territory, passim.
2 Documenti turchi, no. 4; Bombaci, Nuovi firmani greci, 300-305.
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that could be restored; finally, the problem represented by the territories 
conquered with the sword that nobody wanted to yield. In this case, the 
principle of ‘alā ḥalihi or uti possidetis ita porro possideatis, according 
to which each state had to keep what it possessed when the hostilities 
ended, was customarily applied. This concept seems to have remained 
in the agreements with the Porte until the eighteenth century, because 
it was used with the same procedures also in the Treaties of Karlowitz 
and Passarowitz. Also in the agreement reached after the war of Cyprus, 
Venice yielded the island together with Sopot castle, whereas the borders 
in Albany and Bosnia did not change.3
If the line established for Albany in 1479 satisfied Venetians, Morea 
one did not; therefore, two official representatives (a Venetian and an Ot-
toman) were sent there, so that the decision would not be unilateral but 
made by mutual consent. Sinan bey and the secretary Giovanni Dario, 
whose palace on the Gran Canal near the Salute is still known by his name, 
were chosen. They went to Greece and the Venetians superintendents of 
the most important border fortresses took part in their debates and deci-
sions; other debates took place also in Istanbul between the ambassador 
Nicolò Cocco and the sultan himself. They reached an agreement that was 
slightly different from the order given by Mehmed II to Halil; as a matter 
of fact, Pastrovich and Zupa, which had belonged to Giovanni Cernovich’s 
territories, went to Venice. Venetians were asked to destroy Galata castle 
(near Nafpaktos) – which was rebuilt after one year – and were prohibited 
from rebuilding the ‘Tzivérin’ one in Morea.4 Only at the end of the negotia-
tions did the sultan issue a hududname (or sınırname) and the decisions 
were confirmed.
It may be observed that the procedure for the institution of the borders 
was not yet well defined at that time. At the beginning, a single representa-
tive was sent there (the Ottoman one), and only later were two representa-
tives designated. Moreover, the discussions continued also in Istanbul with 
the Venetian ambassador. Finally, the sultan one-sidedly acknowledged 
the border line by means of a sovereign act. His successor, Bayezid II, 
renewing the peace, endorsed those borders but, after the arising of some 
usurpations to his detriment in Morea, he asked for their restorations and 
confirmed them again.5
The hududnames were still rather common in the sixteenth century; 
then, between the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, when a real 
practice for the institution of borders was created, they appeared as a 
remnant of the past, rejected by Ottomans and obstinately demanded by 
3 Documenti turchi, no. 818.
4 Documenti turchi, no. 21.
5 Documenti turchi, nos. 35, 37/c.
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Venetians. The index Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Rehberi mentions only 
the one issued by the Republic and paid at a high price after the Treaty 
of Karlowitz.6
The hududnames concerning international relations are not the only 
ones. There were other relating to the inner borders of the Empire, for 
example to administrative areas or properties given by the sultan to emi-
nent characters.7
3.2 The Creation of a Practice
At the end of the fifteenth century, another war upset the relations between 
the Republic and the Porte. Towards its end, new contacts maintained by 
the Venetian envoy in Istanbul brought peace back. Once again, the issue 
of the borders was referred to some official representatives. The doge 
charged the secretary Alvise Sagundino with this task but then, after the 
latter had given the fortress of Lefkada with arms and munitions to Turks, 
he substituted him with another secretary, Zaccaria de’ Freschi. Ottomans 
assigned the task to Ali, the sanjakbeg of the area (at least for Morea). 
Then, another name-i hümayun that acknowledged and confirmed what 
had been decided was issued.8
Similar imperial documents, i.e. the international sınırnames or the hu-
dudnames, appeared to have been rather common in this period, much 
more than in the following years. They were the natural conclusion of the 
peace agreements and the ensuing debates on the borders. The practice 
concerning the meeting of two official representatives in the places to be 
defined is witnessed not only for Venice but also, for example, for Poland: 
after the Ottoman conquests, around 1542, it was necessary to establish 
the border line of south Ukraine between Poland-Lithuania and the Otto-
man Yedisan: the diplomats were the sanjakbeg of Silistra (assisted by the 
qadis of Akkerman and Bender) and the Polish hetman Mikolaj Sieniawski; 
however, their debates came to nothing since they could not reach a satis-
factory agreement and the border remained indefinite. There were other 
debates a little less than a hundred years later in 1633 for the institution of 
a line of demarcation with the Polish lands and other discussions followed 
in 1673, 1680 and 1703, after the Treaty of Karlowitz.9
6 Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Rehberi, 144.
7 Cf. Calligraphies ottomanes, 166, 170-171.
8 Documenti turchi, nos. 100, 108, 157.
9 Kolodziejczyk, Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations, 58; Veinstein, L’occupation ottomane, 
137-146. For a further Frank-Ottoman delimitation happened at the end of the eighteenth 
century, see Prokosch, Molla und Diplomat, passim.
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Disputes and debates concerning the borders took place in peacetime 
as well. In the 20s of the sixteenth century, for example, uninterrupted 
border violation by both parties brought about usurpations, or we might 
also say that a certain indefiniteness of the border line caused the likeli-
hood of border violation and usurpations. By then, the sanjakbeg of Bosnia, 
Hüsrev, together with the qadi of Skradin and some representatives of the 
other state, was charged with restoring the borders between the Most Se-
rene Republic of Venice and the Porte near Šibenik and Trogir. Venetians 
laid claim to seventy or eighty villages, even though they produced only 
‘Christian writings’ in support of their statements, namely privileges the 
king of Hungary had granted to them. Local Turks, instead, argued that 
those lands had been conquered with the sword during the war but had 
remained deserted; then, they were turned into mukataa; men were sent 
there and registered as tax-payers (i.e. for öşr). In 1530 the emins of the 
country recorded the inhabitants paying haraç and cizyes in a new register 
(defter-i cedid), together with the lands that had been given as tımars to 
the sipahis and the fortress guards (hisar eri) that had already received 
their berats. In the end, these villages were acknowledged as belonging 
to the Republic, but the fact that they had been already assigned as tımar 
made their restitution more difficult. In the following period, in order to 
avoid such cases, just when problems concerning lands that had already 
been assigned were in sight, the sipahi was immediately sent away and 
rewarded with another benefit.10 Putting system like this into practice in 
the Ottoman Empire was rather easy since the system of tımars did not 
bind the recipient and his successors to a specific estate for ever, but the 
latter could be replaced with a wider or smaller one and, in case of the 
sipahi’s death, it came back to the state.
The most ancient Venetian documents, which are kept in Venice and 
certify the sultan’s orders to carry out inquiries (teftişes) with regard to 
borders, date back to this period; they contain also arzs of reply by the 
local authorities and abstracts of sicil with authentications of qadis that 
attest the rights upon the lands given back by Ottoman subjects. Only after 
having been informed did the sultan issue an order with which lands or vil-
lages had to be kept or given back.11 The qadi’s key role in the certification 
of new or re-established borders started in this period, fully developed in 
the second half of the century and was applied until the eighteenth century.
An order given by Murad III to the sanjakbegs of Bosnia and Klis and to 
the qadis of Klis and Sarajevo in 1575 explains how a border with the Re-
public was expected to be re-established after a dispute.12 The recipients, 
10 ASVe, LST, f. I, cc. 10, 28-29, 35; f. II, c. 10; f. VII, c. 49; Documenti turchi, nos. 261, 307.
11 ASVe, LST, f. I, cc. 30, 39; Documenti turchi, no. 638.
12 Documenti turchi, no. 829.
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together with the çavuş Cafer, had to meet the diplomats appointed by 
Venice, mark the borders again and place the signals; then, the two parties 
had to exchange the acts of delimitation. The hüccet issued by the qadi 
had to be transcribed in the sicils and a copy had to be sent to the Porte.
The practice of defining a border, which was to be applied in the Vene-
tian-Ottoman relations also after the Treaties of Karlowitz and Passarowitz, 
was employed as follows. The sultan and the doge designated their own 
representatives and provided them with credentials that certified them as 
diplomats charged with marking the new line. The two representatives, 
together with their retinue that could be composed of hundreds of men in 
the most important missions, gathered where the works had to begin; they 
measured the land, placed signals and questioned the local population on 
the subject, checking the maps and tracing out new ones. At the end of 
these meetings, they exchanged the documents: Venetians provided the 
opposite party with an act undersigned by the clerk (cancelliere) of the 
mission with the diplomat’s seal and the Republic’s seal with Saint Mark’s 
lion. Ottomans handed over the original of a hüccet undersigned by the 
qadi or the qadis that had followed the committee; a copy of this hüccet, 
once copied in the official register, was sent to the sultan together with an 
arz drafted by the diplomat charged with the delimitation and, if necessary, 
by the qadi too. The transaction was completed and confirmed without any 
further formalities. To be safer, however, the sultan could issue a hudud-
name as a confirmation in which the content of the hüccet was quoted.13
Beside hüccets, however, during the negotiations, other documents were 
issued by Ottomans: they were temessüks, i.e. certificates unilaterally un-
dersigned by the sultan’s representative and given to the opposite party. 
In the Ottoman-Venetian affairs, they were drafted mainly when there had 
been some objections or uncertainties. According to Kolodziejczyk,14 these 
acts were an integral part of the practice used to establish the border be-
tween Poland and the Ottoman Empire. They were similar to peace docu-
ments, drafted in two languages, undersigned and sealed by a diplomat 
and exchanged. As for Ottomans, the delimitation document was copied in 
the official registers (defter-i mufassals in the case of the new province of 
Podolia/Kamenice), but it did not originate a hududname. The temessüks 
were drafted after the issue of the ahdname (sometimes even after some 
years) and represented the conclusion of the peace talks.
13 Pedani, The Ottoman Venetian Frontier, 172.
14 Kolodziejczyk, Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations, 67.
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3.3 Marking the Space
Once the areas where a border line had to run were spotted, the official 
representatives of both parties had to identify it on the ground so that from 
then on everybody could recognise where a state ended and another began.
Since the classical antiquity, men used to place signals on the ground to 
indicate a border. These elements possessed a sacred character; according 
to Numa Pompilius’ law, those who dared to budge a boundary stone, i.e. 
a boundary mark, had to be sacrificed to gods. Such severe punishments 
were inflicted by other peoples too. In the Early Middle Ages, however, 
after the coming of peoples of Germanic origin, fences, hedges, ditches 
and, most of all, trees on which some marks had been impressed were 
preferred. This was perhaps the expression of a world that was attached 
more to nature, woods and forests than to human manufactures. The per-
son to whom a plant, and all the other plants from that spot on, belonged 
seemed to be more important than talking about ownership. Only Franks 
resumed the Roman custom of the boundary stones.15
With regard to the Venetian-Ottoman borders, some information about 
the way to mark the territory may be found in the documents issued at the 
end of the delimitation and in the papers that were drafted during the end-
less discussions between the two representatives. First of all, pyramids of 
stones (which were called masiere in Venetian or unche in the Dalmatian 
dialect) were preferred: they were made of stones collected on the spot 
and gathered to form a heap that was placed where the border line ran. A 
cusp-shaped stone was usually placed on the top to make the construction 
more recognisable.16 The construction of such a structure could be a hard 
work and explained the presence of several diggers and labourers in the 
retinue of the diplomats charged with establishing the border.
The long document concerning the so-called ‘Nani border’,17 established 
in Dalmatia in 1671 by Battista Nani and Hüseyin pasha (the beylerbeyi 
of Bosnia), also describes trees or big stones on which a cross had been 
carved. This was a very old system of marking the space used not only in 
Dalmatia but also in other European places; for example, in the Venetian-
Imperial borders a cross carved on the stone with the Habsburg coat 
of arms on one side and Saint Mark’s lion on the other was often used. 
The vertical limb pointed out where the border line ran.18 Another way 
to mark the space was driving a boundary stone into the ground – many 
15 Werkmüller, Recinzioni, 641-659.
16 Sartore, Termini di confine, 273-335.
17 I Libri Commemoriali, vol. 24, nos. 66-71.
18 Sartore, Termini di confine, 295.
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examples of which still exist in the Dolomites or on the Venetian lagoon 
edge; not only coats of arms but also inscriptions, dates, numbers and 
letters of the alphabet were carved on these structures: sometimes there 
was the progressive number of the signals, sometimes the first letters of a 
nearby town’s name. The boundary stones could easily be moved by those 
who wanted the border line to run in a different place. Kolodziejczyk states 
that along the Polish-Ottoman border a heap crowned by a cross was used 
by the Christian party and a stack of wood in the form of a turbaned head 
by the Muslim one.19
Uprooting and replanting a tree used to mark a border was harder, 
but nature itself could destroy it or somebody could fell it. Removing the 
engravings carved on a rocky wall was quite a different thing and, as a 
matter of fact, this system was employed to mark the Venetian-Ottoman 
border of Dalmatia-Albany as well. For example, in the winter of 1699, in 
the mountainous area near Herceg Novi and Risan, there was the meeting 
between the substitutes of the diplomats Giovanni Grimani and Osman 
ağa, who had preferred not to go in such an inaccessible area that was 
covered with ice. After their arrival on the spot, these men realised that 
snow and frost prevented from finding stones or ground to build the heaps 
and, thus, they decided to carve the side of the mountain. Up until that 
moment, the cross was the only sign that had been used in the Venetian-
Ottoman borders, such as the Nani, the Šibenik (1546) and Zadar (1576) 
ones.20 By then, however, the cross was not considered to be fit to indicate 
both states; thus, it was used only with reference to the Republic, whereas 
the crescent was reserved for the other state.21 It was an old Turkish sym-
bol and this was probably the first time Ottomans used it alone, and not 
together with other symbols, to mean the Ottoman Empire, as Europeans 
already did. Twenty years later, on the occasion of the new boundary line 
(the Grimani one), what had been decided was not modified and the cross 
and the crescent remained to show where the Republic of Venice and the 
Empire of the sultans met.
3.4 Border Fortresses
Fortresses and strongholds had great importance in the establishment of 
a border line. Keeping them was a deterrent and ensured greater safety 
to the inhabitants, both in peacetime and in case of a future war. Leaving 
them to the enemy meant granting him a place whence he could watch and 
19 Kolodziejczyk, Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations, 62.
20 ASVe, Confini, b. 243bis, cc. 21-23; Documenti turchi, no. 863.
21 I Libri Commemoriali, vol. 30, no. 61; ASVe, Grimani, b. 8, no. 39 (13 February 1700).
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attack their territory. Such a delicate subject could not be extemporised.
The first Venetian-Ottoman agreement after the fall of Constantinople 
shows that Venetians were still interested in their trades by sea and were 
little involved in probable attacks from the land. Their castles in Romania 
and Albany are mentioned only to state that they could not host enemies or 
traitors of the sultan. The entire Venetian state was included in the peace 
because this had been officially reached by the sultan and the signoria, its 
nobles, the subjects, the towns, the lands, the islands and the places that 
hoisted Saint Mark’s flag.22
The following agreement (1479) reached after a long war (1463-1479) 
fought not only at sea but also in the open field to the point that the akıncıs 
went beyond the Tagliamento river. This document speaks of fortresses and 
borders more in detail. Peace was sworn by the sultan by land and sea with 
all the Venetian lands, castles, islands and places. Venice was obliged to 
return Shkodër, Lemnos, the «castelli e i luogi… in le parte de la Morea» 
(castles and places in Morea) conquered during the war, but it was given 
back «li ocupati destreti neli confini vechi de le terre loro, vicinando cum 
li luogi de la mia Signoria in ogni luogo» (the regions – placed within the 
ancient borders of Venetian lands – that the Ottomans had conquered near 
the sultan’s lands).23 As it was said before, the first known delimitation that 
was made by two official diplomats (a Venetian and an Ottoman) took place 
right after this peace.
When a fortress had to be surrendered to the former enemy, all the 
arms and munitions that were kept there were usually taken away and 
the fortress was emptied of soldiers and officers. Peace agreements usu-
ally provided for this, but this practice was not always observed: in 1503 
Lefkada castle was handed over by Venetians to the sultan’s representative 
with what it contained and seven prisoners; on the contrary, in 1540 the 
subaşi Yunus declared to receive the town of Monemvasia together with 
its stronghold but without armaments.24
An efficient running of the problem constituted by the fortresses placed 
along the border was important since, if they had remained in a disputed 
but empty area, the buildings would have represented an easy and handy 
shelter for criminals. In 1480, for example, the sultan threatened to send 
his men to destroy Thermis, Vatici and the castle of Aberto in Morea, which 
had not yet been given to him as it had been established and which had 
become a den for fugitives.25
22 ASVe, Comm., reg. 14, cc. 136-137v (=143-145v).
23 ASVe, Comm., reg. 16, cc. 136v-137 (=138v-139); in Greek cc. 142-142v (=144-144v).
24 Documenti turchi, nos. 106, 440, 435, 436.
25 Documenti turchi, no. 13.
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If a party could not easily gain such fortresses during the peace talks, 
it often asked to destroy them. This happened in 1539 when the sultan 
destroyed the constructions that had been built by Venetians near Herceg 
Novi in Ottoman territory during the war. The demolished buildings often 
were not old but new and built during the hostilities. For example, in 1542 
the sultan ordered to fell a fortress near Shkodër: already destroyed by 
mutual consent for safety reasons in the days of İskender bey Mihaloğlu, 
it was rebuilt by Venetians during the war (1537-1540). One of the reasons 
that justified the outbreak of the hostilities by Ottomans, stated in the ulti-
matum of the first part of the moon of ramazan of 977/7-16 February 1570, 
was that, according to the sultan, Venetians were rebuilding castles and 
villages beyond the borders. The year before, the Porte had complained 
about the fact that two new fortresses had been built along the borders 
of Klis and other thirty-four (already demolished on the basis of the peace 
agreement) had been gradually restored. This behaviour, however, was not 
only Venetian; also Ottomans, when they could, acted in the same way: in 
1586 the sultan was forced to order the demolition of the new fortresses 
along the border of Bosnia, since Venetians found out suspect traffic of 
lime and wood.26
Fortresses and castles were built or restored not only during war, but also 
in peacetime, especially when this lasted for many years and the geo-politics 
of an area was changing. When we consider the relations between the Porte 
and the Most Serene Republic, we shall take into consideration the fact that 
there was not a permanent conflict, but there were long periods of truce, 
among which the most important one lasted from 1573 to 1645; another one 
lasted from 1718 until the end of the Republic in 1797 and was characterised 
by the drawing-up of the 1733 perpetual peace that did not need any further 
ratifications.27 There are several examples of fortresses built during these 
long truces: in 1557 the sultan ordered to demolish a castle that troubled the 
neighbouring salt marshes in the district of Poljica near Klis, together with 
a fort that had been built nearby by the inhabitants of Split who menaced 
Ottomans’ peaceful exploitation of the salt. In 1577, while the sanjakbeg of 
Klis, Mustafa, was building a fortress in the district of Kotor, Venetians and 
Uskoks were building another fortress in Podgorje round an old tower that 
had remained deserted for more than eighty years. They also tried to seize an 
old fort placed near Sedd-i Islam that was readily demolished by Ottomans. 
In 1601 and in 1622 Ottomans erected two fortresses in Novigrad and Split.28
To carry out such projects, however, it was necessary to have much 
building material and this could not be neglected by the inhabitants of 
26 Documenti turchi, nos. 410, 488, 802, 808, 958.
27 Bellingeri, Un frammento, 247-280; Pedani, La dimora della pace, 40-41.
28 ASVe, LST, f. II, c. 42; f. III, c. 164; f. V, cc. 204-205; BOA, MM, reg. 6004, c. 108.
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the neighbourhood. If the other party had been informed, its help could 
be asked for, but it was difficult to obtain it. In 1531 the sultan ordered 
Venetians to defend the workers that were building the fortress of Solin in 
the sanjak of Bosnia: it was placed in a desert and dangerous area, near 
the Venetian sea harbours, and was easily assailable by the enemies. In 
1547, instead, the sultan asked Venetians to give him bricklayers (bennā), 
carpenters (neğğār), workers (erġāt) and supplies for the construction of 
the castle of Nadin in the sanjak of Klis.29
Nadin, together with Buchach, Rasten, Velin, Vrana, Sene and Degirmen-
ler (i.e. Mills) were fortresses placed in the Bosnian borderland, towards 
Dalmatia, in an area that had been conquered by Ottomans during the 
war (1537-1540); these place names appear in the ensuing peace agree-
ment. The possession of Nadin and the near Vrana was not questioned by 
Venetians, even though their name was remembered also in the following 
capitulations of 1567, 1575 and 1576. Degirmenler, instead, was recog-
nised as Venetian despite the fact that, already in the 20s of the sixteenth 
century, this place was questioned since it was near Solin where there was 
no castle but only mills belonging to Šibenik’s people. In 1523 the area 
was probably the vizier Ahmed’s property (mülk): he proposed an agree-
ment, which was confirmed by the sultan the same year, and Venetians 
recognised his rights in exchange for money. The other fortresses aroused 
much controversy. It was necessary to constitute a mixed committee to 
establish the owners of Buchach (a deserted tower in front of the castle 
of Klis), Sene (the ruins of a castle built to protect a salt marsh), Rasten 
(a house placed among the olive trees near Šibenik and the sea), and the 
tower of Velin, which stands near the castle of Strevice. This committee 
decided they were all Ottoman; the castle of Rasten, however, was then 
left to Venetians who, still in 1546, held a garrison in Velin too.30
As regards the fortresses right along the border, Karlowitz border agree-
ment is of special interest. If we read the reports of the time, it is clear 
that the space around a fortress had to be given to the state that possessed 
the fortress; then, a series of niches and circular bulges was created in a 
straight line that usually could be travelled over in some hours. Therefore, 
not all the forts placed exactly along the border line were demolished, but 
some of them were given, by mutual consent, to one of the two states.
29 ASVe, LST, f. I, c. 25; f. II, c. 18; cf. Bonelli, Il trattato, 355.
30 ASVe, LST, f. I, cc. 22, 27, 70 (edited in Bonelli, Il trattato, 351-352); Documenti turchi, 
nos. 430, 528, 540, 543, 556, 562; Theunissen, Ottoman-Venetian Diplomatics, 617-639.
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3.5 The Disputed Land
Sometimes, after the end of the fighting – in any case before the ratification 
of a peace or the creation of a border –, one of the two parties could sud-
denly seize a place, a village or a castle that was considered to be strategi-
cally relevant and, thus, attractive and important to go on discussing on 
favourable terms. Many examples of such a behaviour exist with reference 
to the Balkan borders. For instance, Habsburgs behaved in this way after 
the Treaty of Karlowitz, during the talks for the new Venetian-Ottoman-
Imperial border: on 10 June 1699, about one thousand knights and five 
hundred infantrymen went under the walls of the fortress of Zuonigrad 
and asked to surrender it. After a refusal, they attacked it, whereas only 
three artillery fires could be shot from the walls; one hundred Habsburg 
soldiers got into the fortress through a breach and took possession of the 
building, which they would possess even after the border agreement.31
Such usurpations could take place also in peacetime. In 1531, for ex-
ample, the bailo complained to the sultan about the unlawful occupation 
of places between Split and Omiš. Vice versa, in 1542 the sanjakbeg of 
Shkodër, Halil, and the qadi of Montenegro told that the people of Kotor 
had taken possession of many public lands of the ‘salt marsh of the despot’ 
and had put them to crop, thus damaging the picking of salt, while other 
lands had been seized near Starigrad and Pastrovich, Bar and Ulcinj. In 
this case, the sultan ordered to check the border by mutual consent once 
again and, if Venetians had gone on farming Ottoman lands, to ask them 
the due taxes. In 1564 the Porte was ordered to demolish three houses 
built on Venetian lands near Klis and to give them back what had been 
unduly occupied. In 1590 border violation near Pastrovich by Ottoman 
subjects was reported, whereas in 1591 Venetians were accused of having 
plundered, and then occupied with the Uskoks, thirty-four villages, i.e. 360 
baştines near Split, Šibenik and Trogir, whose inhabitants ‘now pay haraçs 
to the infidels’, and the castle of Vrhpolje that had become, according to 
the supplicants, a den of pirates. In the near Petrova, two Ottoman for-
tresses were built by Ottomans to protect their territory from usurpations. 
Both Ottoman and Venetian local authorities sometimes unduly changed 
the border line, just like the sanjakbeg of Klis, Ferhad, tried to do in 1559.32
Lands as well as their inhabitants could not be easily yielded to the 
neighbouring state. For example, in 1537, on the eve of a war, the sanjak-
beg of Bosnia, Hüsrev, prepared a list of 150 people – among which there 
31 ASVe, PTM, f. 701, no. 14. For the account of these events seen from the imperial point 
of view, see Holjevac, The “Triplex Confinium”, 133-137.
32 ASVe, LST, f. IV, c. 159, f. V, cc. 10, 13, 14, 28, 10, 478, 479, 2; Documenti turchi, nos. 
284, 490, 748, 788.
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were also women and children – that had taken refuge in the Venetian land. 
Not all the inhabitants of a place were happy to live under a certain ruler 
and, if another state with different customs and faith lay near there, people 
could turn to the ‘enemies’ in the hope of a better destiny. Before the fall 
of their city, the Greeks of Constantinople often said that they liked better 
the turban of a Turk than the tiara of the pope of Rome. Other episodes 
are less known. For instance, around 1520-1523, the inhabitants of some 
villages of both Rhodes and Karpathos wrote to the sultan asking for help; 
the first complained about the oppression exerted by the Christians and 
asked to send the army to conquer the island.33
3.6 Rivers and Mountains
When a border was planned, it was important to make it visible. If it ran 
along a river, the same waters formed a silver dividing line. For many 
peoples, and also for Turks, before their conversion to Islam, water was a 
holy element; dirtying it, even just to wash, was a crime; the banks, most 
of all the nearest to the source, were an area close to god and, therefore, 
they were a place appointed to oaths, alliances and peace agreements. The 
very course of the waters was of special value: as a matter of fact, some 
sovereigns wanted their tombs to be dug right in the riverbed, after having 
diverted it as long as it was necessary. The same applies to high places, 
i.e. the mountain or hill tops, which were considered to be suitable for 
oaths, sovereign graves or else to mark the division of the space. Traces 
of this ancient belief may still be found in the agreements between Venice 
and the khans of Crimea: in 1342, for example, peace was sworn next to 
a river in a place called ‘red bank’.34
Just like the rivers, mountain ranges often used to mark a border; also 
in this case, however, it was difficult, if not impossible and often useless, 
to leave marks to find the exact border dividing the two states. Sometimes, 
the marks were left at steep faces’ feet and in the written agreements it 
was specified that they had to be interpreted as if they had been placed on 
the tops. This is what happened in 1778 to Venetians and Habsburgs near 
the Marmolada glacier; then, ignoring the written text, someone wanted to 
make reference to that old agreement to mark the border between Veneto 
and Trentino taking into consideration only the signs left on the mountain 
and not the maps of the time. Therefore, we may infer that studying old 
agreements is not only a display of culture, but it can have an effect on 
the present as well. From the point of view of the current geopolitics, the 
33 ASVe, CXM, reg. 46, c. 22v; Documenti turchi, nos. 400, 1102.
34 Diplomatarium, vol. 1, no. 135.
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border, or borders, that once divided the Venetian Dalmatia from the Otto-
man Empire are likewise important: for many tracts the ancient maps were 
used to divide the present-day territory of Croatia from that of Bosnia.35
During the nineteenth century, seas and mountains were defined as 
‘natural borders’; as a matter of fact, it was believed that the very nature 
had divided men and cultures; physical barriers were thought to be a god-
send, an element that always existed, just like peoples living on the two 
sides of a border were destined to stay separate. The line of the Pyrenees 
was considered as the best example of that concept for a long time, just 
like the Urals were believed to be the separating element between Asia 
and Europe, and the Mediterranean Sea was believed to be a belt between 
Christianity and Islam.
The border between the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Venice was 
marked not only by the man’s hand but, wherever possible, by nature. In 
1720 the stream Tiskovac, which is a tributary of the Cetina near Strmica, 
for example, was recognised as the limit of a zone that could be crossed 
in five hours. Thus, if a ‘dry border’ (suha meda) existed between Habs-
burgs and Ottomans after 1699 in the area near the left bank of the Una 
River, this means that in other areas of the valley, where the limit really 
ran together with the river waters, the border was necessarily ‘wet’. Still 
in 1542 Polishes and Ottomans contended about a common tract: the first 
argued that it had to run along the Kodyma, which was a right tributary 
of the Boh; the other maintained that it had to run along the Savran (or 
Savranka) placed more northward.36
3.7 Measuring Space and Time
We are used to the decimal measuring system that is world-wide spread. 
Therefore, it is not easy to understand the difficulties peoples once had 
to agree on the way to measure the space. During the discussions held 
to mark a border, the diplomats had to agree on the distance between a 
fortress and the border line or between a sign on the ground and the next 
one. These were important issues, since giving a certain quantity of land 
to a stronghold meant making it more or less dangerous, while giving a 
land to a state meant to reduce the other’s territory.
The Venetian unit of length was the piede veneto, that is to say 0,347 
m; five piedes were equivalent to a passo veneto (1,738 m), whereas six 
35 I libri Commemoriali, vol. 33, no. 13 all. (register); cf. also the original text in ASVe, 
Comm., reg. 33, c. 57; Mustać, The Borders, 63-71. With regard to the mountains in the 
previous 1750 border, see Zoccoletto, Il congresso di Mauthen, 140. 
36 Documenti turchi, no. 1851; Roksandić, Stojan Jankovic, 240; Kolodziejczyk, Ottoman-
Polish Diplomatic Relations, 58-59.
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piedes were equivalent to a pertica grande or cavezzo (2,086 m) and one 
thousand passos were equivalent to the miglio veneto (1.738,674 m). As re-
gards Ottomans, measures of length proper and ‘of walk’ existed. The basis 
of the first was the arşın, which may be translated with ‘peak’ or ‘cubit’, 
but it took on different values according to the person who used it. There 
was the mi’mar arşını used by architects for walls or building lands that 
was equivalent to 0,758 m and had a multiple, the kulaç (1,89 m) and some 
submultiples: the kadem, i.e. the foot (0,379 m); the parmak, i.e. the inch 
(0,03159 m); the hat, i.e. the line (0,0026 m); and the notka, i.e. the point 
(0,0002 m). Then, there was the çuhaci arşını, that is the draper’s arşın, 
used for clothes, which was equivalent to 0,68 m and could be divided into 
rubs (0,085 m); for more valuable fabrics, they used the enzade that was 
slightly shorter (0,65 m). Among the geographical measures, there were 
the mil (mile) that was equivalent to 1,895 m, the fersah (5,685 m), the 
berid (22,740 m), conceptually equal to the distance between two post 
houses (berid), and the merhale (45,480), namely a day journey, whereas 
the imili bahri (sea mile) was equivalent to 1,667 m.37
There were several units of length and, thus, it was often difficult to 
entirely agree on a distance. Sometimes the measures used in different 
states had to be compared but also the space that could be travelled 
over in a certain period of time, usually on the basis of the hour, could 
be considered. After the invention of mechanical clocks, measuring time 
became easier, even though the length of day and night officially contin-
ued to vary according to the season and, as a consequence, according 
to the measure of the hours. In midsummer, the day, from dawn to dusk, 
was much longer than the night and, thus, the hours (always twelve) into 
which it was divided drew out in direct proportion, whereas night hours 
consequently drew in. On the contrary, in winter, the relation was reversed 
while day and night hours were of the same length only in the period of 
the equinoxes. That system clearly belonged to peoples who still lived in 
close contact with nature.
Once the two diplomats established to agree on a walk of a certain 
length, they had to choose whether it was a man’s or an animal’s walk and 
which kind of animal; the steps of a camel are different from those of a 
horse, a mule or a donkey, and these ones are different from those of a man.
The description of the decision of a short tract near the Triplex Con-
finium in 1699 is very useful to show how such a border was physically 
marked. On 20 June 1699 the Venetian, the Imperial, and the two Ottoman 
diplomats started their work debating on the kind of steps they had to em-
ploy, i.e. those of a man, a horse or a camel; they did some tests with their 
37 Martini, Manuale di metrologia, 817; Système des mesures, 3-9; İnalcık, Weights and 
Measures, 987-994; Introduction to Ottoman Metrology, 311-348.
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clocks and they soon realised that each of them differently measured the 
space covered in an hour. Reasoning on the basis of the linear measures ap-
peared to be easier: for the time being, a Turkish ell corresponded to half 
a Venetian step minus a quarter, so that 1330 Turkish ells were equivalent 
to 598 geometrical Venetian steps. On August 30th, after having marked 
the point where the three states would meet, they started to debate on the 
space to be assigned to the strongholds and they decided to establish the 
equivalence between a ride of a quarter of an hour and the geometrical 
steps. They did some tests: in the presence of the two delegations, the car-
tographer Giust’Emilio Alberghetti started to ride and a Turk set out «with 
a ridiculous step» while the imperial diplomat, count Marsili, calculated 
the duration of a quarter of an hour with his clock «plus some minutes out 
of politeness»; in the meantime, his colleague Giovanni Grimani measured 
the ground with a pole sealed with the state seal and representing the 
official measure of a Venetian step. At the end of the test, a quarter of an 
hour was equivalent to 1.057 steps and this would be the measure used to 
establish the semicircular line that ran around the strongholds.38
3.8 Meetings of Diplomats
The papers of Giovanni Grimani and Alvise III Mocenigo – the Venetian 
diplomats charged with establishing the borders after the Treaties of Kar-
lowitz and Passarowitz – provide some information on their life during the 
months spent side by side with the Ottoman delegations to establish the 
border line between Saint Mark’s land and the sultan’s one. Besides the 
diplomatic meetings and the land measurements, building boundary stones 
and distributing guard posts or farmed lands to the parties, there were 
also pleasant and relaxing moments with courtesy visits or the exchange 
of gifts and favours. Working together for many months, meeting almost 
every day and also quarrelling could make people know each other and 
sometimes even become friends.39
The Venetian gifts were: olive oil and cinnamon water (perhaps just ar-
rived from Venice), oranges and lemons, fabrics, sugar loafs, jams, grana 
cheese (i.e. parmesan by then called piacentino), clocks, fish and even 
wine, which request really amazed Venetians. Ottomans gave enamel and 
locally made stirrups, boots, handkerchiefs or muskets (such as the ones 
given by the pasha of Herzegovina to Mocenigo), or fans, clothes, perfume 
38 ASVe, PTM, f. 701, nos. 19, 38.
39 ASVe, Grimani, b. 8, no. 39 (Giovanni Grimani’s diary); Documenti turchi, nos. 1651-
1862; Pedani, The Ottoman-Venetian Frontier, 175. As for an Iberian case, see Szászdi León-
Borja, La demarcación, 194-196, 199-201.
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burners, tobacco and pipes, rose jam, sorbet glasses, combs, amber and 
aloe. Becoming friends also meant to invite the other to family events, such 
as the wedding of the diplomat Mehmed efendi. He invited his Venetian 
counterpart who did not go in person but sent a representative with a 
mirror and some jams for the married couple. Sometimes, this familiarity 
was used to obtain the treatments of a physician who had joined the other 
state’s expedition and who was probably more experienced than their 
own, or the release of a slave, as did Mocenigo for a certain Pellegrini in 
return of some Ottoman slaves. On the contrary, at the beginning of their 
acquaintance, Osman ağa tried to obtain the release of some prisoners 
from Giovanni Grimani who, however, managed to give a vague answer 
about it. Having a physician available for any contingency was often very 
important since several accidents could happen: on 8 July 1699, for exam-
ple, Grimani was hit by a horse’s kick and stayed aching in his tent for a 
few days, while on August 15th people coming from the town of Zuonigrad, 
which Ottomans disputed with Venetians, attacked one of the two Ottoman 
camps, stole some horses and injured some men. Colds and fluxions too 
were on the agenda.40
The diplomats in charge with the borders – Venetians, Imperials or Ot-
tomans – did not do their job on their own. Their retinue was often very 
large. For example, in 1699 Osman ağa, an old ağa of the sultan’s silih-
dars, carried 100 infantrymen, 100 knights, 180 slaves, 70 diggers and 
100 members of the retinue destined to his person; among the latter there 
were a kadı, a defterdar, a miralem, an alaybeyi, five old experts from the 
village and an interpreter. Giovanni Grimani, instead, had a retinue of more 
than five hundred men, i.e. 100 knights, 100 infantrymen, 250 people that 
had to look after the horses and the luggage, and 100 members of the 
most closed retinue of which also a secretary, two or three interpreters 
(depending on the moment), a cartographer, six trumpeters and two physi-
cians were part. According to rumours of the time, the imperial diplomat, 
count Luigi Ferdinando Marsili, reached the place of the meeting with 
four hundred people.41
40 ASVe, PTM, f. 701, nos. 8all., 11-12, 28; Documenti turchi, nos. 1662, 1669, 1723, 1725-
1726, 1731, 1736-1737, 1739-1742, 1744, 1754-1757, 1762, 1766-1769, 1771, 1773, 1776-1777, 
1780, 1784-1785, 1788, 1800, 1821, 1831, 1838-1839, 1853.
41 ASVe, PTM, f. 701, no. 12.
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3.9 The Triplex Confinium
When we think about a border, we usually imagine a long line that divides 
two states. Sometimes, however, there are places where three states meet, 
if not four. If some problems may arise when only two state entities are in-
terested in the delimitation of a border, the decision of a Triplex Confinium 
is even more difficult. The way the Venetian-Imperial-Ottoman border was 
established in 1699, and was later questioned, is a model. In the last few 
years, several historians have dealt with this issue. The break up of Yugo-
slavia, with the consequent birth of new state entities in need of historical 
references for a more correct identification, gave rise to a widespread 
interest (with different political implications) in the subject of borders 
and, especially, in the Triplex Confinium, i.e. the border where the Empire, 
Venice and the Porte met. In this recent historiographical production, it 
is interesting to observe that the documentary sources used by scholars, 
however concerning the same subject, are different and complementary. 
Some historians use only the documents kept in the State Archives of 
Zadar even if they present a point of view that is essentially Ragusean;42 
others tackle the problem from a purely cartographic point of view on the 
basis of the maps kept mainly in Zagreb;43 others study the papers of the 
Steiermärkisches Landesarchiv of Graz and mainly recall the imperials’ 
remarks,44 just like those who focus on the count Luigi Ferdinando Mar-
sili’s Italian papers;45 others analyse the Venetian sources and what the 
representatives of the Republic thought;46 and, finally, other scholars use 
only Ottoman documents.47
As for the concept of the triplex confinium, its meaning may vary ac-
cording to the perspective: it may be a point – more precisely, for the 
Venetian-Habsburg-Ottoman border of 1699, the peak of Debelo Brdo, or 
Veliko Brdo on the Medveda Glavica mountain –, but it may also be, in the 
broadest sense, a whole area that shares the same problems, for example 
the one that extends among Zadar, Senj, Knin and Bihac, i.e. the most 
important towns between the bordering states. As for the Eurasian area, 
42 Tolomeo, La repubblica di Ragusa, 305-323.
43 Slukan, Cartographic Sources. Cf. also the catalogue of the exhibition on the Treaty 
of Karlowitz, Like Mira.
44 Holjevac, The “Triplex Confinium”, 117-140.
45 Marsili, Relazioni dei confini; Nouzille, Histoire de frontiers, 98-105.
46 Pedani, The Ottoman-Venetian Frontier, 171-177.
47 Abou-El-Haj, Ottoman Diplomacy, 498-512; Ottoman Attitudes, 131-137; The Formal 
Closure, 467-475.
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there were, according to Alfred J. Rieber,48 at least five other similar areas: 
Transylvania where Habsburgs, Hungarians and Ottomans met; the Pontic 
steppe next to the Polish-Russian-Ottoman border; the ‘Caucasian knot’ 
as a point of contact among Russia, the Porte and Persia; and finally, the 
Russian-Chinese-Mongolian border in the innermost Asia. The same author 
finds many similarities mainly between the first border, the Pontic steppe 
and the Caucasian part rather than with the other two areas, and draws a 
parallel between the Cossack and the Uskok societies. Peace agreements 
and diplomatic meetings were necessary to establish these borders; for 
example, in 1724 the Ottoman Empire and Russia agreed upon the place 
of the Caucasian triplex confinium: it was near the Caspian Sea, not far 
from Baku, but not on the mountain peak as in the Balkans but at the 
confluence of two rivers, the Kura and the Aras.49 The situation remained 
very uncertain because of the Persian army that moved forwards and re-
tired, and the Russian army that sometimes was called, such as in 1770, 
in defence of Christian peoples. Moreover, there were local rebellions, 
such as the one guided by Mansur Ušurma, i.e. Giovanni Battista Boetti, 
an Italian friar converted to Islam and founder of a new universalist and 
mystic creed, based more on the Koran than the Gospel.50
In the Balkans, i.e. the area where the Habsburg Empire, the Otto-
man Empire and the Republic of Venice met, local people, subject to one 
of these states, did not find, at least until the late eighteenth century, a 
blockade in the state border. Shepherds used to go downhill to reach the 
coast each year in autumn; in spring, instead, they followed the opposite 
path to go to the green summer pastures in the mountains. Here, i.e. an 
area that was always disputed, this transhumance influenced also the real 
border line among the states. To explain this we should start from August 
1699 and the meeting between Giovanni Grimani, Osman ağa, İbrahim 
efendi and Luigi Ferdinando Marsili in Otton. The latter, after a five-hour 
discussion, suddenly «spiccata una corsa» (running), headed for three 
little hillocks that Osman ağa had just pointed out stating that they were 
the perfect place for the Triplex Confinium; then, «col geto de sassi e col 
sbaro della gente di Cesare s’alzò masiera gettando tutti un sasso» (stones 
were thrown and Habsburgs were shooting and the heap of stones was 
built because everybody threw stones), while the four diplomats hugged 
one another. The presence of a wide – Venetian, Ottoman and Habsburg 
– documentation allows to reconstruct also the most hidden manoeuvres 
that led to that run. A secret meeting had taken place the night before 
48 Rieber, Triplex Confinium in Comparative Context, 17-18, 23-27.
49 ASVe, SDC, f. 177, cc. 550-553, with a drawing (a Venetian copy of an Ottoman original 
used for the definition of the border).
50 Sambonet, Il profeta armato, 76, 78, 154-175.
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between Marsili and the representatives of the Porte who had decided to 
place the Triplex Confinium there; in this way the Empire would widen its 
territory at the expense of Venice, preserving (in addition to Zuonigrad, 
which had been unduly torn from Venice after the signing of the peace) 
also the territory as far as the fortress of Otton, whereas Ottomans would 
conquer the fertile plain of Plavno and Strmca.51
Caught off balance, Giovanni Grimani yielded to the psychological pres-
sure of the moment but soon after, realising that he had been compelled, 
refused to undersign anything. A verbal decision was not enough if it 
was not confirmed by a written, signed and sealed text. After a few days, 
while the Venetian diplomat was not taking any decision stating he had to 
wait orders from Venice, there was a small clash between the diplomats’ 
men and some Vlachs. According to Grimani, it was a skirmish done on 
purpose to make him decide and, thus, to close the meeting. As a matter 
of fact, they soon had to leave since the situation was tenser and tenser. 
Therefore, he left Popine and set off with Osman ağa to go on with the 
delimitation along the entire Dalmatia. The problem of where the Triplex 
Confinium had to stand remained unsolved. For Venetians, Debelo Brdo 
was unacceptable, which is why they did not ratify the agreement; on the 
contrary, for the Imperials and Ottomans, recognising it meant seizing a 
strategically important tract. In this way, since everybody kept their posi-
tions, the problems remained unsolved: Zuonigrad went to the Imperials, 
the town of Plavno to Ottomans and the fortress of Otton, together with 
its territory including the Debelo Drdo peak, to Venetians. That situation 
remained unchanged also after the Treaty of Passarowitz. In the meantime, 
since a delimitation was necessary for practical necessities, even though 
there was not a political border, they continued to use, until the end of 
the Republic of Venice (1797), the line that the local people called ‘the 
shepherds’ border’ because it was used for the transfers of herds from the 
summer pastures to the winter ones and vice versa.52
51 ASVe, Grimani, b. 8, no. 39 (12 August 1699); PTM, f. 701, no. 34; Marsili, Relazioni di 
confini, 146, 149.
52 ASVe, SDC, reg. 35, cc. 144-145; Netto, I confini, 137-153.
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4.1 A Border Society
From a social and political point of view, a border area was different from 
any other. First of all, the political uncertainty was greater: not only war 
but also a renewal of peace agreements could lead to reallocate the lands 
to one or the other state. Peoples, especially if pushed by religious reasons, 
very often followed these changes and moved. Mercenary soldiers or com-
panies were recruited more in those areas than anywhere else. Venice, for 
example, made good use of the Dalmatians’ anti-Ottoman feelings, looked 
for alliances with local people and recruited many Serbians or Vlachs in its 
army. Ottomans found an element of strength in the akıncıs, mainly during 
their advance in the Balkans. Habsburgs created the Militärgrenze, namely 
an area where the male population was potentially formed by fighters.
In particular, according to various scholars, the structure of the Habs-
burg captaincies, inherited by the ancient Medieval states of Hungarians, 
Slovaks and Croatians, was imitated in the Ottoman captaincies, created 
in the Balkan conquered lands. The captaincy of Gradiška was created in 
1537, the one of Krupa in 1565, the one of Bihac in 1592. In both states, 
they were military centres of local professional soldiers, both infantry-
men and knights but in Ottoman Bosnia they were hereditary while in 
the Habsburg Empire they were not. Moreover, while in the latter they 
started to gradually decrease throughout the eighteenth century, the Ot-
toman ones stayed longer and still in 1829 they were thirty-nine in the 
eyalet of Bosnia.1
A mountainous area placed close to a more fertile coast appears to be 
a special environment. Then, if also a border line runs in this territory, 
this may influence not only the customs of those who live there, but also 
the natural environment. Mirela Slukan, thoroughly analysing the area of 
the Triplex Confinium, showed that in such a zone a society committed to 
1 Roksandić, Stojan Jankovic, 242; Moačanin, Some Observations, 241-246.
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sheep-breeding and transhumance kept its customs longer than elsewhere, 
and only partially and very slowly changed into an agricultural society; an 
uncertain possession of the land, together with the fear of possible dev-
astating wars, did not encourage to put down roots in certain areas.2 This 
happened only when the international situation was stable and the state 
helped agriculture, as Habsburg and Venetian local administrations did. 
For instance, the introduction of the potato, promoted in the Militärgrenze 
at the end of the eighteenth century, greatly helped to convert the semi-
nomadic population into a resident one.
Habsburg and Ottoman lands had also a different distribution of the vil-
lages that were structured in two different ways. In the latter, the houses 
were assembled in small family units (zadruga, ‘extended family’): for 
instance, the village of Klenovac was formed by nine houses gathered in 
six groups placed on the side of a mountain among pastures, forests and 
lands, but without a road in the true sense of the word that linked them 
together. When Ottoman countries started to go over to the Empire, also 
their structure started to change and the houses assembled mainly along 
the trade roads.
In the Dalmatian area the transhumance was influenced by geography 
as well; the climate of a dry coast (into possession of Venice) was suitable 
for a winter permanence of the herds, whereas the mountains, however 
Imperial and mainly Ottoman, were wetter and more suitable for summer 
pastures. Moreover, men used to gather wood in the mountains for the 
needs both of the coast and the inland. This intense exploitation done be-
fore the agreement on the Triplex Confinium in 1699 contributed towards 
the creation of nude and barren soils in the Venetian part and towards a 
significant reduction of the forests in the Ottoman Lika region.
 At least until the late eighteenth century, the shepherds of both states 
did not find a real blockage in the state border. They went in the inland 
each year in spring and in autumn they headed to the coast. This happened 
also in the area of Otton, Plavno, Strmca, not far from Debelo Brdo, where 
the Triplex Confinium had been officially established and where, as we 
already saw, the presence of shepherds had a peculiar influence on the 
border line.
2 Slukan, Cartographic Sources, 72-75.
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4.2 Trade
A border society usually shares two cultures and two ways of living, speak-
ing, being. Even in Dalmatia, or in the Aegean zone, where Venetian and 
Ottoman, Christian and Muslim territories were neighbouring, people usu-
ally exchanged goods, did business together and, in general, talked. In the 
Modern Era and, even more so, in the previous period even a river or a 
mountain did not create an almost impenetrable ‘rolling shutter’ border, 
which is common today and due mainly to technical progress.
As Ottoman and Venetian sources testify, Christians and Muslims who 
lived in those area traded and attended the same fairs. For example, in 
1527 the provveditore (governor) in Zakynthos sent some of his men to buy 
horses at the fairs held in the sanjak of Morea; in the same area, in 1537, 
some Venetian merchants were attacked and robbed of 500 or 600 Vene-
tian ducats; in 1533 a Venetian merchant was attacked and killed by a gang 
of criminals of a close village while he was going to the famous and re-
nowned market of Podgorica; in 1533 voivodes and subaşis of Dulcinj tried 
to prevent the sultan’s subjects, putting many obstacles in their way, from 
going to trade in Venetian Shkodër; in 1599 Fabrizio Salvaresa thought 
to create a port of call where the wood that Turks and Venetians used to 
chop in the deserted woods between Obrovac and Karin (that belonged to 
the imperial estates beyond the river Kerka in the sanjak of Klis) could be 
sold to Venetians. Documents obviously relate only of extraordinary events, 
thefts or murders; of course, it is difficult to find memories of exchanges 
that took place without quarrels. Sources make reference to merchants 
who took advantage of their status of foreigners to buy goods without 
paying them immediately and to take refuge in their motherland straight 
after, as happened in 1527 for some corn among Methoni, Chlomoutsi 
and the Venetian island of Zakynthos. If some objections arouse abroad, 
an Ottoman subject could sue a Venetian trader in the court of the place 
where he was; only if he was in the ‘guarded Empire’, could he call him 
to answer either locally or at the Porte. As for them, Venetian merchants 
were sometimes explicitly protected by name-i hümayuns addressed to the 
Ottoman local authorities and issued on the bailo’s request.3
The produces the Venetian state exchanged with the Ottoman Empire 
were not only those freighted by the mude after a long journey at sea as 
far as Istanbul or to the harbours of the Syrian shoreline: this was not 
the only way through which Ottoman produces arrived in Venice. Others 
(mainly stock) arrived right from the Balkans or from Morea (wheat, olive 
oil, raisins). In the second half of the sixteenth century, because of the 
3 ASVe, LST, f. II, c. 126; BOA, MM, reg. 6004, c. 17; Documenti turchi, nos. 217-218, 231, 
302-303, 392, 751, 753, 755. As for the reasons that pushed to create the harbour of Split, 
cf. Paci, Spalato, 45-70.
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Uskoks pirates and the Barbary privateers that overran the Adriatic and the 
basin of the Mediterranean, overland journeys from Istanbul to the Adriatic 
coast were preferred. Diplomats, Ottoman merchants as well as goods that 
were brought by Venetians more and more frequently at the Ottoman fairs 
beyond Dalmatian borders followed the same land route, while the jour-
ney by sea was reduced to the crossing of the Adriatic from Dalmatia and 
Albany to Venice. We know of stock either shipped in this area or brought 
by land. When there was a famine in the Ottoman territories, however, also 
the exports suffered a slowdown, as in 1566 near Klis, when the exports 
of oxen and provisions were totally interrupted to meet the needs of local 
people. It is important to observe that the necessities of sailing boosted a 
coast trade too: a ship had only to fire a cannon shot to make the peasants 
of the close inland villages dash bringing commodities and animals to sell.4
When the goods left a territory, either Venetian or Ottoman, they had 
to pay a tax that was equal to a licence of export, as the sultan stated 
in 1569 in a name-i hümayun concerning a trade of arms: once paid the 
customs duty, one of his subjects was on the point of loading weapons 
in Venice when Venetian authorities stopped him since their export in 
Ottoman territory was forbidden by the Venetian law; as a consequence, 
long cases between the two states started. In the Empire, the duties were 
collected by the emins that had usually purchased the contract, paying 
out a tax for the berat of appointment and a yearly sum to the imperial 
treasury; the title of privilege was usually valid for three years and then 
had to be renewed. These officers sometimes were Turk, often Jewish, but 
a few times they bore Christian names. The duty on the Turkish salt sold 
in the Venetian harbours, such as Split, Trogir, Šibenik, Zadar or Kotor, 
was collected by emins who often, even if not always, asked and obtained 
to live in those places, or at least close by, so that they could check the 
trade. Others could settle in farther areas; for example, in 1531 the emin 
of Neretva and Makarska, who checked the trade with Split and Trogir, 
often went to these two towns with the aid of the Venetian authorities to 
collect duties and tolls. If an emin did not pay the contract to the sultan, he 
was sought by the law of his country, even though he was in another state; 
since this money belonged to the imperial treasury, it was possible to 
get legal redress even abroad, as Haydar, the sanjakbeg of Herzegovina, 
stated in 1561. The contractors sometimes were in a ruthless competi-
tion, lowering the percentage due to them to push the merchants to sell 
in a certain Venetian harbour; but if the sultan sold all the contracts of a 
zone to the same person, as happened in Šibenik, Split, Zadar and Trogir 
in 1591, then, the rates increased to Venetians’ great disappointment. On 
4 ASVe, LST, f. II, c. 175; BOA, MD, reg. 23, c. 47; Documenti turchi, nos. 722, 990. As for 
the trade of raisins, cf. Fusaro, Uva passa; Tucci, L'alimentazione, 601.
The Ottoman-Venetian Border (15th-18th Centuries) Pedani
4 Living along the Border 73
the basis of the capitulations, the tax on the salt or other goods was of 5% 
for Venetians: there is evidence of merchants who maintained they had 
been compelled to pay more, up to 12% and, in a resounding occasion, 
up to 150%. The subjects of the Most Serene Republic theoretically did 
not have to pay other taxes, even though sometimes they were compelled 
to sustain other taxations and were subsequently exempted after several 
protests they made to the sultan. For example, in Morea in 1526-1537 they 
had to pay the ağırlık and around 1599, in some Ottoman harbours, were 
compelled to pay the kassab akçesi on the stock like the local merchants. 
Such contrasts with the emins went on also in the following century.5
In the Venetian harbours, however, it was possible to meet not only 
merchants subjects of the Most Serene Republic but also of the Ottoman 
Empire; they were often Jews, but there were also Muslims; in Dalmatia 
they were mainly of Balkan origin, i.e. of Bosnia, Herzegovina or Albany; 
in the Hellenic islands, instead, mainly inland Greeks arrived. It was both 
a local and an international trade and it induced people from Lefkada, 
Arta or Ioannina to reach Cephalonia or Corfu, or people from Morea or 
Aitoliko or Angelokastro to go to Cephalonia or Zakinthos. Surely, given 
the few miles of sea between Ottoman and Venetian lands, these people 
knew the places, the language, the merchants and how to meet the local 
requirements. Nevertheless, they went abroad, in a state with a different 
justice, other laws and other judges; thus, a peculiar institution was cre-
ated to meet local needs and to protect Ottoman merchants: a Venetian 
was charged with defending Ottoman subjects as their consul. The first 
one was created in Corfu in 1598 at the Ottoman merchants’ request; then, 
others were created in Cephalonia, Nafplio and Zakinthos, whereas in Split 
and Zakinthos there were also consuls for the Ottoman Jewish subjects. 
At the end of the eighteenth century, there was still one in Zakinthos that 
dealt not only with the merchants of the close Morea, but also with every 
Ottoman who arrived in those waters and needed his help.6
Besides regular exports, there was smuggling too: both in the harbours 
and along the borders, people arrived ready to challenge the harshness of 
the law not to pay duties and tolls, or to illegally export forbidden goods. 
The Empire forbade to export mainly gunpowder, lead, leather of tanned 
bullock, wheat, copper, cloth for sails, arms, wax, horses, pitch and tallow, 
as a list of 1589 says. Sometimes also Venetians were involved in those 
illegal trades, as some imperial orders of mid-seventeenth century show. 
5 ASVe, LST, f. II, cc. 78, 280; f. V, cc. 212, 213; BOA, MM, reg. 6004, cc. 17 (Morea and 
Euboea), 41 (Split); Documenti turchi, nos. 223, 226, 241, 243, 253, 258, 280, 347, 384, 395, 
526, 537, 557, 571, 572.
6 ASVe, Mercanzia, 1st s., b. 600, fasc. «T. Condulmer» (14 January 1793); 2nd s., b. 44; 
SM, f. 218 (12 July 1618); f. 430 (25 October 1650); f. 677 (30 October 1688); f. 752 (9 Janu-
ary 1700); f. 878 (3 May 1721).
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Venice produced many arms that were exported both via land and sea in 
the sixteenth century, as the bailo Marino Cavalli stated in his report in 
1560: he was sad to see Venetians killed by the weapons they themselves 
had made. The goods sent from Muslim harbours to Ancona were another 
problem: Venetians often wanted the payment of the toll since they con-
sidered the Adriatic as their Gulf.7
4.3 Border Violation and Violence
Life was not always peaceful in a border area, especially when the border 
divided a Christian state and a Muslim one. Here quarrels could easily take 
on a religious value. As the historians synthetically say, wars usually are made 
out of hunger or religion: in the first case, when there is no more hunger, there 
is no more reason to fight, but in the second case stopping the war is much 
more difficult because it is necessary to change people’s ideas and feelings. 
When a Christian and a Muslim country were near, a runaway could easily take 
shelter in a state with different laws, where extradition was not automatic, but 
could be obtained only after a thick exchange of letters with local authorities. 
What had been established by those who ruled in the distant capitals was not 
always accurately applied. Finally, wars often left a legacy of hatred, desire for 
revenge and retaliation that only many years of peace could somehow soothe. 
Speaking in broad terms of a border society is not always easy: we should 
constantly bear in mind the political situation and the wars just ended; in this 
way, we could realise that violent episodes were much more widespread just 
after a war than in other periods, when people had got used to a quieter life.
Some of the oldest Ottoman documents kept in Venice deal with crimi-
nals and fugitives who, in the neighbourhood of Nafpaktos in the years 
following the Ottoman-Venetian war that ended in 1479, left the Ottoman 
lands for the Venetian ones and then went back to destroy and damage 
the country they had abandoned. Vice versa, in the same years, there were 
people who, however still living in the ‘guarded Empire’, went in the other 
country to commit crimes and robberies. Between 1479 and 1481, not all 
the border strongholds of Dalmatia, Albany and Greece had already been 
destroyed or handed over to one of the two states, as peace agreements 
had established; thus, they had become a likely den of drifters instead of 
being a defence for the inhabitants. The governors were interested in keep-
ing both the territory and its inhabitants: without peasants the soil was not 
tilled and the land easily became a prey for those who lived beyond the 
border. At the same time, in this way a state could loose part of its territory. 
7 ASVe, Bailo, b. 250, reg. 330, cc. 5a-b; b. 252, reg. 343, c. 37; LST, f. II, c. 111; BOA, MD, 
reg. 90, cc. 43-44; Documenti turchi, no. 683; Le relazioni, vol. 3/1, 293; Faroqhi, Die Osma-
nische Handelspolitik, 207-222; Ágoston, Merces prohibitae, 177-192.
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Therefore, in 1487 Bayezid II asked the doge to give back or immediately 
stop his Christian subjects running away towards Venetian lands.8
Besides those who ran away for political or religious reasons, there were 
those who took advantage of an uncertain situation to commit thefts and 
robberies more easily: their targets usually were wheat, horses, stock and 
fruit and vegetable produces. The sources recall several episodes, equally 
distributed in the Modern Age and along the entire Venetian-Ottoman 
border. For instance, in 1527 the authorities of Chlomoutsi and Kyparissia 
complained to the Venetian provveditore in Zakinthos about several thefts 
of horses committed by the inhabitants of the island. In the same year, a 
swindler who pretended to become a monk in Vlacherna, in Ottoman terri-
tory, created much more problems: he promised to give everything he had 
to the monastery, but then, once he gained the other monks’ confidence, 
sold some monastic properties and took refuge in Zakinthos. The qadi 
and the notables of Chlomoutsi strongly protested to Venetian authorities. 
The quantity of information regarding thefts and cattle-stealing depends, 
besides their concentration in a given time and a given territory, on the 
importance of the damaged people: for instance in 1577, after Venetians 
had damaged some salt marshes in Bastia, Piero Francesco Malipiero, 
governatore delle galee dei condannati, wrote to the doge saying that the 
local emins’ estates had not been touched, otherwise, as usual, they would 
have already yelled.9
In a border area also water could be stolen. As a matter of fact, fresh 
water was of vital importance at the time as it is still today. Venetians 
knew very well the importance of rivers. There are few documents about 
the thefts of water, but we should not be amazed at the fact that some 
inhabitants of Vonizza in the Venetian Stato da Mar cut the banks of the 
river Berdas, which ran also in the Ottoman sanjak of Karlı Eli, diverting 
its waters so that they flew only in their territory. As a consequence, they 
made the Ottoman fields barren and the neighbours’ mills ran aground. 
This happened not only in 1722 when an appeal to the Porte was necessary, 
but then almost twenty years later. Facts such as this one testify that fresh 
water was of great importance for the inhabitants of this zone.10
There was also the problem of nomadic peoples who could easily reach 
a state border during their wandering: for example, in 1528 several is-
sues arose near Šibenik and Trogir because of nomadic groups of Vlachs 
who moved from land to land and destroyed olive groves, vineyards and 
fields, and seized the inhabitants to sell them as slaves. Other gangs of 
criminals pretended to be Turks in the land of the Most Serene Republic 
8 Documenti turchi, nos. 10, 14, 35.
9 Documenti turchi, nos. 225, 227-230, 310, 373, 378, 387, 541.
10 ASVe, Bailo, b. 254, reg. 350, cc. 295-297; b. 258, reg. 359, cc. 325-328.
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and Venetians in the land of the Porte so that they could bewilder those 
who asked for justice. For instance, in 1523 Venetians said that some 
Turks had attacked their villages while a group of Hungarians had stolen 
15.000 sheep belonging to the Grand Vizier; on the contrary, the latter, 
together with his brother who was sanjakbeg of Herzegovina at the time, 
accused Hungarians of attacking the villages of the Republic and Venetians 
of cattle-stealing.11
Detaining the soldiers at the guard posts in a long and forced inactivity 
was not always easy. The strongholds could not be dismantled, but at the 
same time the soldiers could create disorders. Sometimes they organised 
themselves into very big gangs and terrified the people. In 1523 and in 
1530, for example, Süleyman I commanded the sanjakbegs of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina to check the martoloses, azebs, akıncıs, subaşis and sipahis 
that terrified the Venetian territory; in 1532 there were other forays from 
Herzegovina; in 1533 some hisar eris of Chlomoutsi stole in the Venetian 
Kotor and then shared out the loot with the dizdar of their fortress who 
protected them; later on, in Kotor, after getting drunk, they attacked the 
local superintendent of the fortress with their swords unsheathed. At the 
same time, the hisar eris of Risan attacked men, lands, ships and fortresses 
preventing the trade via land and sea. In 1536 wrongdoers of Klis were 
supported and helped by the neighbouring Venetian castles, whereas from 
the Ottoman coast incursions were made in Kotor, which was attacked, 
together with Budva, by the soldiers of the Ottoman fortresses. Then, in 
1545, after the war, Venetians damaged the area of Klis, as the sanjakbeg 
Mehmed complained to the doge: he maintained he had managed to put 
a curb on his subjects who, under his predecessor Veli, used to kidnap 
Venetian children; therefore, he wanted the Venetian authorities to do the 
same preventing their subjects from committing reprehensible actions.12
Sometimes, however, small local authorities themselves organised their 
bands and destroyed, stole and obstructed the trade. For instance, in 
1534 the voivode of Montenegro, Hamza (subject to Skotor authorities) 
used to ravage vineyards and orchards in Budva, to the extent that the 
inhabitants were compelled to shut themselves up at the fortress. Then, he 
reached Kotor with his men, menaced the Venetian notables and blocked 
the approaches to the town. A few months before the war, in 1537, an-
other voivode – he too subject to Skotor authorities – or the same one, 
but it is not possible to verify it, attacked with a band of thirty or forty 
knights and many infantrymen not only the villages but also the Venetian 
soldiers in their fortresses, killing some of them, seizing and putting the 
11 ASVe, LST, f. I, cc. 1, 27 (translated in Documenti turchi, no. 198); f. II, c. 14; f. III, cc. 
179, 184.
12 ASVe, LST, f. I, cc. 6, 8; f. II, c. 17; Documenti turchi, nos. 251, 285.
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others into slavery. Right after the war, some Ottoman voivodes used to 
steal in Venetian vineyards and vegetable gardens in Zadar. Sometimes 
the sanjakbegs themselves protected their subordinates who did this or 
even made them carry out these actions. In 1545 the sanjakbeg of Bosnia, 
Ulama bey, backed Deli Mehmed when the latter started to repeatedly 
pillage forty-nine villages in the territory of Zadar that were disputed be-
tween Venetians and Ottomans: they hoped the inhabitants would declare 
themselves Ottoman subjects just to put an end to the assaults. Venetians 
apparently did not act in a different way and the following year Turks 
complained about robberies, border violation and forced transfers of the 
people from their territory to the Venetian one; at the same time, the emin 
Ferhad was busy with putting the subjects of Saint Mark into slavery in 
the same area. War had officially ended six years before, but the souls had 
clearly not subsided yet and the uncertainty of the border line helped to 
stir them up. The sanjakbeg of Klis was ordered to stay for some time in 
the fortresses of Karin, Nadin and Vrana to prevent border violation. We 
know of other gangs that, after twenty-five years, were active there: in 
1581, with the connivance of the sanjakbeg of Lika and Kerka, Mehmed, 
a Turkish kapudan, advanced with flags flying from Karin with infantry-
men, knights (sancak açup, as the document says) to attack the fortress of 
Novigrad near Zadar. The following year, two companies of knights were 
sent to pillage the villages of Gruziya and Dračevac in the countryside of 
Zadar. These gangs took 57 men prisoner, killed 12 men, raided 520 oxen, 
1250 sheep and 20 horses, and if someone started to plough the fields 
again, they reappeared to break the ploughs. Many years after, in 1599 
the dizdar of a fortress near Omiš attacked again the Venetian territory.13
A last remark concerns the outbreak of the hostilities. As soon as a con-
flict between Venice and the Porte arouse, also those who did not belong to 
the army could raid the estates just beyond the border. Nothing was safe 
anymore. In those days news spread by word of mouth and people could 
not immediately access to reliable sources for a confirmation or a denial; 
thus, even the rumour of such tragic an event could bring about episodes 
of retaliation. For example, in 1591 a big fleet was built by Ottomans and, 
to prevent people from thinking it was ready to fight Venetians, the sultan 
immediately sent an official denial to all his officers in control of border 
lands.14
13 ASVe, LST, f. II, c. 5; f. IV, cc. 78-79; f. V, c. 236; Documenti turchi, nos. 329, 394, 512, 
553, 600-601, 891, 910-911, 918-919.
14 ASVe, LST, f. V, c. 34.
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4.4 The Divided Land
Governors and local lordlings often sent bands of robbers to raid the lands 
of a neighbouring state not only to devastate the country but also to create 
a no man’s land that acted as a buffer and to lay out the field for future 
silent usurpations. As we saw, borders were rearranged by officers sent by 
both sovereigns not only after a war – when the border line really needed 
to be re-established after new conquests – but also when an uncertain 
situation had been dragging on for years making the territory unstable 
and unsafe.
Men and lands were equally desirable: for example, in 1503 the sanjak-
beg of Morea, Ali, did not care about the recent peace and burnt the har-
vests farmed in the Ottoman state by Venetian subjects who lived just be-
yond the border; the following year, he asked the provveditores of Nauplia 
to forbid their subjects to cross the borders to farm the land. He thought 
that, in this way, they would have lost their means of support and most of 
them would have preferred to become Ottoman subjects. In 1528, instead, 
the emin of Pontikos sent one of his men to Zakinthos to collect the tithe 
from the inhabitants of the island that had lands in that area. In 1524 and 
1525 the Venetian ambassador in Istanbul paid 150 ducats as a tithe to 
Ayas pasha for the vineyards placed in the kaza of Argos in Morea, near 
the Venetian Nauplia. In 1532 objections arose because Venetian peasants 
had to cross the border when they wanted to grind their corn, since their 
mills were in Bosnia. Four years before, Venetian people from Šibenik 
had been attacked, robbed and made prisoners by Ottoman subjects of 
Skradin while they were going to their mills placed in the neighbouring 
state. Sometimes, however, the Venetians who lived along the coast longed 
only for plentiful fodder or woods of the close inland: in 1756 there were 
incidents in the area of Zadar because Venetians went in Ottoman land to 
scythe the grass or to chop wood.15
The examples we find mainly concern Venetians who went to farm the 
fields placed in Ottoman territory; the opposite practice appears to have 
been less common, even though in 1481 Mehmed II wrote that his subjects 
were allowed to possess and use lands placed in Venetian territory. On the 
contrary, an imperial letter addressed to the sanjakbeg of Herzegovina 
in 1529 seems to hint at the fact that the Ottoman subjects of the Poljica 
area could not have fields in the Venetian land. As a matter of fact, when 
a territory that had belonged to the Porte was vacated, Ottoman authori-
ties immediately ordered its inhabitants to leave it and go to another part 
of the ‘guarded Empire’: this happened in 1531 to the ends of Bosnia and 
then in 1558, near Šibenik, to some villages that had been recognised as 
15 ASVe, LST, f. I, c. 1; Documenti turchi, nos. 158, 202, 235, 273-274, 286, 865.
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Venetian. The following year, near Trogir, Vlachs, who lived in three of 
these villages, refused to leave them and consented to pay 1/5 or 1/6 of 
their fodders as land taxes and royalties to the authorities of Trogir and, 
in the due time, other royalties made of neuters, lambs, kids and wood. 
A century later, the inhabitants of one of these villages, Şuhodol, were 
still paying the tithe to the Venetian family Fasaneo from Hvar, owner of 
the lands they farmed, and, at the same time, the haraç to the Ottoman 
treasury. Around 1579, instead, near Parga, all the inhabitants of a village 
chose to leave it and to move to the Ottoman country to avoid paying a 
double taxation. In 1623 the sultan himself exempted the inhabitants of 
some Venetian villages near Kotor from the haraç, as it was customary in 
ancient times. What happened along the Venetian-Ottoman border was 
not different from what could happen elsewhere. For example, in Hungary 
the towns (mezövárosoks) of Nagykörös, Kecskemét and Cegléd obtained 
a certain administrative autonomy from the Hungarian feudal lords and 
then kept it under the new rule, but at the same time they agreed to pay 
the taxes to those who were entitled, no matter if they were Habsburg or 
Ottoman. The ups and downs of a border area could stir the inhabitants to 
submit to two masters just to live in peace: some Vlachs living near Trogir 
tried not to pay the taxes to Venetians anymore, arguing that the sanjak-
beg of Klis had exempted them, but after a series of contestations they 
paid, partially on a voluntary basis and partially after legal proceedings. 
In 1591, instead, according to a letter of Hasan, the beylerbeyi of Bosnia, 
10.000 families of Ottoman subjects paid haraçs to Uskok and Venetian 
infidels. The Most Serene Republic appears to have been more liberal on 
this point, either for sense of freedom or because it was compelled by the 
circumstances: after all, it is easy to send away a few hundred people, but 
it is harder to make a wide surface of land or a heavily populated area 
deserted. For instance, before surrendering Nauplia in 1540, Venetians 
carried the armaments away, but they agreed to leave some inhabitants 
there; this is why Süleyman I ordered his officers not to pester those who 
had decided to stay and to exempt them from various taxes, to respect 
priests, friars and churches, and not to constrain anyone to become a 
Muslim by force. In the same years, the sultan ordered the sanjakbeg of 
Herzegovina and the qadis of Shkodër and Montenegro to demand the due 
duties to the Venetians who farmed the sultan’s lands.16
An estate belonging to a subject of the neighbouring state could eas-
ily create conflictual relations. Quarrels broke out not only when a small 
farmer had his only field halved by a border line, but also when a rich 
16 ASVe, LST, f. I, cc. 8, 60, 65; f. II, cc. 24-25; f. IV, cc. 29-38 (file concerning the Vlachs 
of the area of Trogir); f. V, c. 4; SDC, reg. 5, cc. 142v and ff.; BOA, MM, reg. 6004, c. 143; 
Fabris, Il dottor Girolamo Fasaneo, 116-117; Documenti turchi, nos. 21, 490, 740, 746, 749; 
Beyerle, The Compromise at Zsitvatorok, 27; Veinstein, Les provinces balkaniques, 292.
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landowner possessed wide estates in a border zone; this was the most 
common situation and, in this case, peasants were often compelled to pay 
the tithes to the two sovereigns to live in peace. We know that, in order 
to solve problems of this kind in advance, in the fifteenth century the 
Republic of Venice and Habsburgs created two border lines; one of them 
officially separated the two states while the other marked the limits of the 
estates so that peasants and owners were not compelled to pay the taxes 
to both sovereigns.17 This system was not applied between the Most Serene 
Republic and the Porte and, thus, innumerable quarrels arose.
Sometimes, however, in peculiar periods and in some territories, a sort 
of double sovereignty, at least theoretically, was in force: for example, the 
islands of Cyprus and Zakinthos were officially considered to be Ottoman 
by Ottomans and Venetian by Venetians, even if the Most Serene Republic 
agreed to give a yearly tribute to the sultan to keep them undisputedly.
Zakinthos, which already belonged to the Tocco family from Cephalo-
nia, was conquered by Gedik Ahmed pasha in 1479; the following year it 
passed, together with Cephalonia, to Antonio Tocco again, but the latter 
had to give the two islands to Venetians in 1482 and 1483. In 1485 Vene-
tians surrendered Cephalonia to Ottomans but kept Zakinthos in exchange 
for a yearly tribute of 500 ducats; the agreements of 1573 increased the 
contribution to 1.500 ducats, and this sum remained unchanged until the 
Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699 when the payments stopped.
As to Cyprus, instead, in 1427 king Janus of Cyprus accepted to pay a 
yearly tribute to Mamluks to be able to be freed and leave Cairo where he 
was a prisoner. When Cyprus became Venetian (1489), the Republic took 
upon itself the former dynasty’s obligations and went on paying 8.000 
ducats in silk clothes to Egypt every year. Venice granted also a yearly 
pension of other 8.000 ducats to the former queen of the island, Caterina 
Cornaro. In 1517 Selim I conquered the Mamluk reign and took possession 
of its revenues. Venetians entered into an agreement with the new ruler 
on 21 şaban 923/8 September 1517, and transferred the yearly tribute to 
the Ottoman treasury even if Selim I wanted ready money and not clothes. 
This payment lasted until the eve of the war, broken out in 1571, that led 
to the Ottoman conquest of the island.
The peace agreements say only that a certain sum had to be paid to the 
sultan for Zakinthos every year. On the contrary, the 1517 peace agree-
ment, as well as the following ones, states that the tribute for Cyprus was 
a haraç, thus setting this tribute to an Islamic legal background.
17 Adami, I magistrati ai confini, vi.
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4.5 Border Favours
Those who live along a border often consider the neighbour as an acquaint-
ance and sometimes also a friend. Local authorities too used to exchange 
favours and gifts. It seems that sanjakbegs and qadis were more munifi-
cent towards the Venetian capitanos and provveditores than the sultan 
himself. In the sixteenth century, a large quantity of Ottoman diplomats 
were sent to Venice but the sultan’s gifts they brought were very few and 
worth little even though they had a great symbolic meaning. On the con-
trary, the sanjakbegs who ruled in Bosnia sent expensive objects to the 
doge: for example, in 1522 two horses, in 1587 some carpets and in 1591 
a falconry embroidered glove, a bow with some arrows and another carpet; 
other two horses were sent in 1551 by the beylerbeyi of Buda. There were 
exchanges of gifts also among the provveditore of Zakinthos, the sanjak-
beg of Morea and the qadis of Chlomoutsi and Kyparissia: in 1522 the first 
sent a falcon, namely an animal that Turks greatly held in esteem, and the 
sanjakbeg answered with rams and some head of cattle; other falcons were 
delivered to the qadi of Kyparissia in 1525. Another occasion of contact 
was represented by the visits that were periodically paid by Ottoman au-
thorities in the border districts; when Venetian provveditores knew their 
colleagues were arriving, they used to send them men and gifts and some 
sanjakbegs answered with letters of thanks for the pişkeşes (gifts given 
to a superior) that had been offered to them, as Mehmed, sanjakbeg of 
Shkodër in Albany, did.18
Border authorities exchanged not only gifts but also messengers. They 
often brought letters full of kind expressions, such as the one sent in 1592 
by Hasan, beylerbeyi of Bosnia, to the provveditore generale da Mar, Al-
morò Tiepolo: the beylerbeyi stated his intention to abide by the agree-
ments and assured to spare no efforts against the criminals that marred 
the peace; he also committed himself to preventing his subordinates from 
pestering the Venetian land and promised the respect of the ancient bor-
ders and the assistance by means of provisions and munitions. It seems 
that this Ottoman officer cared very much about the good relations with 
the Venetian authorities to the extent that he wrote to the count and the 
lords of Zadar praising their behaviour against Uskoks and asking them 
to let the merchants freely go to trade in Bosnia in the area of Banjaluka, 
where they would be treated well.19
Sometimes webs of relationships arouse in a border zone. Venetian no-
bles sent as provveditores or officers usually were not involved in them, 
18 Sanuto, I diarii, vol. 33, 440; ASVe, EP, reg. 7, cc. 153-154v; reg. 9, cc. 157-157v; Docu-
menti turchi, nos. 210, 219-221, 248-249, 705; ASVe, LST, f. II, cc. 32-33, 101-102; f. III, c. 173.
19 ASVe, LST, f. V, cc. 111, 148.
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since their families could not easily become related to someone who was 
outside the small group that ruled the Most Serene Republic. On the con-
trary, local inhabitants, who were subject to one or the other lord, could 
easily create new family ties. In 1527 the emin of Pontikos was connected 
by marriage with an inhabitant of Zakinthos. Blood relationships were 
made easier also thanks to the recruitment of the Ottoman ruling class by 
means of the devşirme (i.e. the levy of Christian boys) or the kidnapping of 
children. Not always those who were torn from their home as children for-
got relatives and friends: Ahmed Hersekoğlu, i.e. Stjepan Vukčic-Kosače, 
the duke of Saint Sava’s son, wanted to keep the memory of his origin 
in his patronymic (Hersek-oğlu, namely son of Herzegovina); similarly, 
Sokollu Mehmed pasha, as Gran Vizier, protected his relatives from Is-
tanbul. There were certainly other ties, perhaps less famous, but they too 
did not fall completely into oblivion. In 1550 the beylerbeyi of Buda asked 
Venice some prebends, from which his uncle the abbot already benefited, 
for his cousin Don Antonio from Šibenik. In 1564 Mehmed, sanjakbeg of 
Klis, wrote to the doge asking him to look after the Venetian nobles who 
were collaterals of one of his relatives, a certain Stefano who, after having 
abandoned his house and his faith, had become a Turk and then sanjakbeg 
of Herzegovina. In 1574 Ali, sanjakbeg of Ohrid, entrusted one of his rela-
tives, Vincenzo Diva, who had blood ties also with the powerful odabaşı of 
the sultan, to the doge. Also Uskok pirates sometimes had such relations 
with Turks, of which they were always known as bitter enemies: in 1590 
the chief of Senj, Yuri, was related to Hüseyin, his uncle and voivode of 
Zemunik, who was a great friend of İbrahim bey, sanjakbeg of Lika; in 1599 
the sanjakbeg of Kerka, Halil, sent one of his men to Senj to start more 
friendly contacts off and entrusted him with wheat and horses that were 
to be given to Uskok chiefs.20
20 ASVe, LST, f. II, cc. 32-33, 161; f. III, c. 44; f. V, c. 237; Documenti turchi, no. 222; Bailo, 
b. 250, reg. 330, c. 14.
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5.1 The Gulf: an Inland Sea
In 1727 upon his return from Istanbul, the bailo Francesco Gritti delivered 
a speech to the Senate about the Ottoman Empire and its relations with 
the Republic.1 His speech began with the following words: 
The unbroken and long land and sea border with its states, the trade 
with its harbours that was necessary there more than elsewhere, the 
frequent debates and the several atrocious wars are circumstances that 
lead the Most Serene Republic to have with it the closer relation for 
which it deserved merit and glory. (885)2
And he ended reminding:
On humbly presenting Your Excellencies’ sovereign and wise minds with 
these very honoured remarks whose aim is to prevent more frequent and 
more easily apt to arise disorders, I believe I did not avoid the necessary 
task to examine what is important for the Most Serene Republic when it 
deals with such a great imperium, for which the Divine Providence had 
it neighbouring for a long tract of land and sea. (947)3
1 Relazioni inedite, 885, 947.
2 The translation is made by the translator of this book. The original quotation reads: «Il 
continuo e lungo confine di terra e di mare con li suoi stati, il commercio con le di lei scale, 
più che altrove necessario, le dispute frequenti, le molte et attrocissime guerre, sono circo-
stanze che portano la Serenissima Repubblica ad avere ad essa quella più vicina relazione 
per cui si è acquistata il merito e la gloria» (885).
3 The translation is made by the translator of this book. The original quotation reads: 
«Nell’umiliare alle sovrane sapientissime considerazioni dell’eccellenze vostre questi riveri-
tissimi riflessi diretti a prevenire disordini più frequenti, e più facili a insorgere, credo non 
essermi distolto dall’assunto necessario di esaminare l’interesse della Serenissima Patria 
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The Republic of Venice, whose territory extended from north Italy to the 
Aegean, bordered the Ottoman Empire for a long tract of both land and sea 
in Eastern Mediterranean. Braudel argued that the Mediterranean is not a 
single expanse of water but the union of separate seas connected by more 
or less wide straits. This statement inevitably brings to mind a concept 
conveyed by a much earlier historian, Ibn Ḫaldūn, who in his Muqaddima 
states that the Mediterranean, which originates from the ‘surrounding 
Sea’ through the strait between Tangier and Taifa, splits northwards into 
two other entities: the Black Sea and the Gulf of Venice.4
Ibn Ḫaldūn, therefore, represents the thought of fourteenth-century 
Muslim scholars, for whom the ‘Gulf of Venice’ was a special entity, dif-
ferent from the ‘liquid plain’ from which it sprang, i.e. an inland sea that 
emerged from the north part of the Byzantine territory and extended from 
the Venetian land to Aquileia’s territory. From the point of view of the 
geo-politics, this description already seemed old at his times, inherited 
by previous scholars – when Byzantines still ruled over Adriatic shores 
–, not supervised and adapted to a situation that had already consider-
ably changed. Also for al-Idrīsī, who wrote in the twelfth century, a ǧūn 
al-banādiqa already existed. It should be observed that the first mention 
of ‘Gulf of Venice’ is neither Latin nor Italian, but Arabic: before 1000 AD, 
when a Venetian document still mentioned a Mare Adriaces (the Roman 
name that derives from the town of Adria), the traveller and geographer 
Ibn Ḥawqal already talked of a ǧūn al-Banādiqīn in his Ṣūrat al-arḍ.5
In the fourteenth century, when Ottomans established contact with Ven-
ice, this city asserted his supremacy over the ‘Gulf’, an entity that, initially 
confined within the area between the Po and Aquileia, had expanded as 
far as the axis Zadar-Ancona and then up to an imaginary line that linked 
Otranto to Vlorë and, finally to its maximum expanse, the landspit of Santa 
Maria di Leuca on the Italian coast to Corfu. It is important to observe 
that, however, in the very first years of the fifteenth century, the capitano 
generale da Mar Carlo Zeno defined also the waters of south Peloponnese 
as «chaxa nostra». The Porte did not question the Venetian right upon the 
Gulf except when the Most Serene Republic proved to be unfit to defend 
the Ottoman subjects who ventured there between the sixteenth and the 
seventeenth century. On the contrary, a study carried out on the Ottoman-
Venetian capitulations shows that already in 1419 the sultan wanted to 
con sì grande Imperio, cui la divina Provvidenza l’ha voluta confinante per lungo tratto di 
terra e di mare» (947).
4 Braudel, Civiltà e imperi, vol. 1, 102; Ibn Ḫaldūn, Muqaddimah, vol. 1, 98-99.
5 Edrisi, Libro di Re Ruggero, 78-79 (Arabic text); Documenti relativi alla storia di Venezia, 
58-60, no. 37 (944); Nallino, Venezia in antichi scrittori arabi, 111-120. Other ancient authors 
mentioned a baḥr, ǧūn or ḫalīǧ-Banādiqa.
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establish over the Sea of Marmara the same kind of supremacy Venice 
imposed over the Adriatic. The control exerted by Ottomans over the Black 
Sea was even more effective after all its coasts had fallen under the power 
of the Porte.6
During the Middle Ages, other Italian states behaved like Venice: Genoa 
wanted to have a claim to the Ligurian Gulf; some Tuscan towns to the 
Tyrrhenian Sea and the papacy to Latium’s coast waters. The towns and 
the states that opposed the supremacy exerted by Venice over the waters 
were European and not Muslim, on the basis of the Roman law and Jus-
tinian’s Corpus Juris Civilis for which the sea is shared by everybody and 
it is equally usable. In ancient times, Rome had extended its dominion 
upon all its shores and had got to the point of forgetting the most remote 
agreements concluded with Carthage that provided for a division of the 
sea waters among different states.7 From the thirteenth century onwards, 
welcoming the ancient Roman legislation in the ius commune, most Eu-
ropean states welcomed the idea that the sea was a common good. Ven-
ice, however, on its part, always asserted its own laws, established in its 
consilia and written in its statutes, refusing to conform to the Roman law 
and what was taught in the universities, and safeguarding its supremacy 
over the Gulf.
Only little by little, new situations pushed a Europe fed on the Roman 
law to find new solutions. For example, in 1479 when Europeans were 
discovering and exploring the ocean, the Treaty of Alcáçovas between 
Castile and Portugal mentioned some «terminos» in it, whereas the follow-
ing agreement, signed in Tordesillas in 1494, is called the treaty dealing 
with the «partición del Mar Oceano». Probably, as Ádám Szászdi Nagy 
writes, at the beginning it was just the creation of zones of influence that 
could be placed within the framework of the Roman law; but little by little 
they were converted into a territorial hemispheric empire, to the extent 
that the sovereigns Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella of Castile stated: 
«Mar Océano, que es Nuestro, que comienza por una raya o línea que Nos 
habemos fechos marcar […] por manera que todo lo que es allende de la 
dicha línea al Occidente es Nuestro e Nos pertenece».8 These statements 
of principle, however, did not prevent the sovereigns of Spain from op-
posing, still in the seventeenth century, the Venetian supremacy over the 
Adriatic in the name of the Roman law and the freedom of the seas, but it 
was right in this century that some jurists postulated, also from a theoreti-
6 Tenenti, Il senso del mare, 48-50; Pedani, Gulf of Venice.
7 Vismara, Il diritto del mare, 439-474; Cessi, La Repubblica di Venezia, 45-70, 115-168, 
208-217, 233-242; Camera, La polemica, 251-282; Sassi, La politica navale, 99-200; Stefani, 
Carlo VI, 148-224.
8 Szászdi Nagy, La partición del Mar Océano, 62.
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cal point of view, a maritime jurisdiction over the waters a state managed 
to control, both preventing others from sailing there and collecting taxes.
5.2 A Barrier in the Sea
A recent book by Khalilieh shows – on the basis of trade documents, inter-
national agreements and legal disputes – how Muslims have distinguished 
among high sea, stretches of coast and inland waters since ancient times. 
If high sea was necessarily out of the caliph’s sovereignty, a local authority 
could assert certain rights along the coast, whereas sea and lake waters 
fell straight within the state control. David Santillana states that, accord-
ing to various Muslim scholars, the sea is fay’, i.e. a purchase made peace-
fully by the treasury.9 The same customs concerning the funerals at sea, 
with the body made heavier by stones so that it was dragged down to the 
bottom (if they took place near an infidel country) or put into a coffin and 
left to the currents (when sailing was towards a Muslim territory), lead to 
think that the concepts of dār al-ḥarb and dār al-Islām applied to waters 
as well, or at least to a part of them.
The existence of waters belonging to a state does not appear to be for-
eign to the Islamic thought, just like the idea of a limit placed in the water, 
however difficult to conceptualise. As a matter of fact, three out of four 
verses of the Koran concerning the sea talk about a barrier placed by God 
between the fresh and brackish waters:10
9 Khalilieh, Islamic Maritime Law, 133-148; Santillana, Istituzioni, vol. 1, 318-319 («They 
are not for sale, because they cannot be appropriated by individuals and, therefore, they 
are bestowed to everyone… Water, a gratuitous gift from God, namely the free sea and the 
waters of big rivers… The running waters of rivers and coasts» [this quotation and the fol-
lowing ones were translated from Italian into English by the translator of this text]); 373-
374 («But the judiciary has found a way of… Restricting such rule. Water is indeed common 
and cannot be saleable. But if someone collects some water in a jar or in an enclosure, the 
water thus collected becomes his or her property for the right of occupancy and, since it 
is in his or her care… It stops being common… By extension, the same reasoning applies 
to the waters that are within the limits of a bottom, even if it is running water»); 382-383 
(«Easements… With regard to the waters…»); 406 («Muslims have three things in common: 
water, fire and fodder»); 409-410 («What is cast ashore by the sea… If it does not bear any 
trace of human work, it is res nullius… When… It bears a trace of human work: if it belongs 
to an idolater or there is any doubt about it, it shall be considered to be a treasure…; if it 
belongs to a Muslim or a protégé… The rules of the lost properties shall be applied»); 413 
(«Lost properties…»); 421 («Shores abandoned by the sea… al-Qarāfī tells the doctrine of 
Saḥnūn, Aṣbaġ and Muṭarrif, who believe that, when the sea moves and leaves a tract of 
land uncovered, this becomes a common property – ‘fay’, namely a purchase made peace-
fully by the treasury – such as the sea already is…»).
10 The Koran [online], 117, 188-189, 215, 273. URL http://www.streathammosque.org/
uploads/quran/english-quran-yusuf-ali.pdf (2017-01-23).
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It is He Who has left free the two bodies of flowing waters: One palat-
able and sweet, and the other salt and bitter; yet has He made a barrier 
between them, a partition that is forbidden to be passed. [25.53]
Or, Who had made the earth firm to live in; made rivers in its midst; set 
thereon mountains immovable; and made a separating bar between the 
two bodies of flowing water? [Can there be another] god besides Allah? 
Nay, most of them know not. [27.61]
Nor are the two bodies of flowing water alike, – the one palatable, sweet, 
and pleasant to drink, and the other, salt and bitter. Yet from each [kind 
of water] do ye eat flesh fresh and tender, and ye extract ornaments to 
wear; and thou seest the ships therein that plough the waves, that ye 
may seek [thus] of the Bounty of Allah that ye may be grateful. [35.12]
[He is] Lord of the two Easts and Lord of the two Wests: - Then which of 
the favours of your Lord will ye deny? - He has let free the two bodies 
of flawing water, meeting together: - Between them is a Barrier which 
they do not transgress: - Then which of the favours of your Lord will ye 
deny? - And His are the Ships sailing smoothly through the seas, lofty 
as mountains. [55.17-24]
From what has been expounded it seems that in the Muslim thought, and 
thus in the Ottoman one too, there was nothing to exclude the principle of 
considering the waters of inland seas that communicate with wider basins 
only through narrow mouths as state properties, such as the Black Sea, 
the Sea of Marmara or the Adriatic. Thus, Mehmed II wanted the follow-
ing words inscribed on the main gate of his new palace built in Istanbul:11
By the grace of God and by His approval, the foundations of this aus-
picious castle were laid, and its parts were solidly joined together to 
strengthen peace and tranquility, by command of the Sultan of the two 
Continents and the Emperor of the two Seas, the shadow of God in this 
world and the next, the Favorite of God on the Two Horizons [i.e. East 
and West], the Monarch of the Terraqueous Orb, the Conquerer of the 
Castle of Constantinople, the Father of Conquest Sultan Mehmed Khan, 
son of Sultan Murad Khan, son of Sultan Mehmed Khan, may God make 
eternal his empire, and exalt his residence above the most lucid stars 
of the firmament, in the blessed month of Ramadan of the year 883 
[November and December 1478]. (34-36)
11 Necipoğlu, Architecture, 34-36.
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As a matter of fact, the two continents and the two seas could be seen 
from the acropolis of the Byzantine city, the new Istanbul: the plaque re-
fers to the achievement of a universal dominion, the same one that Osman 
dreamt in the legend that was codified right in the Conqueror’s time. In 
the intitulatio (unvan) of Kanûnî Süleyman’s imperial documents we read: 
«sultan and padişah of the White Sea and the Black Sea, of Rumelia, Anato-
lia, Karaman…», to which his successors added the Red Sea; therefore, the 
seas were an essential element of the Ottoman sovereignty, at least since 
the conquest of the city that had been founded where the two seas meet.12
Neither was there a problem with having a limit in the Mediterranean 
waters. In 1403 and in 1411 princes Süleyman and Musa accepted some 
limits not to be passed by their warships, but by then Ottoman nautical 
inferiority was manifest, to the extent that still in 1466 Venetians thought 
that forty light galleys would be enough to contain the sultan’s ships. After 
a few years, however, given the number of masts, the appearance of the 
new Ottoman fleet seemed to have transformed the sea into a wood: a 
close past when the Ottoman could only run away in front of the Venetian 
galleys was missed.13 In 1480 the waters around Lefkada belonged half 
to Venice and half to the sultan. Another ancient example concerns the 
waters nearby the island of Rhodes that were overrun with pirates at the 
end of the fifteenth century. The truce agreed in 1481 between the Grand 
Master Pierre d’Aubusson and the subaşı Peçin – and confirmed the follow-
ing year – provided for sailing freedom for both military fleets in the area 
between Sette Capi14 and Balat (Miletus), but still respecting coasts and 
waters. The letters of marque issued in those years by the knights often 
referred to customary limits (limites et confinia), within which Ottoman 
ships had to be respected. According to Nicolas Vatin, the two words are 
not redundant at all, since they indicate two distinct sea areas: the first 
was between Sette Capi and Balat, as in the 1481 agreement, or between 
Kastellorizo and Patmos, as it is seemingly recorded in subsequent papers, 
whereas the second was probably the channel of the Genoese island of Chi-
os.15 It should be observed that these limits were mostly respected by the 
Christian ships, which were much more numerous and well-equipped than 
the Ottoman ones, even after 1495 when the letters of marque were more 
and more frequent. That year, as a matter of fact, prince Cem (Bayezid II’s 
12 Tursun Bey, Târîh-i Ebü’l-feth, 66-67; Gokbilgin, Osmanlı Paleografya, 57-59; Kütükoğlu, 
Osmanlı belgelerinin dili, 148-149; Kolodziejczyk, Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations, 285 
(ve Ak Deniz ve Kara Deniz ve Derya-i Kulzumun, 1591, Murad III).
13 Turan, Türkiye-İtalya ilişkileri, 356-370; Tenenti, Il senso del mare, 59.
14 It is the area between Ölüdeniz and Patara in the old Lydia; it was called ‘Mount Crago’ 
by Strabo and then ‘Capo Serdene’ or ‘Sette Capi’.
15 Bombaci, Il “Liber Graecus”, 301, no. 10; Vatin, L’ordre de Saint-Jean, 115-129.
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brother) died in Italy and the West lost a precious shield that for a decade 
had sheltered it from the advance of the troops of the sultan who was too 
interested in keeping on good terms with those who had his rival impris-
oned. We have less information and documents about the Ottoman attacks, 
even though we can imagine that, thanks to the patrol done by the ships of 
the Order, the limits were mostly respected, even in the periods of greatest 
activity, for example in 1493-1495 when important commanders such as 
Kemal reis, uncle of the more famous geographer Piri reis, made a name 
for themselves, and then during the Venetian-Ottoman war of 1499-1502.
5.3 The Sea as a Territory
When we study the maritime law, we should take into consideration an-
other important issue in addition to inland basins, namely the existence or 
the width of territorial waters, i.e. the area that trespasses on the high sea 
and within which the sovereignty of a state that rules the coast extends. 
In general, except for special cases, in a Europe fed on Roman law it took 
centuries to regard the sea adjoining the coast as a state territory and, 
thus, to supersede the previous idea that the sea is of everybody, object 
only of imperium and not of dominium on the part of coast political pow-
ers. It was not until Grozio that such a concept was theorised and it was 
not until the year 1621 that for the first time in peacetime the measure of 
a cannon shot was accepted and used to define the width of state waters.16
According to Muslim customs, instead, we may affirm that waters be-
longing to a state could exist at least near coast areas. The local authorities 
were in control of that area. It is not clear which was their width, even 
though around 1154 al-Idrīsī explicitly mentioned six miles as the distance 
within which an enemy advance was considered as such, because it was 
within the look of the sentry who guarded the Andalusian coast.17 The start-
ing point of view, however, always was that of the fighters living in border 
ribāṭs (castles), which could be attacked by enemies from whom they had 
to be ready to defend themselves, and not the point of view of a peaceful 
state that expanded with its offshoots on the sea as well.
Some clauses of privileges granted by Muslim states to Christian ones 
during the Middle Ages hint at the existence of waters considered to be 
a Muslim state’s appurtenance. Around 1200, for example, the Almohad 
commander of the army in Tunis gave an amān to the inhabitants of Pisa, 
specifying that the safe-conduct was valid wherever they were, in castles 
or on the shores, on land or on the sea of Africa. Similar expressions may 
16 Benvenuti, La frontiera marittima, 16-24.
17 Khalilieh, Islamic Maritime Law, 138.
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be found in another amān issued by the Hafsid caliph of Tunis for the 
prince of Pisa and Lucca in 1366; on the contrary, in 1397 his successor 
promised in the peace agreement that the Tunisian ships would not attack 
the Pisan ones if they met them, both on the open sea and in a harbour, as 
was reasserted in 1414 and 1421.18
5.4 Mediterranean Geo-Politics
After its early conquests, the Ottoman advance in the Mediterranean was 
not chaotic but followed its own logic, which was not always similar to 
the logic of land conquests. During the Empire’s formative period, it was 
mainly the control of the straits that appeared to be vital.19 In the mean-
time, Venetians ruled a wide sea area placed among Crete, Karpathos, 
Rhodes, Tenedos and Euboea, while a myriad of local seigniories (beylik) 
formed a protective barrier for the Christian states in the Aegean. In 1479, 
at the end of a long war, the Venetian ships were pushed away from the 
Aegean almost definitely, whereas the town of Vlorë, conquered by Otto-
mans, became like a sultan’s watchful sentry placed outside the entrance 
of the Gulf.20 Shortly after, with the Venetian defeat of 1503, the waterways 
towards the Western Mediterranean opened up for Ottomans.21
The siege of Rhodes in 1522 represents a further step in the Ottoman 
geo-political vision of the Mediterranean. In 1481 there were already set-
tled limits for the sultan’s and the Knights’ privateers. After 1495 Christian 
attacks became more and more numerous. That year prince Cem died and, 
as was previously said, European states lost, together with their hostage, 
also a valid defence against Ottoman fancies of conquest. The letters of 
marque issued by the Order became more and more numerous and turned, 
for the most part in respect of the previously established limits, towards 
the ships that sailed the route between Alexandria and Istanbul. As long 
as Egypt was a Mamluk land, this could bother the sultan’s interests but 
it was not as vital as it was after 1517: after having conquered that reign, 
Selim I could not allow repeated attacks on the route between his capital 
and the richest province of his Empire. Not only wheat, but also money 
and expensive gifts came from Egypt, and much more when the Empire 
extended to North Africa. Selim I himself, whose interests for the navy 
18 Amari, I diplomi arabi, 30, no. VII, 117, no. XXXII, 131, no. XXXIV, 146, no. XXXV, 160, 
no. XXXVI. Some diplomas stress the existence of maritime countries placed along the 
coasts, cf. 88, no. XXIX (year 1313), 101, no. XXX (year 1353).
19 Fleet, Early Turkish Naval Archives, 138.
20 Gullino, Le frontiere navali, 51, 105.
21 Hess, Ibero-African Frontier, 58; İnalcık, Essays in Ottoman History, 415-445.
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made the following conquests possible, stated that the Mediterranean was 
a sole gulf and that it would be worthy and right if it had not belonged to 
so many different kings and realms but to a single ‘sublime state’. There-
fore, it is not by chance that the siege of Rhodes was in 1522. Thus, at 
the beginning of his reign, Süleyman the Magnificent got rid of a ‘den of 
pirates’ and the route between Alexandria and Istanbul, which was more 
and more important for the capital’s splendour, was made safer.22
If we look at a map of the Mediterranean where the Ottoman conquests 
are marked, we realise that in the first place the advance happened on 
the basis of the importance of the objectives, not of their distance from 
Istanbul; on the contrary, the latter principle was valid for the campaigns 
on land, as Rhoads Murphey showed. As a matter of fact, when we talk 
about sea spaces, we must renounce the categories that support terrestrial 
strategy and consider the kind of ships that is used, the time they resist 
at sea without landing and the distance between the places where it is 
possible to disembark and take in fresh water and food.23
After the conquests of the islands placed further north, the sixteenth-
century advance seems to be more linked to the necessities of one own’s 
and other’s sailing than to an attempt to systematically conquer the en-
tire East. On the other hand, this is the logic that underlay Venice’s con-
quests throughout the centuries, as a state known mainly for its sea and 
mercantile vocation. In the first half of the sixteenth century, Hayreddin 
Barbarossa’s lucky deeds suddenly brought wide North-African territories 
under the protection of the sultan who found himself acting on a Mediter-
ranean scale in the struggles among empires and was no longer limited 
to the eastern territories. The advance came both from East and South. 
Some islands, however, were not immediately conquered. Cyprus, Crete, 
Tenedos, Kythira and Antikythera were not reached, whereas the sultan’s 
ships went further West until the failed siege of Malta (1565). It was as if 
Ottomans had tried to take over the entire Mediterranean beginning with 
the lesser defended wide areas and encircling the larger islands; not by 
chance Imber forcefully asserted the predominance of the Ottoman thal-
assocracy in that sea from the Battle of Preveza (1538) to the Battle of 
Lepanto (1571):24 once they seized those areas, Ottomans could proceed 
to the conquest of the key spots, first of all Malta, which ruled the strait 
between Sicily and the Maghrebi coast; then, they could turn back and 
more calmly conquer what had been left behind, according to a tactics 
that remembers the one employed in the terrestrial campaigns by the 
22 Bostan, Osmanlı bahriye teşkilâtı, 4; Bellingeri, Il Golfo, 14 (bir halic devlet-i âliyye 
hükminde); Vatin, L’ordre de Saint-Jean, 117-129.
23 Murphey, Ottoman Warfare, xiv; Tucci, L’alimentazione, 601, 604, 614.
24 Imber, The Navy, 221-282.
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early Ottomans and by more ancient peoples labelled ‘the barbarians’ by 
our history books: the less protected areas were attacked and the towns 
protected by high walls were ignored and destined to capitulate after the 
conquest of the whole surrounding territory. Another comparison may 
connect these two worlds, even though they are very different: the early 
Ottomans were few if compared to the wide territory they faced, just as the 
fleets that sail a sea are small in front of the immensity of a sea expanse.
It was perhaps the failed siege of Malta that pushed Ottomans to change 
their Mediterranean strategy rather than the death of the great Süleyman 
I (1566) and the accession to the throne of weak successors. Even though 
Tunis was definitely torn from the Spaniards, the new geo-strategy was 
not aimed at the clash of great empires in the Mediterranean waters any 
longer, but at the marginal war that was fought for many years and was 
made of privateering and quick retaliations, sudden clashes of ships or 
small convoys beyond the logic of the great naval forces. The Ottoman fleet 
relied more and more on North-African reises’ ships, whereas the galley, 
however partially modified on the basis of the new Atlantic techniques, 
remained the most popular ship in the Mediterranean.25
Right the uninterrupted use of this ship, which was very suited to sail-
ing along the coast and across the Mediterranean, together with repeated 
piratical attacks in the important routes of the Empire, forced Ottomans to 
move in a different direction. The most important route was naturally that 
between Alexandria and Istanbul.26 It was intended for domestic trade and, 
thus, it was little considered by the historians interested only in interna-
tional politics. Until late mid-sixteenth century, the Ottoman fleet used to 
offer protection mainly to ships and convoys; then, it took a step forward 
and tried to protect the route in itself in a wider and more general view 
on the problem, as the conquest of Cyprus shows.
The ships that carried wheat and pilgrims between Egypt and Istanbul 
were continuously attacked; therefore, it was necessary to deprive the 
pirates of any possible anchorage and prevent them from getting their sup-
plies of food and water in safe places. At the same time, the soldiers of the 
harbours along the coast were ordered to ensure that the goods reached 
their destination and were not landed elsewhere.27 A galley – which was a 
world populated by hundreds of men shut up in a narrow space and which, 
according to a maritime saying, firstly was smelled and then spotted on 
the horizon – had to stop if possible every day, or every two days, for the 
supplies. The rowers, even though they changed off, had to rest and could 
25 Bondioli, Burlet, Zysberg, Oar Mechanics, 172-205; Mangio, Alcune considerazioni, 
117-118.
26 Panzac, Commerce et navigation, 195-216.
27 BOA, MD, reg. 72, c. 202.
The Ottoman-Venetian Border (15th-18th Centuries) Pedani
5 Sea Borders 93
not keep the same rhythm for long; only favourable winds allowed quicker 
courses and only in exceptional circumstances could they run the risk of 
staying at sea for some days because the supplies of food and water could 
run out while the wind died down.
The small islands scattered in the Mediterranean were strategic points 
for the galleys’ supply; bringing the few landings of the east part of the 
basin that were still Christian under the sultan’s rule meant depriving 
Christian pirates and privateers of anchorages and, therefore, definitely 
pushing them and their raids away from those waters. This explains the 
necessity of conquering Cyprus and, in the following century, also Crete, 
which was the last important strip of the Dominio da Mar.
5.5 The Sea after Karlowitz and Passarowitz
Encouraged by these premises, Ottomans had no difficulty in conceptualis-
ing the existence of territorial waters and limits established in the sea. As 
a matter of fact, according to recent studies, it does not seem that they ap-
proached the problem of their theoretical legality, but it appears that they 
relied only on concrete cases. Already in 1416, respecting specific areas 
subject to Venetians was considered to be an established tradition, as the 
sultan reasserted in an order addressed to the kapudanpaşa and issued 
in the second decade of rebiyülahır of 1023/21-30 May. At the same time, 
some limits started to be recognised in the Mediterranean. In 1697, for ex-
ample, the European states, after several reprisals against the Christians 
in the Holy Land, agreed on the fact that their privateers would keep away 
from the area near the eastern coast for fifty miles; for the privateers of 
Malta the forbidden area was extended to the Adriatic and the portion of 
Mediterranean placed north of a line that linked the Strait of Gibraltar and 
Sicily. As to the Porte, instead, another great admiral, in the first decade 
of rebiyülevvel of 1121 (11-20 May 1709), ordered the reises of his fleet 
and the reises of Algiers to escort two travelling Venetian ships once they 
reached the limits (hududs) of the Ottoman waters, even though it is not 
clear where these limits were.28
It was mainly after the Treaty of Karlowitz that there were discussions 
and agreements between Ottomans and Venetians with regard to sea wa-
ters. After fifteen years of conflict, the representatives of the doge and 
the sultan were talking about borders. It was not a question of bounding 
only tracts of territory (as it was at the end of the fifteenth century), how-
ever long, but they both desired to establish an uninterrupted border that 
28 ASVe, Bailo, b. 253, reg. 346, unnumbered cc. (year 1121/1709); b. 332, reg. 250, c. 91 
(second decade of rebiyülahır 1203); Hess, Ottoman North African Provinces, 79.
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clearly distinguished their belongings. During the long discussions that 
Osman ağa had with the representatives of the Republic between 1699 and 
1701, also the subject of the waters was tackled. In the second decade of 
rebiyülevvel 1113/16-25 August 1701, for example, an hüccet drawn up 
by the qadi Ahmed and a temessük issued by Osman himself granted that 
the two diplomats had agreed so that – it being understood that there was 
a prohibition for frigates, caiques and feluccas of privateers and outlaws 
– the tract of sea between the mainland and Lefkada had to be considered 
as freely sailable; neither state could create impediments to the ships that 
crossed it. After a few days, the first rebiyülahır 1113/5 September 1701 
Ahmed himself drew up a long document, undersigned by the Ottoman 
diplomat and the beylerbeyi of Euboea İsmail, in which it was certified 
that, by mutual consent, the gulf near Lepanto had to be used in common 
by Venetians and Ottomans.29
Even after the Treaty of Passarowitz, the limits of waters were still dealt 
with as a continuation of terrestrial borders and not as a problem in itself. 
This time, however, the two diplomats (Osman efendi and Antonio Lore-
dan), arrived in the small gulf between Vonitsa and Preveza, and wondered 
if they could carry on delimiting the sea waters and how to consider the 
range of a cannon shot, that is to say the distance generally established 
as the limit for territorial waters, in such a narrow space. By then, how-
ever, they preferred to refer the question to their superiors, even though 
they had the qadi of Arta Mehmed draw up a report of their discussions.30 
This matter was certainly delicate: for example, from Preveza, which was 
in Venetian hands, towards the sea an Ottoman promontory was within 
the reach of a cannon shot; moreover, there were some fishponds that 
belonged to the Ottoman Empire during the war but were near the coast 
belonging to the Republic; finally, ships used to sail when the water was 
deep trying to avoid the shallows of the opposite coast. Therefore, it was 
not a simple question of territorial expansion but also of the fishing rev-
enues, taxes and duties that could be levied.
This stalemate could not go on because the episodes of piracy by those 
who tried to profit from that uncertain situation were more and more 
frequent. Mainly the Tunisian ships benefited from this to the detriment 
of the Venetian ones; in the absence of a definite law to apply, the Porte 
had difficulty in repressing such behaviours. The only feasible solution, 
pending an agreement, was giving back to the Venetian subjects what they 
had lost allowing Tunisians to go back to their coasts. Finally, in the third 
decade of rebiyülahır 1132/1-10 March 1720, the sultan issued an order 
for the notables of Tripoli, Tunis and Algiers telling them of the existence 
29 Documenti turchi, nos. 1615-1617.
30 Documenti turchi, nos. 1643, 1645.
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of a border within which the Venetian ships could not be attacked since 
the agreements reached by the Porte and the Republic were in force. Tak-
ing for granted that the entire Adriatic was Venetian, that border ran at 
a distance of thirty miles from the coast from the latitude of Santa Maria 
di Leuca (the extreme Apulia), carrying on along the Greek coast, beyond 
Crete, Karpathos, Rhodes and Cyprus, and finally along the shores of 
Tripoli in Syria, Beirut and Saïda and up to Alexandria. Therefore, for 
trade reasons, the sea was bounded to ensure the right of way along that 
domestic route for which the Ottoman armies had fought to conquer Rho-
des, Cyprus and Crete.31
The protest of the Maghrebi provinces was quick in coming. Imposing 
such limits meant depriving them of an important income, on which the 
welfare of their cities was based. At that time, piracy and privateering, as 
a matter of fact, fed the riches and the trades; it was not just a question 
of the booty that was gained or the slaves that were sold in the Maghrebi 
markets, but also of possible ransoms paid by the relatives that were in 
the motherland or of loads and ships that were bought and resold feeding 
both an inland and a foreign trade with Christianity. A border like the one 
established by the Porte would have not only allowed Venetian ships to 
reach undisturbed the big emporium of Alexandria, but would have also 
weakened the close ties that had been created in the name of shared sea 
raids between Maghrebis and the Ottoman subjects of Ulcinj. Mehmed bey 
of Algiers and the dey of Tripoli wrote by mutual consent to the kapudan 
paşa reporting the terrible situation in which such a limit would plunge 
the subjects faithful to the sultan and Islam, who fought the ǧihād by sea 
and protected the imperial border, which was the bank of the winners 
and the shelter of Islam. Deprived of adequate resources, they would 
have certainly run away and become pirates; then, they would not have 
protected the Empire against the bellicose tribes of the country and the 
infidels anymore.32
5.6 The Importance of Fishing
In the eighteenth century, among the maritime activities, fishing was more 
and more important and was done both on the open sea and growing the 
31 ASVe, Bailo, b. 254, reg. 348, cc. 110-111, 183-186, 206-207 (letter of the kapudan paşa 
Süleyman); cf. also reg. 349, cc. 80-82 (s.d., passport issued by the kapudan paşa to Rocco 
Bon, with the instruction that he is not pestered within or outside the borders (hududs) of 
the sea established by the Porte); c. 87 (s.d., translation in Ottoman of the bailo’s memo-
rial for a Tunisian ship that had violated the sea borders); BOA, MD, reg. 129, cc. 207-208.
32 ASVe, Bailo, b. 254, reg. 349, cc. 89-91 (Algiers), 100-102 (Tripoli), first decade of 
rebiyülevvel 1133 (30 January-8 February 1721); Pedani, Spunti, 221-239.
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fishes in enclosed spaces. Sometimes the existence itself of fishponds along 
some coasts in the border areas posed problems to a peaceful coexistence 
between Venetians and Ottomans. For example, right after Passarowitz, 
there were repeated fights for the waters between Preveza and Vonitsa33 
for some years; in this case it was not only a question of stretches of water 
where they could fish, but also of duties paid by the ships that crossed 
them. At one point, shortly before the mid-century, the Porte granted some 
waters of this area as malikâne to a local ağa, Aziz, who, relying on that 
accordance, levied a tax on every okka (1280 grams) of catch of fish and 
demanded by brute force the payment of that undue tax also from the 
Venetian boats that fished with the trawl net. Venetians obviously turned 
to the Porte to stick up for their rights. There were other problems as to 
the fishponds of Buthrotum and Risan and then of the area of Corinth. 
Here in 1744 the Ottoman officers demanded half the catch from those 
who used these fishponds, without considering if they were Venetian or 
Ottoman. On the contrary, the agreements with Venice had always set a 
tax of 3% for the subjects of the Republic.34
The fishers’ life was not peaceful there, also because of unforeseen 
events that were always in ambush for those who plied the sea. Some-
times they could be mistaken for pirates, who, mainly if they acted along 
the coasts at a short distance from their houses, often used simple barges 
– perhaps the same barges that were used to work when they did not 
buccaneer. Ships, galleys or galleons were used by those who had to sail 
for many miles before gaining their booty, such as the Maghrebis when 
they ventured as far as the Aegean or the Adriatic. Therefore, fishers 
could also be attacked by the pirates of the close coasts and be enslaved: 
in 1732 twenty-eight Venetians who sailed across the gulf of Corfu were 
made prisoners by a man of the coast who had invited them to eat and 
whom they had ingenuously trusted. In 1740, instead, another ship that 
was fishing near Thessaloniki was seized by some Muslims who thought 
they were dealing with pirates.35
Other disputes regarding fishery saw the Most Serene Republic op-
posed to the Republic of Ragusa, which was closely bound up with the 
Ottoman Empire in foreign policy since the fifteenth century. The first 
accident involved the island of Sušac. In the years 1590-1592, some men 
from the Ragusean island of Lastovo started to attack the Venetian fishers 
33 ASVe, Bailo, b. 254, reg. 348, cc. 192-196 (third decade of cemaziyülevvel 1132, 30 
March-9 April 1720); cf. also b. 257, reg. 355, cc. 48-61 (1734-1735, several documents on 
the issue).
34 ASVe, Bailo, b. 265, reg. 353, nameless, şaban 1140, 13 March-11 April 1728; b. 257, 
reg. 356, cc. 30-32; b. 258, reg. 359, c. 158 (1153, 1740-1741); reg. 360, cc. 38-38v (i’lâm of 
the qadi of Corinth, first decade of receb 1157, 10-19 August 1744).
35 ASVe, Bailo, b. 256, reg. 354, c. 109; b. 258, reg. 359, cc. 212-213, 331-332.
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of Vis and Palagruža, accusing them of fishing outside their state terri-
tory. It was a question of both waters and ownership of the island, which 
belonged to the people of Ragusa since 1324, when their city was still a 
Venetian possession though. The Republic reacted appealing to its right 
over the Gulf and reminding that its subjects fished a fraìma in those 
waters, which implied a cultivation of the fish in rigged areas that had to 
be prepared many months in advance; therefore, it was not a question of 
a new fishing area found out that year, but of fishponds used according 
to an ancient custom. Finally, they agreed on the freedom to fish for the 
subjects of both states but Ragusa, even though its rights over the island 
of Sušac were recognised, had to accept the Venetian sovereignty over 
the Gulf, which sovereignty did not allow the existence of coastal waters 
belonging to other states.36
After more than one hundred and fifty years later, in 1757, the agree-
ment established for Sušac was validated again by Venetians and Raguse-
ans. This happened even though the Republic had recognised the presence 
of other forces in the Adriatic, pushed by the emperor who had created a 
free port in Trieste and Rijeka in 1719 and by the pope who had done the 
same in Ancona in 1732. On 25 ramazan 1167/16 July 1757, two qadis, 
Mehmed efendi and Ali efendi, issued an hüccet that certified the new 
agreement on duties, fishing and coral. Ragusa recognised the Venetian 
jurisdiction on the Gulf and pledged to pay a silver tepsi (tray) that was 
worth 20 sequins every three years instead of the usual duties. As for Ven-
ice, it pledged not to attack Ragusean boats near the coast and to prevent 
its own subjects from chopping wood in the other state’s territory and from 
disturbing the gathering of fish and coral.37
Ironically, then, if the first evidence that certifies the existence of a 
Venetian sea is of an Arabian author, the last document that recognises 
the supremacy of the Republic over its Gulf was issued by an Ottoman 
authority.
5.7 The Imposition of a Limit
The order issued in 1720 by the sultan Ahmed III was repeatedly men-
tioned in several following documents that explicitly refer to it as the ‘es-
tablishment of a sea border’ and, at the same time, bear witness to how 
the levends of the Maghreb usually ignored it. It has often been argued 
that until 1770 and the naval disaster in the waters of Çeşme Ottomans 
36 ASVe, Provveditori alla camera dei confini, b. 246, fasc. “Dalmazia”, 1590-1592.
37 ASVe, Provveditori da terra e da mar, b. 595; no. 48 (29 July 1754, Francesco Grimani, 
sindico and inquisitore in Dalmatia).
98 5 Sea Borders
Pedani The Ottoman-Venetian Border (15th-18th Centuries)
took no interest in the fleet, preferring to reach an agreement with the 
European states and leaving the North-African provinces rather free, even 
though they did not encourage their independence. These two tenden-
cies, however, could come into conflict: on the one hand, the sultan was 
interested in the respect of the capitulations he had granted, which ca-
pitulations provided for a trade sailing free from dangers in the eastern 
Mediterranean; on the other, Maghrebis considered privateering against 
Christian ships to be an essential source of income.
It was not surprising that there were tensions mainly with Algerians who 
were the most active in the eighteenth century. In 1716, for example, the 
dey stated that his men would obey the sultan’s orders only if the latter 
had paid the slaves and ransomed the sailors held prisoners; in turn, the 
Porte reacted threatening to prevent Algerians from recruiting soldiers 
and sailors in Anatolia. Later, in 1723-24, the dey refused an agreement of 
non-aggression of the Dutch ships that were under Istanbul’s protection; 
four years later, another imperial order concerning the Austrian ships was 
rejected. This time the threats were put into effect; with the support of the 
fetva of the şeyhülislam, the financial and military aids to Algerians were 
interrupted; the Algerian ships were not allowed to enter the Ottoman 
harbours of the East; the Anatolian recruitment was stopped and even the 
caravan that took the pilgrims to Mecca was halted. In this way, Algiers 
was forced to surrender and obey the Porte again.38
In the eighteenth century, therefore, the politics that had allowed Ot-
tomans to keep their supremacy over the most exposed and peripheral 
areas of the Balkans was still applied to the North-African provinces. If 
on the one hand the sultan could leave his provinces free with regard to 
the inland politics, on the other he could not allow any freedom in inter-
national politics.
A more complicated European situation pushed Ottomans to take further 
measures. When in the first half of the eighteenth century England started 
to see the threat to the European equilibrium, to its own position in the 
Mediterranean and to the commercial supremacy of the new European set-
up, a conflict inevitably broke out, despite the pacifist politics adopted by 
the minister Robert Walpole until then. The war was declared to Spain in 
the name of the principle of the freedom of the seas (1739), but a dynas-
tic controversy for the Austrian succession extended the conflict also to 
Austria and France, which took opposite sides. Only the Treaty of Aachen 
(1748) brought accord back to Europe, even though it did not solve the 
commercial problems that had caused the war.
By then, the sultan lived at peace with both the king of France and the 
king of England and could not displease either of them and much less 
38 Hess, Ottoman North African Provinces, 76-81.
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damage his economic interests. He decided to consider the Mediterranean 
as a sea halved by an imaginary line that linked the coasts of Africa to 
the Peloponnese, which choice was communicated by his grand vizier to 
the European representatives in Istanbul. The merchant ships could have 
peacefully crossed that limit, but the warships, either English or French, 
would have been attacked and captured by the Ottoman fleet anyway and 
the same would have happened to the commercial ships that would start 
to levy war upon each other.39 In the legislator’s mind, the eastern Mediter-
ranean waters were considered to be a new inland sea, totally belonging to 
the ‘guarded Empire’ that still undisputedly ruled over its oriental shores.
The powers that had been fighting in the Mediterranean waters for 
ages did not radically change the stakes and the war rules. Genoeses, 
Venetians, Catalans, then English, French, Dutch, and in the eighteenth 
century also Swedes and Americans sailed that sea mainly to trade; some 
of them devoted themselves also to another less conventional but richer 
kind of trade, i.e. privateering and piracy; the levends of Morocco made 
that activity their main source of income, but also small communities, such 
as the knights of San Giovanni of Pisa or the knights of Malta, proved to 
be as much active in this field. For almost two centuries, from the end of 
the clash between empires that was completed with the Battle of Lepanto, 
until the second half of the eighteenth century, the Mediterranean was (in 
Braudel’s words) outside the great history. The ships that sailed it looked 
only for goods or a booty – which are equivalent but with a rather different 
view – and this was the most ancient vocation of this inland sea that saw 
more than one state devote itself to piracy in its first period of expansion, 
then prefer more peaceful and lawful activities and toughly fight against 
the new arrivals who went in for piracy, just like Venice before and after 
the year 1000 and, in its own way, the Ottoman Empire. In the second half 
of the eighteenth century, however, something changed. France introduced 
a more aggressive economic policy; the states started to visit North Africa 
more and more frequently, but it was the arrival of the Russian fleet in the 
Mediterranean that led the so-called maritime Ottoman border towards the 
West to collapse. The Russian-Ottoman war of 1768-1774 changed many 
things: the codification of the idea of the sultan-caliph as the holder of a 
religious ascendancy over the entire Muslim world dates back to these 
years. This was a new way of opposing the West by means of ideas rather 
than arms. This was the reaction to the contraction of the land frontiers, 
the reduction of the Ottoman territory north-east and the transition of 
Muslim peoples under Christian sovereigns. The coming of the Russians, 
instead, brought about a new technology and a much more aggressive war 
by sea, which was comparable to the one that had ended in the sixteenth 
39 ASVe, Bailo, b. 258, reg. 360, cc. 1-2; Pedani, Spunti, 221-239.
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century; their fleet came from the Baltic after a long circumnavigation of 
the entire Europe going through the strait of Gibraltar.40 Russians, how-
ever, the last to come in the Mediterranean, upset the customs that had 
settled throughout the ages: as a matter of fact, they came neither to trade 
nor to devote themselves to privateering or piracy, but to subvert its geo-
political set-up and, in short, to change its borders.
40 Gencer, Bahriye’de Yapılan Islâhât Hareketleri, 24-26. There is a formal protest, sent 
to the bailo in 1770, with which the Ottoman government complained because Venice had 
allowed the Russian fleet to go through inland channels as far as the Adriatic and the Le-
vant; it was drawn up by an officer of the Porte who was evidently little conversant with 
geography. Cf. Lewis, Europa barbara e infedele, 150.
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6 Beyond the Marks
Summary 6.1 Marks on Things. –6.2 Marks on People. – 6.3 Turks and Ottomans. – 6.4 Franks.
6.1 Marks on Things
How can a border be established among peoples or kingdoms that belong 
to wide plains with neither peaks of mountains nor silver lines of rivers? 
How can a spatial limit be defined there and how is it possible to avoid 
that everything become prey to the men of one or the other frontier? Some 
nomadic peoples, for whom the country was the road they covered day 
after day, rejected the furrow of the plough and chose to leave a mark on 
what belonged to them; the herds of stock were branded with the own-
ers’ symbol. Zanini defined it as a «portable border».1 Areas such as the 
steppe seem to refuse the borders among states; the flat immensity of 
the land never changes and everything mingles and blends; the border of 
one’s own living space has to be rebuilt and redefined every day. Fences 
cannot be built because other people will be there the next day; the only 
way to identify what belongs to one or the other is making it recognisable 
by means of clothes, marks, symbols known and recognisable by everyone.
The brand used to recognise the stock developed in its own way among 
peoples in the Near East. Tamğa, tuğra and tabın probably originated from 
this function. The word tamğa means brand,2 mark and then, by extension, 
seal. It was originally affixed on stock or personal belongings and little by 
little it was used to mean specific tribes and, after the Mongolian invasion, 
appeared also in some documents, for example those of the Ak Koyunlu, 
the Golden Horde or Tatars of Crimea. Tamğa may also be imprinted on 
coins or in the ornamentation of carpets or else reproduced as a heraldic 
device on Mamluk coats of arms. As Mayer stated, some blazons of the 
time, otherwise unintelligible, may be explained by means of brands used 
in heraldry as well, even though their meaning continues to be very ob-
1 Zanini, Significati del confine, 47 (translation made by the translator of this text).
2 Leiser, Tamgha, 182-183. There are also examples closer to us: the signum (sign or seal) 
of the Lex Wisigothorum transformed also into the border mark, whereas in Sardinian sinnu 
means the brand for the animals and sinnare is the action of branding the stock; Mastrelli, 
Riflessi, 789-811.
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scure because it is not possible to equate them to symbols that indicate 
a specific profession, contrary to other marks used in the same context. 
According to Maḥmūd al-Kāšġari, tamğa was synonymous with the Arabic 
ṭābi‘ (print, mark).3 Ghizela Suliteanu showed that, among the Nogay Ta-
tars, there are and there were specific geometric signs, called tabın, used 
to emphasise the belonging to a particular family and the descent from 
a common ancestor. They often represented a stylisation of the object to 
which the name of the line referred and were the symbol of both a warlike 
unity and a territorial prohibition.4
The origin of the tuğras, i.e. the sovereign monograms used not only 
by Ottomans but also by other peoples such as Seljuqs, Ayyubids and 
Mamluks, has been thoroughly analysed. They have been equated to a 
falcon, namely a totem bird of some Turkish tribes or to a bow with some 
arrows; other scholars, in order to explain them, thought about the im-
print of Murad I’s hand (1359-1389) or associated its name to the word 
tuğramak (to cut) or to the tuğs, i.e. the horsetails that were a symbol of 
sovereignty in the Ottoman world. The most followed hypothesis saw them 
as born from the brands used for the stock. Maḥmūd al-Kāšġari says that 
the animals and the slaves of the Oğuz sovereigns were branded with an 
element called in this way.5
6.2 Marks on People
Borders sometimes may be brought along, not only on what belongs to 
us but also on one’s body, the clothes or an object put on. Many tales of 
slaves or prisoners on the run emphasise the clothes that distinguish a 
Christian from a Muslim, or the inhabitant of a village on this side of the 
3 Bates, Darley Doran, The Art, 387, no. 526; Talbot Rice, I selgiuchidi, 181-183; Mayer, 
Saracenic Heraldry, 18-19; Maḥmūd al-Kāšġari, Türk Şiveleri Lügatı, vol. 1, 321.
4 Suliteanu, Le «tabin», 93-113, especially 98 where we read (the following passage was 
translated from French by the translator of this text): «The tabın is a geometric mark that 
the Nogay assumed to mark their belonging to a same family and their descent from a com-
mon ancestor. In Tatar, it literally means ‘bend down’, but it indicates the ‘holy respect’ as 
well as the ‘citizenship’. The following words are related to it: tabı (trace, frontier [with the 
nuance of respect of the frontier]); tabınmaq (pray), tabıntaşi (gravestone [with the nuance 
of respect of ancestral noble belonging]); it may be found in the saying: Tabındın tamagası 
bolmagan qazaqqa ograr (‘he who does not have a tabın showing his descent is a pagan’). 
As it may be seen, the word tabın does not only mean ‘mark’, for which the Nogay use the 
term tamğa, but it also indicates a certain historic function of moral education and a form 
of social organisation». See Karataev, The Seals, 476-488.
5 Cahen, La tuǧrā seljukide, 167-172; Wittek, Notes, 310-334, no. 18; 267-293, no. 20; 
Bayramoğlu, Firmans enluminés, 14-36; Babinger, Die Grossherliche Tughra, 3-16; Umur, 
Osmanlı, 11-24; Kütükoğlu, Osmanlı belgelerinin dili, 71-75. 
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barrier from the one who lives on the other side.6 Changing one’s clothes, 
wearing a turban or throwing it away meant taking on a different political 
and religious identity, mingling with the people of the village just crossed 
and, thus, being able to going unnoticed. In societies that did not know – or 
where it had just started to spread – an international document of personal 
identification such as the passport, clothes were an important identifying 
element, just like the language that could be correctly spoken, without 
accent, ignored or stammered.
Let us consider the Moors on the run from Spain in 1609. Forced to 
leave their lands and their houses, they poured not only into North-African 
Muslim lands, but also into other European states to reach the Ottoman 
Empire. Harbours such as Marseilles, Livorno or Venice were reached by 
this fleeing mass that very often, if it did not find ships on which to sail for 
a Muslim country, tried to cross the line that separated Christianity from 
Islam in the Balkans. In those years, an Ottoman envoy came to Venice to 
help them, bearing imperial letters that asked the doge to allow this mass 
of wretches, once they arrived as far as the eastern limits of his state, to 
freely change the western clothes used up until then as a cover and dress 
as a Muslim; the Venetian officials, as a matter of fact, thinking they were 
Christians, prevented them from crossing the border.7
Several reasons could push a man to wear a turban or western clothes. 
Some people left a country where they had had an experience of impris-
onment or slavery; others, right for the job they did, voluntarily left their 
homeland to go to distant and different lands hoping to go back. They were 
above all merchants, but also people with official tasks and often interpret-
ers. The lowest level of diplomatic envoys were usually allowed to disguise 
themselves; this does not mean their missions were not important, but 
that they often did not hold the official character that was necessary for 
an important legation made up of many people. They were messengers, 
secretaries or interpreters often sent in times of war or international ten-
sion in order to keep the contacts in an understated manner.
In the relations between Venice and the Porte, the most ancient trace-
able example seems to be that of three Muslims, Yusuf, Mehmed and Ağa, 
sent by Hamza, dizdar of Herceg Novi, with credentials and the written 
information, addressed to the Republic, that they would be dressing up as 
Christians during the journey. As for the Venetian interpreters that went 
to the Porte, instead, the imperial safe-conducts that are still kept date 
back mainly to the Cretan War: they are letters of the sultan to its subor-
6 Cf. for example Osmân Agha, Prisonnier des infidèles, 180.
7 Documenti turchi, no. 1190; Pedani, In nome del Gran Signore, 176-178; Temimi, Le 
Gouvernement Ottoman, 32-42; Le passage de morisque, 304-316; Mangio, Echi italiani, 
555-568.
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dinates who ruled countries and harbours along the route between Venice 
and Istanbul; those documents informed that the bearers were allowed 
to be armed and, in dangerous places, to wear a turban and dress up as 
Muslims. Passing for subjects of the sultan probably was not very difficult 
for those who, such as the Venetian interpreters, had a perfect command of 
spoken Turkish, besides the written language, and knew Ottoman customs 
and traditions because of their long stays in the Empire.8
It was not only the manner of dressing, but also the use of specific 
colours, that identified a Christian or a Muslim. The eastern clothes were 
usually coloured, as the renegades who went back to the Christian land 
often reminded, impressed by daring combinations such as white with 
red, black, or green. Also the Venetian aristocratic ladies were amazed 
at the showy clothes of the noblewomen who had had to leave the native 
Crete and go back to their ancestors’ land. In the Ottoman Empire, for 
example, light blue and yellow characterised mainly Christian and Jewish 
headdresses; at the end of the sixteenth century, heavy caps – yellow for 
Jews, blue for Christians and striped for Armenians – were very common, 
even though for a short period of time. It was in 1693 that Englishmen, 
soon imitated by the other Europeans, started to wear their national outfit, 
since they were ordered to wear only black dresses, shoes (not clogs or 
slippers) and bells as well; but, by then, black was still a very fashionable 
colour in Europe among the upper classes, since dyeing clothes in that way 
was difficult and expensive and, thus, using them meant showing wealth. 
Up until then, foreigners in Istanbul had tried to blend into the resident 
population.
Besides clothes, Christians and Muslims differed in another mark. If bap-
tism does not leave any trace on those who receive it, circumcision marks 
men’s body forever and was different for Jews and Muslims, as surgeons 
summoned by the Inquisition observed. If changing clothes could have a 
symbolic value, when it was not imposed by a necessity of safety during 
the journey; if a Turkish haircut (which left only one lock on the shaved 
head) could be imitated by making one’s hair grow for a few weeks, cir-
cumcision definitely marked the passage to Islam and was often loathed 
by those who experienced it in adulthood also because of the pain and the 
danger it entailed. Bartolomé and Lucile Bennassar describe with a wealth 
of examples the various methods of the surgery, which could be done in 
secret or in public, without any other ceremonies or followed by celebra-
tions. They observe, however, that specific circumstances could delay or 
8 Bombaci, Il “Liber Graecus”, 298, no. 21; Preto, Venezia e i Turchi, 95-115; Lucchetta, La 
scuola, 19-40; Lo Studio, 479-498; Un progetto, 1-28; Una scuola, 21-61; L’ultimo progetto, 
1-43. Cf. Documenti turchi, nos. 1485, 1497, 1499.
The Ottoman-Venetian Border (15th-18th Centuries) Pedani
6 Beyond the Marks 105
even spare it, mainly for those who converted in adulthood.9 In any case, it 
was a rite of passage in which men symbolically crossed the ideal border 
that divided the Christian world from the Muslim one. The opposite pas-
sage was obviously marked by baptism, which was charged with a similar 
value but was not so traumatic from a physical point of view.
6.3 Turks and Ottomans
Circumcision, together with clothes, was for people what the tamğa or the 
heraldic device was for things, i.e. the element that allowed to identify a 
group, besides the geographic space where an individual, a herd of stock 
or an object was. When we talk about a Mediterranean environment, the 
first major distinction is based on religion. On the one side, there was 
Europe, where the word ‘Turk’ became synonymous with ‘Muslim’ in the 
Modern Era. Expressions such as ‘I become a Turk’, ‘to dress as a Turk’, 
‘to smoke as a Turk’ or ‘to swear as a Turk’ became very common and 
indicative of a world with blurred and indefinite outlines, different and 
‘distant’. In the Middle Ages, Muslims were often denoted as ‘Saracens’ 
or even ‘Hagarenes’ – from Hagar, Abraham’s slave from whom they de-
scended. Then, other peoples converted to Islam when they went closer to 
the Mediterranean basin. Tartars, more correctly called Tatars, were as-
sociated with the pagan afterlife, the Tartar. Among them were the kipçaks 
(also called Cumans), who settled north of the Black Sea and were called 
‘Westerner Tatars’ for this reason, whereas people from Persian Ilkhanate 
were ‘Levantine Tatars’. For the Europeans at the end of the Middle Ages, 
‘Turks’ were generically the inhabitants of the principalities of Menteshe 
and Aydın, to which other groups such as Ottomans were added. These 
peoples were often called ‘Teucri’ in Latin documents, i.e. with the name 
of ancient Trojans, in whose area they had settled. Then, Ottomans became 
‘the Turks’ par excellence and ‘the Turk’ or ‘Great Turk’ was their leader, 
namely the sultan.10
The distinction between the words ‘Turk’ and ‘Ottoman’, however, is 
often unclear today. ‘Turk’ is an ethnic term referring to populations of 
Turkish origin, whereas ‘Ottoman’ meant not only those who belonged to 
an empire, but above all the ruling class of that state. Coming from vari-
ous provinces, when they were not converted Europeans, the members 
of this group considered themselves as slaves of the sultan, forgetful of 
their origin and ethnic group, while among the subjects there were Turks, 
Arabs, Serbians, Croatians, Berbers, Kurds, Armenians etc.
9 Bartolomé Bennassar, Lucile Bennassar, I cristiani di Allah, 320-331.
10 Preto, Venezia e i Turchi, 13-22; Soykut, Image of the “Turk” in Italy, 1-45.
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This distinction, however, was often unclear even at that time. Only 
those who unceasingly mixed with them, i.e. above all merchants, could 
have more precise ideas on the point. For example, in 1604 in Venice a 
decree issued by the Cinque Savi alla Mercanzia11 established that the 
negotiations concluded by Turks, up until then registered in the same 
book together with those of all the other subjects of the sultan, had to be 
listed separately. The understanding of the distinction between Ottoman 
subjects in general and people from different ethnic groups (i.e. Armeni-
ans, Greeks, Bosnians…) on the part of the Venetian bureaucracy was very 
clear in this case.
Also in the high-ranking Venetian politics there were those who knew the 
difference between ‘Turk’ and ‘Ottoman’. A quick examination of twenty-
eight reports by Venetian ambassadors or diplomats written between the 
sixteenth and the eighteenth century allows to make some remarks. They 
were edited some years ago using modern scientific parameters and not 
the rather superficial criteria that characterised some of the most famous 
nineteenth-century editions, in which language often appears to be Ital-
ianised and the most difficult sentences are replaced with dots. Moreover, 
these reports, unpublished up until then, were taken from the original 
manuscripts given to the Collegio of the Republic after the public reading 
in the Senate. As a matter of fact, the nineteenth-century editions were 
based on copies, or copies of copies, made by friends or people interested 
in the topic; this happened also because at that time the access to the State 
Archives was difficult for scholars, who had to be content with codices 
scattered in several Italian libraries.
Looking through this material, we may observe that in the oldest re-
port, Andrea Foscolo’s one of 1512, the word ‘Ottoman’ or othomano, as 
it was spelled at that time, is never mentioned but only the terms ‘Turks’, 
turchesco, the ‘Turkish Lord’ and ‘Turkey’ are employed. Also the few 
pages by Tommaso Contarini (1522), Tommaso Mocenigo (1530) and the 
long report by Alvise Renier (1550) produce the same result. Only Nicolò 
Michiel (1558) talked about the ‘Ottoman house’ and the ‘Ottoman lords’, 
referring only to the dynasty though. The following reports resumed the 
ancient usage and it was only with Giacomo Soranzo (1576 and 1584) that 
such terms were used again, but very seldom and with the same meaning. 
This applies also to Giovanni Correr (1578), Lorenzo Bernardo (1590), 
Girolamo Cappello (1600) and Ottaviano Bon (1609). More specifically, 
however, Alvise Bonrizzo (1570) used the word mori referring only to those 
coming from Granada, whereas Correr, Soranzo and Bernardo and their 
successors distinguished among Moors, Arabs and Turks: «If we talk about 
Aleppo and the neighbourhood, everybody knows that Moors do not want 
11 Mentioned in Vercellin, Mercanti turchi, 70.
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to hear the word ‘Turks’ and it is very well-known that Arabs, both from 
the Arabian desert and Arabia Felix, hate it and so do the Moors of Cairo 
and Alexandria»;12 «Not only Christians are ill-treated and tyrannised by 
Turks; Arabs and Moors, who are of the same religion, are oppressed by 
the ruling Turks; therefore, they often would rather be subjected to the 
Spanish government than the Turkish one».13
In 1637 Angelo Alessandri, who not by chance was in the bailo Pietro 
Foscarini’s employment, was the first to speak both of ‘Turks’ in general 
and of ‘native Turks’, ‘Ottoman Empire’ and ‘Ottomans’, showing that he 
knew the first word could be considered to be an ethnic term and that 
the state was not Turkish but Ottoman. The same remarks apply also to 
Tommaso Tarsia (1683), a Venetian interpreter who knew well the Turk-
ish language and was with the army of Kara Mustafa under the walls of 
Vienna in 1683.
In general, it seems that there was a more correct understanding of 
the terms during the eighteenth century: Carlo Ruzzini (1706) used both 
‘Turks’ and ‘Ottomans’ but distinguished the ‘Barbary states’ inhabitants’ 
from them; Vignola (1724), another secretary, knew that ‘Turk’ was an eth-
nic term as well: «Pushed by curiosity, a great number of Greek, Armenian, 
Turkish women and men from every nation poured into the streets to see 
him»;14 Francesco Gritti (1727) almost exclusively employed the term ‘Ot-
toman’, whereas Giovanni Donà (1746) completely forgot to use the word 
‘Turk’ in its place. Finally, the last representatives of the Republic to the 
Porte employed again both terms.
Besides what people thought in the West, the Ottoman Empire continued 
to consider itself as a multi-ethnic empire, to the extent that only after the 
rise to power of the Young Turks was this concept, in the wake of the many 
nationalistic claims followed by territorial losses, laid aside. One of the 
items of the Committee of Union and Progress’ programme supported the 
acknowledgement of the existence of a single people and a single national-
ity, the Ottoman one, in the Empire: as a consequence, Armenians, Greeks, 
12 Relazioni inedite, 237, report by Giovanni Correr (1578). The translation is made by the 
translator of this text. The original reads: «Se parlamo d’Aleppo, et quei contorni, ogn’uno 
sa che i Mori non vogliono sentir Turchi, et è cosa notissima che gli Arabi, sì della Arabia 
deserta come felice, l’odiano estremamente, né miglior volontà si ritrova nei Mori del Cairo 
et d’Alexandria».
13 Relazioni inedite, 316-317, report by Lorenzo Bernardo (1590). The translation is made 
by the translator of this text. The original reads: «Né soli li Cristiani sono da Turchi maltrat-
tati e tirannegiati, gli Arabi e i Mori, che pure sono della medesima loro religione, sono di 
maniera oppressi da Turchi che governano, che ben spesso hanno più tosto voluto sottoporsi 
al governo delli Spagnoli che de Turchi».
14 Relazioni inedite, 866, report by Girolamo Vignola (1724). The translation is made by the 
translator of this text. The original reads: «Concorravi a vederlo per le stradde la curiosità 
di un affollato numero di femine greche, armene, turche e di huomini pure d’ogni nazione».
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Albanians, Arabs etc. had to consider themselves to be just Ottomans, like 
Basques and Bretons regarded themselves as French.
6.4 Franks
In the last few years, historiography has often underlined that the idea of 
crusade, as it is understood in the West, was totally extraneous to the Arab 
historians of that time who did not distinguish, among the crusaders of the 
first generation, the different national groups but indiscriminately labelled 
them for their religion or their place of origin. The others, i.e. the different 
ones who suddenly attacked Islam at the end of the eleventh century, were 
just a group of unbelievers, infidel barbarians, ḥarbīs, namely those who 
lived in the dār al-ḥarb. The same word kāfir basically became synonymous 
with Christian, the infidel par excellence. If historians wanted to employ 
a geographic term, they called them ‘Franks’ (Farānǧs).15
Just as in the West there was a certain confusion as to the use of the 
terms Muslim, Arab, Ottoman and Turk for many centuries, in the Near 
East there was the same uncertainty in defining the Europeans, who were 
generally still defined as ‘Franks’ or ‘belonging to the nation of the Mes-
siah’ during the Ottoman period. Especially the documents concerning 
international relations bear witness to a first necessary effort towards the 
identification of the groups belonging to different nations, even though 
within Christianity. If an agreement was entered into with a foreign coun-
try, it was necessary to be able to exactly recognise the subjects, even more 
so if the sovereign granted a general safe-conduct (amān ‘āmm) to those 
who came from a specific reign or republic. Besides truces, therefore, 
agreed on with crusading states which were easily recognisable in the di-
versified eastern world of the Middle Ages, there were documents issued 
by Ayyubid and Mamluk sovereigns (when not by other North-African coun-
tries), aimed at protecting groups of western merchants above all. In this 
case, Venetians, Pisans, Genoeses, Florentines and Catalans were correctly 
identified as members of specific communities. Venetian subjects were 
usually called al-banādiqiyyīn, whereas al-Bundaqiyya – the only case of 
an Arabic place-name that was completely different from the sound (even 
though not in its etymology) of the original – was the city they came from.16
The same two trends of knowledge of the other proceeded side by side 
also with regard to the Ottoman world. A survey conducted on the elkabs 
(inscriptiones) of the imperial letters addressed to various sovereigns 
shows that a different title was reserved for each of them. Two concepts, 
15 Storici arabi, v-xvi; Piacentini, Le crociate, part 1, 243; part 2, 282.
16 Nallino, Venezia, 111-120.
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however, recur in the letters addressed to the king of Poland, the doge of 
Venice, the tsarina of all Russias, the king of England or of France, or the 
Habsburg emperor: all of them were ‘distinguished’ in the country (millet) 
of the Messiah and judges of the people (tayfe) of the Nazarene. If in the 
sixteenth century millet meant only a group organised on the basis of re-
ligion, the tayfe was the band, the troop, the group whose members had 
common characteristics: tüccar tayfesi, therefore, was the whole of foreign 
merchants. In general, in the ahdnames this word was much more used 
than halk, which theoretically indicated the folks, the nation, the people 
and also the crowd with greater precision. According to Viorel Panaite, the 
ahdnames allow to state that, between the sixteenth and the seventeenth 
century, subjects of different countries could be distinguished with even 
greater precision.17
The word millet was employed to mean most of all a confessional com-
munity. Right after the capture of Constantinople, Mehmet II acknowl-
edged the Greek patriarch as the leader of the community, but there was 
not a proper ‘system of the millets’ still in the sixteenth century. At that 
time, the European consuls were considered to be the leaders of their colo-
nies, but they were neither independent nor had territorial or protection 
rights; only with time, when they were regarded as substitutes of the am-
bassadors, did they start to enjoy diplomatic immunity. This explains how 
after the outbreak of the hostilities the bailo could often be imprisoned: he 
was an ambiguous character who combined the competencies of a consul 
with some functions typical of an ambassador. Finally, in the most ancient 
times, a foreign trade community in the Ottoman Empire, even though it 
was protected by capitulations, was often considered to be responsible in 
solidum of crimes of debts of one of its members.18
It was in the eighteenth century that the representatives of the com-
munities became proper milletbaşıs, i.e. high state dignitaries bestowed 
with the honour of two horsetails; they had a very specific role within the 
Ottoman administration and a civil and military authority; moreover, they 
were free from external interferences in the religious field and possessed 
fiscal and judiciary competencies. The mid-nineteenth century reforms 
tried to establish a centralised state on the basis of the European model, 
reducing the millets’ authority and the dictatorial powers of patriarchs, 
rabbis and high officials by means of new constitutions and boards of 
governors; also those who did not join Islam were considered to be just 
like Muslims in front of the law. At that time, western powers supported 
the spreading of the nationalism among the millets to be able to proceed 
17 Kütükoğlu, Osmanlı belgelerinin dili, 149-152; Panaite, Ethnicity, 201-212.
18 İnalcık, The Ottoman State, 190-192. As to the Venetian consuls in the Ottoman Empire, 
cf. Faroqhi, The Venetian Presence, 368-384.
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to the dismemberment of the Empire with the aid of the various peoples 
who lived there.
It was mainly in the chronicles that the old word ‘frenk’ continued to be 
used to mean all the Europeans. It was sometimes employed as a patro-
nymic by converts, mainly if they had become powerful or came from aris-
tocratic families. Alvise Gritti, son of Andrea the doge, even though he was 
still a Christian, struck up important friendships with the highest officials 
and was known as ‘Beyoğlu’, i.e. ‘son of the lord’. This patronymic, then, 
was used to mean one of Istanbul’s neighbourhoods. ‘Bey’, as a matter of 
fact, was the title used to indicate Venetian nobles, but not only the doge as 
someone argues. Another example of this use is in Selānikī Mustafa efendi 
who, among other things, tells the adventures of ‘Mehmed Frenkbeyoğlu’, 
i.e. ‘son of the Frank lord’, who was cebecibaşi first and then leader of 
the troops of the ulufeciyânı yesârs when they killed the kira Esperanza 
Malchi; he was a scion of another important Venetian family and, before 
the conversion, he was known as Marc’Antonio Querini.19
As time went by, however, the perception of the differences among the 
European states was clearer and clearer in the Ottoman world where 
people started to coin also puns formed by a national adjective followed 
by an abusive epithet and based on the use of alliteration too. There are 
ingiliz dinsiz (English without religion), fransız cansız (soulless French), 
engürüs menhûs (ill-fated Hungarian), rus ma’kûs (wicked Russian), alman 
biaman (ruthless German), and so on and so forth.20
19 Selânikî Mustafa Efendi, Tarik-i Selânikî, 738, 854.
20 Lewis, Europa barbara e infedele, 172.
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7 In Search of an Identity
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7.1 Ambassadors, Envoys and Diplomats
Besides those who fought along the border or had settled in a border area, 
there were also those who, pushed by various reasons, left a country for 
another: it was not easy to go in a foreign state at that time, but this did 
not keep militaries, ambassadors, scholars, physicians, spies and runaways 
from doing it.
First of all, the beginning of international relations required the ex-
change of messengers, envoys and ambassadors. Until a short time ago, 
scholars agreed that in the Middle Ages and the Modern Era the Muslim-
Christian diplomatic exchange happened only in a single direction, i.e. 
from West to East, but recently it has been shown that this statement 
is not true and that, although less frequently, not only eastern Muslim 
sovereigns but also North-African rulers sent their envoys to European 
capitals. For example, the first Ottoman envoy reached Venice in 1384 and 
many others followed him, almost one every year throughout the sixteenth 
century. Others came from Tunis, Mamluk Egypt, Persia, the khanate of 
Crimea and finally, in the eighteenth century, also from Tripoli of the West. 
In the hall of the Quattro Porte in the Ducal Palace of Venice, a big paint-
ing bears witness to the arrival of the Safavid envoys at the beginning of 
the seventeenth century, whereas carpets and other gifts they brought 
are still kept, some in Saint Mark’s Treasury and some in the Correr and 
Mocenigo Museums.1
An ambassador was usually followed by a large group of people who 
helped him to perform his mission and make it more sumptuous, in order 
to display also the importance of the sovereign they represented. There 
were secretaries, interpreters, servants, sometimes also cartographers or 
physicians; these were often joined by men of letters or scientists willing to 
discover new countries and by young men who would be ambassadors or 
1 Arazzi, 62, 60-70, 72-74.
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chancellors themselves one day and who took advantage of the opportunity 
to learn the job. As for Venice, the retinue of an Ottoman envoy was made 
up of twenty people in the sixteenth century but then decreased after the 
war of Cyprus when a retinue of ten people could count itself to be large. 
In other circumstances, however, these groups were stately, formed by 
hundreds of people, including a band to impress even more. For example, 
Kara Mehmed pasha went to Vienna in 1665 with a retinue of one hundred 
and fifty people.2
Such a train could not secretly cross the border and it was not required 
to do so either. Diplomats, on the contrary, enjoyed special protection and 
those who gave offense to them were accused of lese-majesty towards the 
sovereign who had sent them. Sometimes this was considered as a deliber-
ate declaration of war, as it happened when in 1461 Vlad IV of Walacchia 
ordered to drive three nails into the turbans – and the heads – of the Ot-
toman sultan’s envoys to kill them.3
The protection of an ambassador and his retinue was made by means 
of letters issued both by the ruler who sent him and by those who wel-
comed him. In the second half of the fifteenth century, the Ottoman sultan 
wrote some official letters, which are still kept in Venice, to accredit ei-
ther a diplomatic envoy or even a real ambassador. Already at that time, 
to make reference to this diplomats, these documents used the word elçi 
if they were written in Ottoman and apokrysarion if they were written in 
Greek.4 Also Venetian ambassadors and bailos had letters of the doge who 
accredited them as his representatives. A letter of this kind usually bore 
the name of the envoy, his role and, more generically, the reason of his 
mission. If the letter and the person did not match, it was readily found 
out, since there were swindlers who turned up as envoys just to have their 
expenses paid and then vanished with the money or the gifts given by the 
host government.
Upon his departure, the envoy carried one or more credentials issued 
by his sovereign or by other important officials – for example, by the grand 
vizier or another member of the divan if he came from the Ottoman Empire. 
Before leaving Istanbul, the Ottoman envoys sent to Venice customarily 
paid a visit to the bailo who gave them another letter that certified their 
role.5 Besides these letters, however, a diplomat usually bore also other 
2 Pedani, In nome del Gran Signore, 54-55; Lewis, Europa barbara e infedele, 103.
3 Babinger, Maometto, 218.
4 Pedani, In nome del Gran Signore, 8-9.
5 This habit was then extended to the other diplomatic venues in the Ottoman Empire and 
was made valid for all the subjects who went abroad; it was abolished and substituted by 
the passport only after the foundation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Vekālet-i Hariciye) 
in 1836; cf. Zakia, The Reforms of Sultan Mahmud II, 424.
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letters addressed to the commanders of the places he had to cross to reach 
his destination. If the credentials made reference only to the diplomat, the 
latter (a sort of safe-conduct of passport) had to protect his retinue too.
al-Qalqašandī’s chancellery manual, written in the Mamluk period, 
contains examples of this kind of safe-conduct. It describes a decree of 
Turkish origin little used in Egypt, called barliġ (plural barāliġ), belong-
ing to the category of the public correspondence (mukātabāt ‘āmma), i.e. 
letters sent contemporarily to various addresses, and explains its use by 
means of an example: in 729 (1328-1329), upon his arrival in Egypt, the 
Ilkhanid envoy Timur Buġā showed a document to the sultan Muḥammad 
b. Qalāwūn and received a similar one in order to have free right of way 
in the countries he would cross on his way back. al-Qalqašandī explains 
that, when a foreign ambassador reached the Mamluk borders, the gov-
ernor of that region had to write immediately to the sultan to inform him 
of his arrival.6
In case of two neighbouring countries, the journey was usually quite 
simple. The sultan’s documents ordering sanjakbegs, qadis, dizdars of 
fortresses and other officials of the places between Venice and Istanbul 
to protect a Venetian ambassador and his retinue are several: if the route 
was the maritime one, then the document was addressed only to those who 
lived on the coast; on the contrary, if the envoy followed the Via Egnatia, 
or another parallel itinerary across the Balkans, the order was addressed 
to the authorities along the route that joined the two capitals.7
In case of an exchange between ambassadors of countries that did not 
border each other or were not separated by the sea, other letters, which 
could offer a further official protection to the envoy, had to be addressed 
to the rulers of the countries the diplomat had to cross. The latter could 
offer a further official protection to the envoy. Several name-i hümayuns 
and letters of viziers that certified diplomatic contacts with France and 
other countries are kept in Venice. For example, already in 1483 İskender, 
on his way to Paris, passed through Venice; the same route was followed by 
Kasım and Martino (1487), Mahmud bey (1570), the çeşnegir Hasan ağa 
(1581), the müteferrika and dragoman Ali (1581),8 Hasan ağa (1583), the 
müteferrika Mustafa ağa (1597) and, finally, a dragoman and a janissary 
in 1652. The subaşi Hüseyin and another anonymous envoy, instead, were 
accredited to the emperor in 1483 and in 1497 respectively; the kapıcıbaşı 
6 al-Qalqašandī, Ṣubḥ, vol. 4, 58-59; vol. 7, 229-231.
7 Cf. for example Documenti turchi, nos. 417 (1539), 475 (1542); ASVe, Bailo, b. 250, reg. 
332, c. 93 (1614 for the bailo Nani, the çavuş Huseyin and the dragoman Gianesino Salvago); 
reg. 334, c. 49 (1622 December-1632 January for the ambassador Simone Contarini); b. 251, 
reg. 335, c. 32 (1625 for Simone Contarini).
8 With the sultan’s and Siyavuş’ letters to the doge, cf. Documenti turchi, nos. 893, 896.
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Mustafa ağa, passing through Venice in 1490, went to Rome, while Mustafa 
dei Cordovani9 was heading towards Florence in 1574.
Obviously, an ambassador had better avoid the countries that were at 
war with his sovereign, even at the cost of undertaking long tours. The 
envoy who, heading towards Paris, was in Venice right when the sultan 
opened hostilities with the Republic for the island of Cyprus (1570) dis-
covered it to his cost. If the official bearer of the declaration of war, the 
çavuş Kubad, could immediately go back to his homeland protected by the 
diplomatic immunity, this did not happen to Mahmud who had not been 
accredited to the doge but only had a request for transit: confined to his 
house in the Giudecca and then moved to the castle of San Felice in Verona, 
he stayed there for three years before he could set foot in his homeland 
again.10 If this was the only case of an Ottoman ambassador imprisoned 
in time of war, the Venetian bailos accredited to the Porte often had to 
suffer the same fate, mostly in older times; on this point we should go into 
what Ottomans really thought of the diplomatic role of such a character; 
accustomed to ambassadors who went in a foreign country only to set-
tle one single affair, now they were facing a resident diplomat who was 
responsible for his fellow countrymen’s trades, collected custom duties 
and had a jurisdiction over the subjects of his sovereign. According to the 
Ottoman point of view, he looked like the chief of a millet or the Ragusean 
ambassadors who, charged with bringing the tribute of their city, were 
detained almost as hostages until the next tribute arrived.
The diplomatic representative brought official letters also in his home-
ward journey. He carried with him the other sovereign’s permission to 
go back and, as a matter of fact, he could not leave the country without 
that document.11 In the eighteenth century, together with the imperial let-
ter addressed to the bailo or the Venetian ambassador who were leaving 
Istanbul, another letter by the grand vizier was handed over. Then, the 
envoy who came back home was often accompanied by some militaries 
or interpreters of the other country at least as far as the border or some 
important towns from which he could continue his journey safe. In 1633, 
for example, Mehmed ağa was sent as far as Venice by the pasha of Buda 
9 ‘Dei Cordovani’ probably indicated a profession previously practised by the envoy. NB 
in Venice the ‘cordovani’ were skins tanned after the fashion of Córdoba.
10 Pedani, In nome del Gran Signore, 163-164.
11 Many examples of Ottoman documents issued by Venetian ambassadors may be con-
sulted in Documenti turchi, nos. 6, 27, 44, 1863, 1867, 1869, 1881-1883, 1887, 1889, 1895, 
1897, 1899-1900, 1901, 1903, 1905, 1908, 1924, 1926, 1939, 1941, 1946, 1948, 1954, 1956, 
1961, 1964, 1968, 1970, 1972, 1974, 1980, 1982, 1984, 1986. In the eighteenth century, the 
credentials issued by the sultan were always accompanied by a similar letter issued in the 
name of the grand vizier.
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to accompany the ambassador of the king of Sweden to the Porte.12 It was 
mainly during this century that the military escorts increased, namely 
when the deterioration of the international situation, together with a minor 
control exerted by Ottomans in their provinces, made the journey more 
dangerous.
Not only ambassadors and eminent characters of the state élite were 
charged with missions abroad, but also less known people. Among these 
abounded interpreters, who could move at their ease in a foreign coun-
try speaking its language like natives. Among the Ottoman envoys who 
reached Venice between the end of the fifteenth century and the war of 
Cyprus were all those who held the position of divan-i hümayun tercü-
manı (dragoman of the imperial divan) and, more specifically, Ali bey bin 
Abdullah, Yunus bey bin Abderrahman, İbrahim bey (Joachim Strasz) and 
Mahmud. With regard to the Venetian interpreters, instead, they were 
sent mainly during periods of high international tension and, as a matter 
of fact, they were often allowed to wear Turkish clothes, white turbans 
and weapons by the sultan’s safe-conduct.13 The interpreters, however, 
carried out an important function also in their motherland, because they 
were the official intermediaries between the foreigners and their fellow 
citizens.
7.2 Merchants
When the systems of personal identification were not yet very sophisti-
cated, being part of a group meant to travel safer and easily find shelter. 
In past ages, as a matter of fact, the entire group was considered to be 
responsible for its members’ actions and was obliged to retaliate, if un-
fortunate events occurred and other protective measures had not been 
established by means of international agreements. Many documents tes-
tify how, throughout the Middle Ages, European merchants travelling in 
Muslim countries were summoned all together, as if they were in solidum, 
because of problems caused by one of them. As we saw, Ottomans them-
selves created the ‘system of millets’ and, thus, took the idea of community 
to its extreme meaning: they believed that every millet was not a foreign 
community but a group different as for religion or origin, but still har-
moniously included in the Empire. Their starting point was Islam, which 
theorises the existence of infidels, called ḏimmīs, living in peace under a 
Muslim ruler and only subject to particular obligations.
12 Documenti turchi, nos. 1436, 1439.
13 Cf. for example ASVe, Bailo, b. 250, reg. 331, c. 12 (1595 to the sanjakbegs and qadis 
of the Porte in Klis and vice versa, for Gianesino Salvago).
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Many international agreements between Muslim and Christian countries 
were used to protect merchants and merchandises, mostly if they did not 
share common borders: in this case, as a matter of fact, to occupy the 
other’s land with an army was very unlikely. For instance, the rulers of 
Egypt – from Ayyubids to Mamluks – chose the general safe-conduct (amān 
‘āmm) to offer protection to the foreign merchants. In that case, a Venetian 
who went to Alexandria to trade did not need any other document since 
his own community vouched for him and his honesty. Living in the same 
fonduk, using the same hammam, the same church and the same bakery 
made all Venetians a close-knit group, under their consul. This happened 
also to Genoeses, Pisans and Catalans.
The influence of the Egyptian amān ‘āmms was so strong that, when 
Selim I conquered Egypt, took over the point of view of the sovereigns 
he had defeated with regard to his authority over foreign communities. 
Even though he could not change, if not occasionally, the structure of the 
Ottoman ahdnames already used for some European countries, he tried 
to turn them into something different. His successors, from the end of the 
sixteenth century onwards, went on the same path and granted no more 
bilateral international agreements to France, England and Holland, but 
only berats (in this case, a kind of ‘trade licences’).
If European merchants were protected by the capitulations (both 
ahdnames and berats), and mostly by their own community, Ottoman mer-
chants in Christian land had a different experience. First of all, they were 
people belonging to different ethnic groups, speaking several languages 
and believing in different religions, even though they were all subjects of 
the sultan. This meant that an Ottoman community abroad could not be 
close-knit but was necessarily tormented by quarrels and misunderstand-
ings. Moreover, they usually stopped only for the time needed for the trade; 
it was inconceivable for a Muslim to move definitively or create a family 
in a Christian country unless he abandoned his religion; on the contrary, 
thanks to the concept of ḏimmā, the infidels could legally go to live in a 
Muslim empire without having to embrace Islam.
The first Ottoman merchants arrived in Venice in the fifteenth century. 
At the beginning, the sources about their presence in the city are scanty, 
but the two following centuries number many examples. We know the 
areas they went to and where they lived for the most part. We hear of 
letters of attorneys, agreements, sales and, most of all, quarrels; there 
are also the death certificates of those who died in Venice from 1631 
until the end of the eighteenth century. The institution of the Fondaco 
dei Turchi in 1621 did not definitely solve the problem of their dwelling 
because some continued to gravitate around the parishes of San Martino 
and San Pietro of Castello, which especially attended by foreigners such 
as Greeks or Dalmatians. They were mostly people coming from Bosnia 
and Albany, but some of them came from Anatolia too, mainly from Bursa, 
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as Cemal Kafadar argues when he finds out the expansion of an Otto-
man trade activity in Venice between the end of the sixteenth and the 
seventeenth century.14
Just like the sultan’s ambassadors, the merchants used to travel over-
land as far as a town of the Adriatic coast and then crossed the sea on a 
Venetian or Ottoman ship. They could spend the compulsory quarantine 
either in a town of the Stato da Mar, or in the lazaretto of Venice. The quar-
antine was used to prevent epidemic diseases from entering the country. 
Venetians were not interested in their honesty as traders or their solvency 
but in the public health: as a matter of fact, they were not asked to present 
any document that certified their identity but only their health.15
The Ottoman merchants were protected not only by a reciprocal treat-
ment granted by the capitulations, but also by the Venetian laws. They 
did not have a consul who helped them in Venice, as happened in other 
towns of the Stato da Mar: in some places, they used to chose a Venetian 
subject to hold this office; in the most ancient times, the ‘consul for the 
Ottoman subjects’ was officially acknowledged only by the Venetian state, 
which tried to turn him into one of its officials, but around mid-eighteenth 
century he was acknowledged by the sultan himself by means of a berat 
of appointment.16
Some Ottoman subjects arrived in Venice protected by imperial docu-
ments that accredited them, not as ambassadors, but as merchants. Some-
times they were on proper official missions, aimed not at the establishment 
of international relations but at the purchase of luxury goods for the court, 
often on the occasion of special holidays; these envoys are sometimes 
called ‘court merchants’ in the documents and they were received and 
hosted as the diplomats. In any case, the Porte considered the market 
of Rialto, as well as the bailo’s house in Istanbul, to be the place where 
they could stock with any object, such as silk or velvet cloths, glasses, 
telescopes and Arabic manuscripts as well.17
Also eminent characters of the Ottoman government sometimes sent 
their men to Venice to purchase; in that case, as a rule, they were accom-
panied by a letter of introduction in which their name and the reason for 
their voyage were specified: for example, in 1560 the beylerbeyi of Egypt, 
Ali pasha, wrote a letter for two Jews, whose name was Ḫayyīm for both; 
so did the sanjakbeg of Klis, Mehmed, for his kâhya Süleyman in 1561; 
and the nazır of the sanjak of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mehmed, in the 
14 Lucchetta, Turchi morti a Venezia, 133-146; Kafadar, A Death in Venice, 198.
15 Moracchiello, Lazzaretti, 819-836; D’Alberton Vitale, Tra sanità e commercio, 253-288.
16 ASVe, Mercanzia, 2nd s., b. 44, fasc. 102, 3rd part, c. 51.
17 Cf. for example Turan, Venedik, doc. 4; Documenti turchi, nos. 991-992; Fabris, Artisanat 
et culture, 51-60.
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name of the sanjakbeg Mustafa bey Malkovich (the second vizier’s cousin), 
for his man Mustafa çelebi in 1563. Also Christian merchants sometimes 
could dress up as Turks in dangerous places; an evidence is an order for 
the qadis of Aydın and Saruhan and of Smyrna issued in Emanuele Negro-
ponte’s favour in 1608.18
Among the merchants mostly Jews managed to obtain name-i hümayuns 
in their favour addressed to the doge. In 1585 a similar document was 
granted to Giacobbe Castiel who, however, confident in a slender acquaint-
ance with the Ottoman language, showed it about ten years later, as if it 
was a recommendation for his definitive settlement in the city. He was soon 
discovered by the state interpreters and had to make amends for what he 
had falsely stated. Another example of a sultan’s safe-conduct issued in fa-
vour of a woman, Grazia, and her son dates back to 1569 and is addressed 
not to the doge but to the qadis on the road from Venice to Istanbul. More 
often, however, these Jews were not merchants but people on the run from 
Spain and Portugal, where the situation was more and more critical, and 
who had relatives or friends in Istanbul who could deliver arzs to the sultan 
and pay the attendant taxes to obtain the protection documents. This was 
the case of Ezibona and her daughters, related to Giovanni Miches’ widow, 
who passed through Venice in 1580, and of Alvaro Mendez: in 1584 Murad 
III wrote a letter in his favour stating that the had been officially called in 
Istanbul and asking to accompany him from Venice to Ragusa.19
The Ottoman subjects in Venice, therefore, did not constitute a close-
knit community; they did not live always in the same buildings and did not 
have an official representative but, all the same, their commercial opposite 
party obviously knew their identity and, above all, their solvency. This was 
certified not by the members of a community but by the Venetian brokers 
(sanseri). These were officials, acknowledged by the state, and not scratch 
people who acted breaking all the rules. The first information about the 
sanseri de turchi (brokers dealing with Turks), as those who were special-
ised in that kind of customers were called at that time, dates back to 15 
December 1534; in front of unauthorised people who behaved incorrectly 
meddling in the Ottoman subjects’ business, «sì mercanti come oratori et 
altri de la dita nation che vengono in questa città» (merchants as well as 
18 ASVe, LST, f. II, c. 66, 82, 131; cf. also c. 64 (in 1554 Ali himself writes in favour of the 
Jewish merchant Samuele Cohen’s commercial traveller); Bailo, b. 250, reg. 331, c. 145.
19 ASVe, LST, f. I, c. 76, cf. also cc. 78, 80, 81, 83, 85, 87 (1585, letters written by various 
Ottoman authorities to various Christian and Muslim addresses in Mosé Sarfati’s favour to 
protect his journey as far as Istanbul); Documenti turchi, nos. 931, 1064-1065, 1067. Wittek, 
A Letter of Murad III, 381-383 (transcription and translation of the 1580 document, published 
in an antiquarian catalogue of Istanbul; this originally was the c. 42 of the f. VIII of the series 
LST, kept in the ASVe; only the cover and some of the first pages are kept today; the rest 
has been evidently removed and sold in the antiquarian market more than fifty years ago).
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diplomatic envoys and others of the above-mentioned nation who come to 
this city), it was established that sale contracts could be entered into only 
in the presence of Girolamo Civran, interpreter of Turkish and Greek and 
notary of the Ducal Palace’s chancellery.20
Michele Membré took the place of Girolamo Civran, who died in 1550.21 
Within a few years, as a proof of the increase of the Ottoman presence in 
Venice that Kafadar had already imagined, the title of official broker deal-
ing only with Ottoman merchants started to be entrusted to people who 
knew the language and who, in any case, had to pay a tax to Membré even 
though they did not employ him as interpreter. The first was probably a 
Venetian in 1561: Michele Summa di Santo, who had been enslaved, sold 
and resold and had embraced Islam. He went back to Venice and his former 
faith after nine years and a half and here he used what he had learnt dur-
ing his slavery to survive. Others followed the same path, such as in the 
same year Simone the Armenian who had lived in Venice for twenty-eight 
years and then, in 1571, Filippo Emmanuel from Cyprus, already slave in 
Istanbul, who was made broker because he was Membré’s nephew, even 
though he had not already lived in Venice for ten years, as it was estab-
lished by the law.22
In Membré’s times, thus, there were some sanseri ordinari (ordinary 
brokers) who, even though they did not know the Turkish language and 
had to avail themselves of an official interpreter, had specialised, although 
non-exclusively, in negotiations with Ottoman merchants. Besides them, 
there were those who, thanks to their linguistic skills and the events of 
their life, could exert the sansaria, but only for the Ottoman subjects. We 
may infer that to attest that a foreign merchant was reliable and trust-
worthy and a business transaction with him was not risky was the task 
of the official interpreter of the Republic, such as Civran or Membré, or 
of those who had obtained the right to exert «solo con turchi» (only with 
Turks). In a time when the document of personal identification did not ex-
ist, besides ready money and bills of exchange, only the following things 
were of value in order to trade without running any risk: acquaintances, 
friendships or the presence of countrymen and finally even rumours that 
in certain milieus got around from mouth to mouth.
20 ASVe, CN, reg. 22, cc. 153v-154. On the importance of interpreters in the economic 
transactions in the Ottoman Empire, cf. Çiçek, Interpreters, 1-15.
21 ASVe, CN, reg. 27, c. 86v; on this interpreter cf. Membré, Relazione di Persia, xi-lxx; 
Mission, vii-xxviii.
22 ASVe, CN, reg. 33, cc. 39, 62v; reg. 39, c. 17v; reg. 40, c. 166v; cf. also ff. 39 and 48. 
As for other brokers, cf. Vercellin, Mercanti turchi a Venezia, 243-276; Dal Borgo, Neo-
convertiti, 163-165.
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7.3 Slaves on the Run
Besides those who had made the frontier their house, there were also 
those who stayed there only for the time necessary to cross it. They were 
often people who had decided to leave their motherland and their faith 
or those who, on the contrary, wanted to go back to their house after a 
period of detention or slavery in a foreign land. Most European-Ottoman 
agreements state that the prisoners of war had to be given back after 
its end but they were very often detained as slaves by those who did not 
intend to lose a free labour. The situation was different along the Persian 
front: as a matter of fact, other Muslims, however Shiites, could not be 
enslaved by Ottomans. Some masters of prisoners of war even stated 
that they were only purchased and sold slaves or even other slaves’ sons. 
The Venetian-Ottoman capitulations always established the reciprocal ex-
change of prisoners. This meant that in the Republic, during peacetime 
and at least officially, there could not be subjects of the Ottoman Empire 
reduced to slavery; moreover, the Republic ordered its officials to release 
and give back to the sultan also the Muslim prisoners that had been found 
on Christian privateers’ or pirates’ ships; likewise, the Porte had to give 
back Venetians taken prisoner during the war, even though it often refused 
to set free those who had been reduced to slavery in other circumstances.23
During the wars, instead, such as the Cretean or the Morean ones, the 
Venetian navy needed very huge crews – up to 150 rowers could stay in 
a trireme, besides soldiers, officials and sailors – and its galleys were 
equipped also with Muslim rowers. The slaves’ condition was very bad; as 
a matter of fact, they frequently died and other had to take their place. In 
peacetime, instead, Muslim rowers on the galleys or Muslim slaves in the 
palaces were secretly employed; the captains of public and private galleys 
kept them hidden and did their best to avoid controls, or recorded these 
people among the dead onboard; thus, they had men doing an exhausting 
job cheap, in a period in which free rowers (the so-called buonavoglia) 
were decreasing in number.24
Both during and after the cessation of the hostilities, prisoners and 
slaves fled, if they could go back to their homeland. They were wretches, 
often moneyless and easy prey to impostors and frauds who, promising to 
ferry them across a river or to accompany them in dangerous areas, stole 
everything they had. The painful account of Osman ağa of Temesvar’s25 
wanderings presents a clear image of how dangerous those journeys were, 
23 Zug Tucci, Venezia e i prigionieri, 51; Faroqhi, Subjects of the Sultan, 90; Bono, Schiavi 
musulmani, 450-460.
24 Lo Basso, Schiavi, forzati e buonevoglie, 204.
25 Documenti turchi, no. 198; Osmân Agha de Temechvar, Prisonnier des infedèles, 145-201.
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of how they could end in despair, and of how mean men could be towards 
their likes. The thirst for profit overrode any moral or religious consid-
eration and only those who had a lot of money and as much slyness could 
hope to survive and succeed in their object. Venetians were not better 
than Turks on this point: Osman ağa met them twice during his journeys 
between the Balkans and Vienna and twice they were slave traders who 
bought men to supply the Most Serene Republic’s galleys with rowers. 
This happened at the end of the seventeenth century when slavery was 
little talked about but still existed, also in Italy, as Salvatore Bono’s recent 
book on Muslim slaves shows.
The quickest escape route from south Italy included the passage by 
sea to the Maghreb. In the Mediterranean there were some islands, such 
as Giannutri and even more so Lampedusa, that could give shelter to 
the runaways. For the latter, there was also a tacit agreement between 
Christians and Muslims to leave provisions and money in a cave, where 
there were both an altar dedicated to the Virgin Mary and the türbe of a 
marabout, for those who needed them. According to legend, a hermit who 
lived on the island lighted a candle every night to point out the track and 
introduced himself as a Muslim to Muslims and as a Christian to Christians, 
so much so that still today in Sicily «il romito di Lampedusa» (the hermit 
of Lampedusa) means a person with a double faith.26 Another escape route 
for a Muslim slave could be the territory of the Republic of Venice, which 
was the only Italian state that directly bordered the Ottoman Empire; 
moreover, the peace agreements with the Porte made Venetians respect 
and, if necessary, help the Muslim runaways of any status.
If we know little of Muslim slaves and if the accounts of their misadven-
tures (such as Osman ağa’s) are rare, we have more information about 
Christians in flight, thanks to both the archives of the Inquisition, always 
ready to check those who might have abjured the faith,27 and the accounts 
left by some of them, which soon became a widespread and highly regarded 
literary genre with topoi such as capture, slavery and regained freedom. One 
of the most famous examples is an episode of the Don Quixote whose author, 
Miguel de Cervantes, really was in Algiers as a slave of that stronghold’s 
commander, the Venetian renegade Venedikli Hasan pasha. A model of this 
kind of literature is Andres Laguna’s pseudo-biography, which is a summa 
of many other accounts on the subject and tells the story of a Spanish young 
man captured in 1552 off the island of Ponza and forced to row; after having 
pretended to be a physician, he managed to ran away passing along Mount 
Athos, the islands of the Greek archipelago and reaching Sicily.28
26 Scaraffia, Rinnegati, 15-18; Bono, Schiavi musulmani, 463, 468.
27 Bennassar, Bennassar, I cristiani di Allah; Scaraffia, Rinnegati.
28 Fabris, Hasan, 51-66; Laguna, Avventure.
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In the western jurisprudence the escape of a slave was considered to be 
a theft, even if of oneself. On the contrary, Ottoman subjects very often ac-
cused their Christian former slaves, who had already reached Venice’s lands, 
of having stolen their goods or money so to convene them before a court on 
the basis of the peace agreements. These complaints often caused endless 
cases between border authorities and sometimes they involved also the cen-
tral authority. A firman of 1533, for example, addressed by the sultan to the 
sanjakbeg and the qadis of Morea, established that some Turkish subjects 
wrongly charged their Venetian former slaves, freed from a Barbary galliot 
by the capitano generale da mar.29
Slaves on the run usually did not have documents that could protect 
them during their journey. Sometimes, however, someone tried to offer 
them an official protection. This was the case of the Venetian representa-
tives in Constantinople, but the attempt did not always go through. In 
1574, for instance, the bailo Antonio Tiepolo let some of them run away 
on a Venetian ship, but they were arrested by Ottoman officials who found 
out they had letters with the bailo’s seal. Freed slaves, instead, received 
official documents by the imperial chancellery addressed to the Ottoman 
authorities certifying that they were going back to their homeland.30
Also women, however fewer than men since they had less occasions 
to be captured, were slaves of Christian or Ottoman holders and, if they 
could, they too tried to run away. In his dangerous but successful return 
home, Osman ağa brought also his friend Mehmed, two Muslim women and 
a three or four-year-old little girl. A document of 1559 speaks of a mother 
and her two daughters who had been captured in Hungary, had fled from 
Klis and were looking for shelter in the Venetian town of Trogir. That same 
year, Franceschina Zorzi Michiel – the Venetian mother of Gazanfer, the 
man who would become the most famous chief of the white eunuchs of the 
Topkapı at the end of the sixteenth century – was captured together with 
her four children on a ship that was crossing the Adriatic; she could not 
save her two sons, who were brought to the imperial palace in Istanbul, 
but only the two girls with whom she managed to go back to Venice after 
many wanderings.31
29 Documenti turchi, no. 291.
30 ASVe, LST, f. III, c. 40; Bailo, b. 251, reg. 334, c. 6 (1621, for seven freed Venetians 
already captured by Abaza Mahmud).
31 Osmân Agha de Temechvar, Prisonnier des infedèles, 143-144, 193; Pedani, Veneziani a 
Costantinopoli, 67-84; Safiye’s Household, 9-32. Documenti turchi, no. 749.
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7.4 Other Means of Identification
When we read biographies of people who went on a long journey from 
East to West or vice versa, we are struck by the fact that the foreign was 
looked at with distrust by the people of the countries he crossed and, 
even more so, by the inhabitants of the border areas. A traveller was not 
obliged to have a document written by a high authority and addressed to 
the officials of the countries along the way, even though it could certainly 
smooth out some difficulties. Those issued by the Porte usually specified 
only the name and the role of the person who bore them and sometimes 
his (or her) generic itinerary or other information such as, for example, 
if he was travelling in secret and if he was armed; instead, there were no 
physical descriptions that let identify the person for certain. As a rule, such 
documents were issued for those who travelled on behalf of one or the 
other state but, as we saw, sometimes also for private citizens who went 
in a foreign land to trade, for religious reasons or to reach their relatives 
or anything.32
Among those who provided a public service, there were also couriers 
and postmen, meaning with the first term those who were paid by the state 
and with the second one those who undertook that activity under private 
companies’ orders or ordinary citizens. The postal service, considered to 
be a sovereign prerogative, was already widespread in the Muslim Egypt 
since 659/1260-1261, when the sultan Baybars organised it. In the most 
magnificent period of the Mamluk Empire, when state borders were almost 
impassable by those who were not authorised, the postal service officers 
were several and they had documents certifying their role. In his descrip-
tion of the mukātābats, al-Qalqašandi includes in that category the pass-
ports āwrāq al-ǧawāz or āwrāq al-ṭarīq (singular waraqah) employed by 
the couriers to have the right of way and to certify their identity.33 Besides 
paper, however, there were also other marks that allowed the officer to be 
easily recognisable from afar. They were identification marks made of sil-
very or golden leather, coin-like but as big as the palm of the hand, tied to 
the neck with a cord or a yellow silk foulard and kept under one’s clothes, 
even though a big and very visible bow hung at the back. This mark was 
useful also to immediately swap horses at the post houses. Once gone back 
to Cairo, the couriers had to give back to the chancellery (dīwān al-inšā’) 
32 ASVe, LST, f. IV, c. 106 (1591, the kapıağası Gazanfer for his mother who, travelling 
from Venice, had to join him in Istanbul), f. V, c. 131 (1593, Abdi alaybeyi sent to Venice 
by the beylerbeyi of Bosnia for the interpreter Luca Stagner); Bailo, b. 259, reg. 361, cc. 
126-127 (1747, for Antonio Becich who goes to Walachia); Documenti turchi, no. 401 (1537, 
issued for Giovanni Soranzo, relative of the Venetian ambassador who goes to Jerusalem 
from Istanbul).
33 al-Qalqašandi, Ṣubḥ, vol. 7, 231-233.
124 7 In Search of an Identity
Pedani The Ottoman-Venetian Border (15th-18th Centuries)
the leather mark that, being coined by the state mints, was conceptually 
linked to the sovereign right to mint money.34
The Ottoman post derived from the post that existed in the ancient 
Muslim and Mongolian states. Since Mehmed II’s times, there were 
state messengers (ulaks or tatars) whose task was to keep the contact 
between the Porte and the provincial authorities; the service, however, 
was employed also to gather information on the frontier areas. For their 
correspondence, the private citizens used either occasional carriers 
(emanetçis) or people paid to do it (sais). It was mainly a horse post; 
therefore, menzilhanes (post houses) and hans were used for the change 
of mounts, while escorts of janissaries ensured the safety.35 As we saw, 
the name of some Ottoman units of measurement was conceptually linked 
to the postal service. When the ulaks were used to send official letters 
abroad, accreditation letters were written also for them specifying their 
role and the reason for their mission, according to the practice for dip-
lomatic envoys.
For centuries, Venetian post to and from Istanbul used only couriers 
and messengers who went on foot; also in this case, there was a service 
provided by the state together with other webs of transmissions run by 
and for private citizens. People who engaged in that activity usually were 
either Slavonians or Ottoman subjects of Montenegro. On this point, an 
episode of 1590 that caused the bailo’s vehement complaints can be re-
minded; the  bailo’s arz to the sultan brought about a name-i hümayun for 
the sanjakbeg of Shkodër obliging the qadis of his zone to overrule the 
order he had given to the men of Montenegro not to serve the Most Serene 
Republic. We know that, already around 1524-25, an imperial document 
was issued to offer protection to those who practised that profession, but 
in periods of international tension, when carrying letters to Venetians 
meant risking their life, the envoys had to move in secret and did not have 
letters certifying their profession, neither from the Venetian authorities 
nor from the Ottoman ones.36
Also other countries used their own postal services. For example, since 
1514, Poland and the Ottoman Empire ensured reciprocity of treatment to 
‘ambassadors, merchants and messengers’; in this clause, taken up again 
in the following ahdnames, some Italian translations of the same period 
included couriers too; as for France, in 1542 the sultan asked the doge 
to let right of way to the official messengers to and from that country.37
34 al-Qalqašandi, Ṣubḥ, vol. 14, 366-372; Sauvaget, La poste, 20, 44-49.
35 Stein, Ottoman Ambassador, 219-312.
36 ASVe, Bailo, b. 250, reg. 330, cc. 18a-b; De Zanche, I vettori, 19-43; Tra Costantinopoli 
e Venezia, 33-71; Fedele, Un enigma di storia postale, 5-17.
37 Cf. Kolodziejczyk, Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations, 217; Documenti turchi, no. 486.
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Sometimes the imperial documents certifying people’s role were also 
export licences for forbidden goods. They concern mostly horses, usually 
given as a gift to some ambassadors who returned home. It should be 
observed that also the passports for ships stated that they could enter 
the Ottoman harbours only if they had not shipped forbidden goods such 
as arms or horses.38
In the Mamluk Empire, the authorities could issue also a kind of safe-
conduct to protect those who had not obeyed some orders and thus feared 
to be punished. In any case, theoretically, from an Islamic point of view, 
the ‘safe-conducts for Muslims’ (amānāt li-ahl al-Islām) were not needed 
since Muslims could travel safe within the dār al-Islām. More specifically, 
they were a kind of certification of amnesty, such as the dafn: its name 
meant ‘to hide something’, namely the sins, and it was a document al-
ready neglected at the beginning of the fifteenth century. In the Mamluk 
reign there were also the tarhānīyāts, i.e. letters of freedom, given at the 
moment of the retirement with or without the pay, mostly to state offic-
ers, the so-called ‘men of sword’, such as the emirs, but sometimes also 
to some ‘men of pen’. These letters allowed to settle or travel everywhere 
they wanted within the state borders.39
To end a discussion on the ancient means of identification we must cite 
a very effective one, however more macabre and drastic. It could be used 
only to make sure that somebody condemned in absentia, or a state en-
emy, had really been eliminated. This happened a few times in Venice too. 
Some bounty hunters, after having killed, sent to the Consiglio dei Dieci 
the head severed from the bust so that they could collect what they had 
been promised.40 This practice was certainly more common in the Ottoman 
Empire: in the outer walls of the Topkapı, there are still some niches where 
the executed criminals’ heads were placed and such macabre trophies 
were often sent in great numbers as a generous gift to the sultan by com-
manders and militaries.41 Thus, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, 
a Persian ruler’s head – maybe of the famous Alâüddevvle according to 
some Venetian sources but not according to the Ottoman ones – was sent 
to the doge as a gift by the sultan.42
38 ASVe, Bailo, b. 251, reg. 335, c. 32 (1625, for Simone Contarini, with a horse of great 
value given by the sultan); b. 252, reg. 343, c. 37 (1593).
39 al-Qalqašandi, Ṣubḥ, vol. 13, 48-53, 352-355.
40 Fabris, Il dottor Girolamo Fasaneo, 105-118.
41 See, for example, ASVe, LST, f. IV, cc. 79-80 (undated, around 1583, Hasan ağa, it tells 
of an Ottoman attack near Zadar and of the sending to Istanbul of the heads of twelve 
killed people).
42 Sanuto, I diarii, vol. 22, col. 460, 462, 465; İdrîs-i Bidlîsî, Silim şah-nâme, 250.
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At that time, it was rather difficult to effectively depict the appearance 
of a person in a piece of writing, except from the description of some dis-
tinguishing marks; to make sure about a man’s identity it would have been 
necessary to have a portrait at least. The sultan Bayezid, for example, used 
this device despite his disapproval of images: he sent two pictures to the 
duke of Mantua, the first of which represented prince Cem and the other 
an envoy of the Mamluk sovereign who protected him; but in this case, 
the sultan was probably organising their murder in Italy.43
7.5 The Health Front
In 1348 a plague epidemic, i.e. a disease doomed to periodically reappear 
for more than three centuries, spread in all Europe. In 1377, Ragusa, 
which had just become independent from Venice, was the first city to 
create a sort of quarantine. Within a few years, it was imitated by many 
other countries. In 1423 also the Comune Veneciarum started to system-
atically prohibit the contacts with the areas at risk. The Venetian hospital 
for plague victims was turned into a quarantine station for the foreigners 
coming from infected countries and was used with this function until 1471 
when another complex was built. The quarantine was compulsory both for 
merchants and merchandises, to the extent that already at the beginning 
of the sixteenth century people said that the Lazzaretto Nuovo served also 
as dogana da mar (sea customs) and, sometimes, as dogana da terra (land 
customs); it was right there that the first contacts between merchants, 
interpreters and brokers were established. The lazaretto, therefore, was 
also a meeting place where merchants, however unwillingly, stroke up a 
friendship, knew each other and got to know also some Venetians.44
The officials of the Stato da Mar had also the task to promptly inform the 
central government of any possible centre of infection so that they could 
immediately break off the ordinary contacts with those places, whereas 
special permits, the fedi di santità, were used by land and sea to check 
the place of origin of travellers and loads: countersigned at the various 
checkpoints, those documents had to be propounded upon their arrival 
in Venice.45 In that case, therefore, the state was not interested in the in-
dividuals themselves or their role or profession, but wanted to know only 
the place they came from and if they were infection vehicles.
The lazaretto was used also in some Muslim countries, at least in the 
eighteenth century. There are proofs that by then there was a lazaretto in 
43 Pedani, In nome del Gran Signore, 111.
44 Preto, Le grandi paure, 177-192.
45 Palmer, L’azione della Repubblica, 103-110.
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Tunis for the goods and people coming from the ships in which the disease 
had manifested itself. Other North-African countries were not as quick in 
taking the necessary precautionary steps for the infectious diseases. Some 
Moroccan harbours could use the very strict quarantines imposed in the 
Spanish harbours and, if the infection spread, officials did not allow ships 
coming from areas at risk without the Spanish fede di santità. When the 
danger diminished, however, they used to leave people and goods in the 
open air for some days, according to an ancient custom of their country. At 
that time, in general, in the Ottoman provinces mainly the foreign consuls 
tried to persuade indifferent pashas to take into consideration the health 
front but, already at the beginning of the following century, the Ottoman 
governors themselves started to worry about the spreading of the infec-
tion. They usually acted in this way prompted by the circumstances and 
soon abandoned the restrictive measures right after the first results and 
not when the plague had been eradicated; moreover, the various local 
administrations did not act jointly and, therefore, the measures were effec-
tive only to a limited extent. The methods to fight the epidemic, however, 
were those used in Europe and, when some brisk governors were imitated 
by their neighbours, the plague started to slowly shrink back also in the 
Empire, even though it did not completely disappear.46
Venice, the Oriental gateway of Europe, was more exposed to the con-
tagion coming from East than other states. The border line that divided 
its territory and the Muslim one from Kotor onwards little by little turned 
into a cordon sanitaire that separated two areas where the virulence and 
the contagion of the epidemic had different values. Leaving the Chris-
tian territory behind often was experienced as an entrance in hell, not 
for religious reasons but for sanitary ones: people left behind a country 
where science and experience had found out tools useful to reduce, if not 
eradicate, the propagation of the miasma, and entered the reign of death. 
The observance of the cordons sanitaires became stricter and stricter: 
people could show preference neither for the noble nor for the rich; all 
men, animals and also goods were considered to be a possible carrier of 
infectious diseases. Also the mail could convey the plague and, therefore, 
letters were often smoked so that the fire could purify them, or ‘perfumed’ 
with olive oil and juniper berries, or else carried in tarred boxes, believ-
ing that these stratagems avoided its spreading. Although rather late, the 
Venetian rigour as for health was imitated by other countries bordering 
the Ottoman Empire and, thus, easily exposed to contagion. In 1770 the 
Austrian state used an existing structure to this end, the Militärgrenze, 
i.e. the strip of land that was from 15 to 20 kilometres wide and more than 
46 Ciammaichella, Il ‘Giornale istorico’, 21-23; Speziale, Oltre la peste, 207-212, 252-256; 
Arribas Palau, Los hermanos Chiappe, 813-869; Panzac, La peste, 452-454.
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one thousand kilometres long, from the Adriatic to the limits of Bukovina 
and Moldavia. It reminded the Roman limes and had been created after 
the Treaty of Karlowitz. In that area, the military border and the sanitary 
one overlapped and jointly acted, whereas the fear of the military invasion 
yielded to the dread of epidemics.47
47 De Zanche, Tra Costantinopoli e Venezia, 104-109; Selmi, Il Magistrato di Sanità, 28-38; 
Panzac, Politique sanitaire, 87-108.
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Conclusion
A topic such as the passage from the frontier to the border may be faced 
from many points of view: it may be oriented towards the past and the 
ancient world; it may involve the land, the sea and even the sky; it may 
unfold in thorough tales of histoire événementielle; it may confine itself 
to micro-history; finally, it may be considered within a wider discussion 
of economic or social relations or flow into geo-politics and current af-
fairs, into the wars being fought today and the peace that is so difficult 
to be reached. It is a complex subject that may be dealt with only from a 
limited point of view in a single book to avoid the risk of losing oneself in 
too general discussions. The aim of these pages is to consider some basic 
elements regarding the relations developed between the Muslim and the 
Christian worlds from the end of the Middle Ages through the Modern Age.
There is already a huge body of works dealing with the Andalusian 
frontier and the continuous withdrawing, in the Iberian peninsula, of the 
limits placed to separate the Moorish and the Christian reigns. The same 
cannot be said of the frontiers between Muslim countries and Europe in the 
Modern Age. The Ottoman historiography of the last century was strongly 
influenced by the idea of frontier, but only with reference to the early his-
tory of an empire that, at its maximum expansion, dominated almost all the 
Islamic world. To consider Osman’s and his first successors’ advance as a 
ǧihād or to find other reasons for it meant to side with a specific school of 
thought. Luckily the positions have softened and today it is possible to pick 
the positive elements from each of them without forgetting the pragmatism 
that always characterised the Ottoman behaviour. There are few pieces 
of writing about this Empire’s frontier in the Modern Age and its follow-
ing transformation into a border. Almost twenty-five years ago, Andrew 
C. Hess wrote a book on the contacts between the sultan’s subjects and 
the king of Spain’s ones in North Africa. Some essays by Rifa‘at Ali Abou 
El-Haj about what happened at the time of the Treaty of Karlowitz date 
back to almost thirty years ago. Only the proceedings of a few more recent 
conferences show the development of a certain interest in this subject. 
In this field, however, books and papers often repeat preconceived ideas 
that it is still difficult to get rid of. The constant study of documents is the 
only way to provide solid bases for new hypotheses.
This volume starts from the terms used both in Europe and in the Arabic-
Turkish world to label the concepts of frontier, border and other related 
elements, trying to define the precise shades of meaning that distinguished 
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them. Exactly understanding the different points of view is, as a matter of 
fact, the necessary starting point for every further discussion. The histo-
riographical point of view of frontier is considered broadly exploring the 
debate that arouse in the twentieth century. The next step was taking into 
consideration the peace agreements between Muslim and European coun-
tries. It is notable how the closeness or distance between the two sides 
influenced the type of agreement they entered into: if the two countries 
shared a common land border, the document chosen by the Muslim side 
was usually a truce (hudna); on the contrary, if this was not the case, they 
fell back on a safe-conduct (amān).
The people and the societies that once existed along the land and sea 
frontier between Christianity and Islam provided further material for re-
search. The relations between the Republic of Venice and the Ottoman 
Empire give clear and numerous examples of the contacts established in 
such areas throughout the centuries. A study of piracy and privateering 
in the Adriatic demonstrates close ties, which have remained unknown up 
until now, between the Maghrebi people and Albanian Ottoman subjects.
After having studied the frontier, the passage to the border was consid-
ered. Few books have dealt with this topic until now; the establishment of 
a border line, usually decided on the basis of bilateral agreements, rep-
resents the realisation of the peace and the material acknowledgment of 
the other country’s right to exist as an independent entity. In the relations 
between Christianity and Islam the existence of a shared border marked 
the passage beyond a pure war logic and the acceptance of the peaceful 
coexistence of different entities; hence, the importance of clarity in the 
agreements concerning a border line. A thorough analysis of the docu-
ments regarding the relations between the Republic and the Empire let 
us overcome the theory according to which Ottomans had accepted the 
idea of a western border only after the Treaty of Karlowitz. Border agree-
ments already existed in the second half of the fifteenth century, when the 
sultans’ empire had already come into direct contact with countries that 
had a consistent military strength. Throughout the centuries, the practice 
used for such agreements changed: in the most ancient times, the sultan 
issued a document with an final ratification that could even modify what 
had been decided far from the capital. In the sixteenth century, instead, 
the local agreements decided by bilateral committees formed by diplomats 
and technicians were considered to be sufficient, whereas the sultan’s 
decree concluding the works was regarded only as a relic of the past. 
What changed with the Treaty of Karlowitz were not Ottoman ideas on the 
possibility of a border with Christian countries but the extension of the 
border itself, which bounded also the area close to the Habsburg Empire.
The research on the practice used to establish a border raises questions 
about the types of society developed on one side or the other. If there were 
violence and misunderstandings, there were also attempts to reach an 
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agreement made, although in a spatially limited field, by people of differ-
ent religions and countries. The division of the land was of special interest 
since the separation of fiscal and property interests did not always match 
the limits imposed by the states.
Also the sea was a frontier for many centuries. It is impossible to place 
boundary stones or markers on a liquid element to distinguish what be-
longs to a state or to the other. Yet, common conventions were chosen to 
place limits there. The European manner of viewing maritime possessions 
had its origin in the Roman law and did not coincide with Islamic thought. 
Europeans considered the sea as a common freely accessible good, while 
Ottomans held a different view that was more similar to that of land. In 
some cases, they considered it as the prince’s property that could be de-
fined by more conventional devices.
It was the latter point of view that was generally welcomed by the 
modern states, maybe unaware of a likely and far-off Muslim origin. A 
limit, thus, could be conventionally established also on the water: the first 
reference was the distance from the coast indicated by the range of a can-
non shot; then, even wider spaces were split. Already in the first half of 
the eighteenth century, the Ottoman rulers faced the new developments 
in a practical manner once again by establishing, however unilaterally, a 
maritime border using a short distance from the coast first and then an 
imaginary line through the open sea.
Studying the Ottoman geo-politic point of view allows to notice the 
economic importance of the route that linked Istanbul and Alexandria. In 
ancient times, before the conquest of the Mamluk sultanate by Selim I, it 
was considered to be an international route, but then it became a route 
within the Empire. At the beginning, the sultans tried to defend first of 
all their own ships from the thread posted by pirates and privateers: as a 
matter of fact, the sultans attempted to conquer the entire Mediterranean 
basin by capturing mostly wide and weakly fortified areas and leaving the 
strongholds and the better fortified zones for a later wave of conquests. 
The failed siege of Malta revolutionised the sultans’ geo-political point of 
view, pushing them to defend the Istanbul-Alexandria route and, thus, to 
destroy the dens of pirates that still existed in some islands of the eastern 
Mediterranean. The wars fought to conquer Cyprus and then Crete, which 
were the last shreds of the Venetian empire in the eastern seas, fall under 
the same reasoning.
A border is not only the mark dug into the ground. A border can be 
something else, such as what separates two ways of living and thinking; 
hence, the importance of the elements that allow to identify those who 
are different as to culture, origin, religion and who cross others’ territory. 
Unlike the frontier, which is an area seen from a single standpoint and 
intended as a place where battles are fought and a force advances and 
the other withdraws, the border line is used to separate lands in a more 
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lasting and peaceful way. In general, it is not an impassable limit. Many 
categories of people could cross it. The means of identification become 
very important: in the most ancient times, they were aimed mostly at 
detecting the belonging to a specific group but then, with the passing of 
the Modern Age, they were intent on identifying people in themselves, 
as single individuals, different from those who came from the same area, 
shared the same profession or professed the same religion.
In this slow process, the spread of epidemics, which experienced a re-
crudescence, pushed European countries to control more and more strictly 
the origin of people, animals and things that came from areas exposed to a 
greater risk of contagion, such as the Muslim lands in general and the Ot-
toman ones in particular. Because of health reasons, the opposite journey 
was often considered as a sort of descent to hell. With the first documents 
of personal identification, the discourse can count itself to be finished. The 
slow development in the relations between Christianity and Islam that had 
started in the Middle Ages led to long-lasting results.
Only the birth of new technical tools allows to establish new borders 
today. They are no longer tied to space, but rather involve the image one 
holds of himself and of others and, most of all, the way of living and con-
ceiving time.
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Sources
ASVe Archivio di Stato di Venezia
Arsenale Provveditori e patroni all’Arsenale
Bailo Bailo in Constantinopoli
CN Collegio, Notatorio
Comm. Commemoriali
Confini Provveditori alla camera dei confini
CXM Consiglio di Dieci, Misti
EP Collegio, Esposizioni principi
Grimani Archivio privato Grimani ai Servi
LST Lettere e scritture turchesche
Mercanzia Cinque savi alla mercanzia
PTM Provveditori da Terra e da Mar
SDC Senato, Deliberazioni Costantinopoli
SM Senato, Mar
BOA İstanbul, Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi
MD Mühimme Defteri
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The frontier is a zone that divides two states fighting 
against each other but, when the war finishes and peace 
arrives, the rulers of the two countries can agree to 
create a borderline to divide their lands. The aim of this 
book is to study the frontier and the border between 
the Republic of Venice and the Ottoman Empire from 
the 15th century, when Ottomans arrived in Greece 
and in the Balkans, to the 18th century, when the Most 
Serene Republic disappeared. It begins studying the 
words used to define these concepts and it proceeds 
with the idea of the frontier and the society of a frontier 
zone. Then, it describes how a borderline could be 
established between Venetian and Ottoman lands and 
how people lived in such a zone. The idea of the sea as 
both a frontier and a border zone is also investigated. It 
ends studying those who were accustomed to crossing 
the Ottoman-Venetian border and the marks used to 
recognise peoples and things belonging to each country. 
